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Board of  directors have been studied extensively in corporate governance literature. However, 
little literature investigates the corporate governance role played by academic independent 
directors (AIDs). In addition, some literature investigates the corporate governance role of  female 
directors. However, results are mixed. In this thesis, I attempt to explore these questions. All 
empirical chapters focus on Chinese listed companies.  
The first objective of  this dissertation is to investigate the corporate governance role of  academic 
independent directors (AIDs, hereafter). The second is to investigate the corporate governance 
role of  female (independent) directors. To achieve these objectives, this dissertation focuses on the 
following research questions. Firstly, it investigates the corporate governance role of  AIDs, 
particularly focusing on the relationship between AIDs and firm performance. Secondly, it 
investigates the market reaction to the resignation of  independent directors (i.e., IDs) and 
academic independent directors (i.e., AIDs). Thirdly, it investigates the corporate governance role 
of  female (independent) directors, particularly focusing on the relationship between female 
(independent) directors and firm performance. 
The sample include all listed companies in China, between 2004 to 2016. The first empirical 
chapter investigates the relationship between AIDs and firm performance by OLS regression and 
Difference-in-difference model. overall, this study finds no evidence about the influence of  AIDs 
on firm performance. AIDs have influence on firm performance only when AIDs hold senior 
academic position, such as PhD supervisor post. This study uses various methods to do data 
analysis and find the similar results. The second empirical chapter investigates the shareholder 
wealth effect of  directors’ departure, i.e., the market reaction to the announcement of  directors’ 
departure, particularly focusing on the AIDs’ departure. If  AIDs do add value to the firm, the 
market should respond negatively when AIDs leave their jobs as independent directors. The market 
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reaction to the resignation of  AIDs is positive. This result is opposite to the expectation if  AIDs 
are beneficial to the firm. This is because if  AIDs are beneficial to the firm, investors should view 
the departure of  the AIDs as bad news and the market should respond negatively to the resignation 
of  AIDs. However, this study finds the opposite results. The third empirical chapter investigates 
the relationship between female (independent) directors and firm performance. The OLS and fixed 
effect results indicate that there is relationship between female (independent) directors and firm 
performance. However, the system GMM results show that there is not association between female 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Background of  Listed Companies in China 
At first, I elaborate the background of listed companies in China. There are two stock exchanges 
in China. One is Shanghai stock exchange and the other is Shenzhen stock exchange. The Shanghai 
stock exchange was established in 1990 and the Shenzhen stock exchange was established in 1991. 
There is a significant increase in the number of companies listed in both Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange since they were established. In Table 1.1, it shows that there were 
8 companies listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1990. This number increased to 1,450 in year 
2018. There was only 6 companies listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991, while this figures 
increased to 2,134, making the total number of companies listed in both Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange more than 3,500 including all firms listed in Main Board, Small and 
Medium Board, and ChiNext Board.   
In addition, the market capitalization of Shanghai Stock Exchange is 26956 billion RMB in 2018 
and the market capitalization of Shenzhen Stock Exchange is 16542 billion RMB in 2018. The 
total market capitalization in China is 43,492 billion RMB (i.e., equivalent to 6,324 billion USD) in 
2018, which makes China as one of the largest stock markets around the world. It is larger than 
other countries except the United States, in which the total market capitalization was more than 
30,000 billion USD in 2018.   
Overall, the Chinese stock markets developed dramatically over the last three decades both in 





Table 1.1 Number of  listed companies and market capitalization in China’s stock market 
























1990 8 - 8 1.234 - - 
1991 8 6 14 2.943 - - 
1992 29 24 53 55.839 48.974 104.813 
1993 106 77 183 219.569 133.532 353.101 
1994 171 120 291 260.013 109.048 369.061 
1995 188 135 323 252.566 94.862 347.428 
1996 293 237 530 547.781 436.457 984.238 
1997 383 362 745 921.807 831.117 1752.924 
1998 438 413 851 1062.59 887.973 1950.564 
1999 484 463 947 1458.047 1189.070 2647.117 
2000 572 514 1086 2693.086 2116.008 4809.094 
2001 646 508 1154 2759.056 1593.163 4352.219 
2002 715 508 1223 2536.372 1296.540 3832.912 
2003 780 505 1285 2980.492 1265.279 4245.771 
2004 837 536 1373 2601.434 1104.122 3705.556 
2005 834 544 1388 2309.613 933.414 3243.028 
2006 842 579 1421 7161.238 1779.151 8940.389 
2007 860 670 1512 26983.887 5730.201 32714.09 
2008 864 740 1604 9725.191 2411.453 12136.64 
2009 870 830 1700 18465.523 5928.389 24393.91 
2010 





































































1.1.1 Independent Director in Chinese Listed Companies   
Before 2001, listed Chinese companies can decide at their sole discretion whether to hire external 
independent directors or not. In order to improve the governance structure of  listed companies 
and promote their compliant operation, China Securities Regulatory Commission issued the 
Guiding Opinions on Establishing an Independent Director System in Listed Companies on 
August 16th 2001 and started to require all listed companies to establish an independent director 
system inside themselves. The Opinions also required all listed companies to have at least 2 
independent directors on their board before June 30th, 2002 and no lower than 1/3 independent 
directors on their board before June 30th, 2003. 
One of  the main reasons why CSRC introduced the system of  independent director is to guard 
against the “hollowing-out” of  listed companies by the insiders (major shareholders) and protect 
the interests of  small and medium investors (Kangtao Y et al., 2007). In order to achieve this, the 
reform of  the independent director system also implemented a series of  institutional arrangements 
that are designed to address the “hollowing out” acts of  major shareholders. For example, the 
Guiding Opinions stipulated that listed companies should grant some special powers to the 
independent directors: “Major related-party transactions (proposed transactions between the listed 
company and the related party with a total value of  over RMB 3 million or higher than the 5% of  
the recent audited net asset value of  the listed company) must be approved by independent 
directors and submitted to the board of  directors for discussion”; “Independent directors shall 
issue independent opinions on major affairs of  the company, such as borrowing activities or other 
capital transactions with a total value of  over RMB 3 million or higher than 5% of  the recent 
audited net asset value of  the listed company, as well as whether the company has taken effective 
measures to recover the arrears”. 
In order to further enhance the independence of  independent directors and ensure their effective 
performance of  supervisory function, both Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
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Exchange have set compulsory regulations in the “Rules Governing the Listing of  Stocks” (2004 
Amendment), which require listed companies to make timely disclosures of  board decisions and 
announcements regarding major affairs of  the company, including information about the “the 
number of  votes for approval, objection and abstention on each board meeting proposal, as well 
as the reasons for the director’s objection or abstention”. In addition, “For issues that require the 
prior approval or independent opinions from the independent directors, relevant approval or 
opinions should also be disclosed and explained to the public.” According to the research by 
Kangtao Y et al. (2011), other countries do not require their listed companies to announce their 
board meetings votes to the public. China is the only country that imposes compulsory disclosure 
of  such information. Based on the votes and specific opinions issued by an independent director 
on board meeting proposals, we are able to identify the independence that independent director 
has managed to maintain from the management of  the company. 
Under the institutional background of  China, the motivation for the independent directors to 
perform their duties is to avoid reputational and legal risks (Qingquan T et al., 2006; Kangtao Y et 
al., 2011). From the perspective of  reputational risk, the independent director system of  listed 
Chinese companies is mainly comprised by prominent figures in education or business fields. 
These people are usually very successful in their own areas of  focus, which means that they also 
hold relativity high social status and good reputation in their respective industry. As an elite social 
group, they attach great importance to their personal reputation (Qingquan T et al., 2006). Under 
such circumstances, when major legal or operational problem emerge in the company where the 
independent director performs his/her duty, the social reputation of  the director himself/herself  
would also be severely undermined. Existing empirical studies have shown that reputational 
incentive is the main mechanism for the performance of  governance function by the independent 
directors in listed Chinese companies (Fan Z et al., 2008; Yan L et al., 2011). In terms of  the legal 
risks, according to Article 118 of  the Company Law of  the People’s Republic of  China (1999 
Amendment), “Directors shall bear the responsibilities for the resolutions adopted at the meeting 
20 
 
of  the board of  directors. If  the resolutions adopted at the board meeting have violated the law, 
administrative decrees, or the articles of  association and incurred serious losses to the company, 
the directors that participate in the resolution are liable to compensate the company. But if  a 
director can be proven expressly objecting to the resolutions and that the objection had been 
recorded in the minutes of  meetings, the director per se may be exempt from the responsibilities”. 
In addition, Article 212 stipulates that “If  a company is found to have provided false financial and 
accounting statements or concealed important facts in the reports to shareholders or the public, 
the responsible person(s) directly in charge and other persons directly responsible shall be imposed 
of  a fine of  RMB10,000 to RMB100,000. If  the case is serious enough to constitute a crime, 
criminal responsibility shall be affixed according to law”. These provisions also apply to 
independent directors.  
Table 3.2 shows the information about the board of directors of the listed companies on Main 
Board in China. Firstly, the total number of directors sitting on the board in listed companies in 
China was 12,234 in year 2003, while this number increased to 16,073 in year 2018. This is 
consistent with the increase of listed companies in China from year 2003 to year 2018. In addition, 
the total number of independent directors also increased from 3,982 in year 2003 to 5972 in year 
2018. Secondly, the average number of directors sitting on the board is quite stable during the 
sample period. The range is between 8.68 and 9.84. Thirdly, the average number of independent 
directors sitting on the board is also quite stable during the sample period. This range is between 
3.20 and 3.36. These figures indicate that on average there are more than three independent 
directors sitting on the board and slightly more than one third of directors sitting on the board are 
independent directors. This is consistent with the corporate governance requirement- “Guiding 
Opinions on Establishing an Independent Director System in Listed Companies" states that before 
June 30, 2002, the board of directors should include at least 2 independent directors, while after 




Table 1.1.1: The Average Number of  Independent Directors Sitting in Board 
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2005 1283 12265 4237 9.56 3.30 





















































































1.1.2 Academic Independent Director in Chinese Listed Companies   
Around the world, many companies have academic professors sitting on the board as non-
executive directors. For example, in US, approximately 40% of SP1,500 firms had at least one 
academic professor sitting on the board as non-executive directors during the period of 1998 to 
2011. More than 76% firms have at least one academic professor as non-executive director in 
China. 
 
Table 1.1.2: Additional Post of  Academic Director 
Number of  Additional Firms Number of  AD Percentage  
0 11114 41.86% 
1 5647 21.27% 
2 3964 14.93% 
3 3035 11.43% 
4 2172 8.18% 
5 472 1.78% 
6 127 0.48% 
7 19 0.07% 






1.1.3 Female Independent Director in Chinese Listed Companies   
There are female independent director serving on the board is an important indicator of board 
diversity. Many studies investigate the impact of female directors on firm performance. However, 
their findings are mixed. For example, Carter, Simkings, and Simpson (2003) and Campbell and 
Minguez-Vera (2008) find that the percentage of female directors has positive impact on firm 
performance. Levi, Li, Zhang (2014) find that female directors are beneficial in creating 
shareholder value through reducing bid premium. Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) find a positive 
association between female directors and firm performance. On the contrary, Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012), Bohren and Staubo (2014) document that imposing the quota of 40% female directors 
sitting on the board is detrimental to the firm value. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find a positive 
association between female directors and corporate governance, such as attending board meeting 
and playing monitoring role. However, they did not find evidence about the positive association 
between female directors and firm performance. Triana, Miller, and Trzebiatowski (2013) show 
that board gender diversity is a double-edged sword as it depends on the firm performance and 










The independent director system has long been considered as one of the core mechanisms that 
alleviate the agency problem between the shareholders and the management inside a company. 
Board of directors have been studied extensively in corporate governance literature. Some 
literature discusses the role of board composition. For example, Guner, Malmendier, and Tate 
(2008) present a research on the financial outside directors. Baker and Gompers (2003) study the venture 
capital investors as directors. In addition, some other studies also discuss the CEOs as outside 
directors of other companies. Fich (2005) finds that the market response to the adding CEOs of 
well-performing firms to the board is positive. Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) show that the company's 
performance is down when the interlocking directorates joined the company. Seary, and Tuna (2005) 
present that interlock directors receive abnormally high pay. Several other papers investigate the lobar 
representation on the board, such as Faleye et al (2006). Around the world, many companies have 
academic professors sitting on the board as non-executive directors. For example, in US, 
approximately 40% of SP1,500 firms had at least one academic professor sitting on the board as 
non-executive directors during the period of 1998 to 2011. More than 76% firms have at least one 
academic professor as non-executive director in China. The independent director system of listed 
Chinese companies is mainly comprised by prominent figures in education or business fields. 
However, little literature discusses board composition from the perspective of academic professors 
sitting on the board as independent directors. This is one focus of this dissertation.  
On the other hand, whether independent directors can play their intended roles effectively has 
been a controversial issue both in practice and academic research. For example, the existing 
literature only found weak evidence of a significant correlation between the proportion of 
independent directors in the board and the corporate performance (Bhagat and Black, 2001; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Changqing Li and Jianqing Lai, 2004; Yuetang Wang et al., 2006). 
One of the major reasons behind this is the fact that board structures often have endogenous 
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factors that are rooted in corporate-level features such as historical performance and shareholding 
structure of the company, which has made it difficult to examine the roles played by the 
independent directors from the empirical perspective in a reliable manner (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003; Harris and Raviv, 2008) ; Adams et al., 2010). This suggests that appointments or 
resignations of  AIDs cannot be regarded as exogenous to firms’ needs and the market reaction to 
such appointments or resignations is not informative to evaluate the value of  AIDs. To avoid this 
concern, I need to find a “true” exogeneous shock causing the appointments or resignation of  
AIDs. Since the issue of  Regulation 11, many university professors resigned their directorship 
from the listed companies they serve. Regulation 11 was not expected by the listed companies. 
Thus, resignations of  AIDs can be regarded as exogenous to firms’ needs and the market reaction 
to such resignations is informative on evaluating the value of  AIDs. This is one of  motivations. 
In addition, the literature on the corporate governance role of female directors is still inconclusive. 
For example, Carter, Simkings, and Simpson (2003) and Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) find 
that the percentage of female directors has positive impact on firm performance. Levi, Li, Zhang 
(2014) find that female directors are beneficial in creating shareholder value through reducing bid 
premium. Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) find a positive association between female directors and firm 
performance. On the contrary, Ahern and Dittmar (2012), Bohren and Staubo (2014) document 
that imposing the quota of 40% female directors sitting on the board is detrimental to the firm 
value. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find a positive association between female directors and 
corporate governance, such as attending board meeting and playing monitoring role. However, 
they did not find evidence about the positive association between female directors and firm 
performance. Triana, Miller, and Trzebiatowski (2013) show that board gender diversity is a 
double-edged sword as it depends on the firm performance and the power of female directors. 
Thus, another focus of this dissertation is about corporate board composition from the perspective 




The first aim of this dissertation is to investigate the corporate governance role of academic 
independent directors (AIDs, hereafter). The second aim of this dissertation is to investigate the 
corporate governance role of female (independent) directors.  
1.4 Research Questions 
To achieve the aim about the corporate governance role of AIDs, this dissertation focuses on the 
following research questions: 1) what is the relationship between the presence of AIDs and firm 
performance? 2) what is the relationship between the different number of AIDs sitting on the 
board and firm performance? 3) what is the relationship between characteristic of AIDs and firm 
performance? (include school affiliation, administrative position, academic position, various 
subject expertise) This is the focus of the first empirical chapter-Chapter 2.  
In addition, this dissertation also investigates the market reaction to the resignation of independent 
directors and AIDs as I want to investigate the value of independent directors and AIDs from the 
perspective of investors. This is the focus of the second empirical chapter-Chapter 3.  
To achieve the aim of corporate governance role of female (independent) directors, this 
dissertation focuses on the following research questions: 1) what is the relationship between the 
number and the percentage of female directors and firm performance? 2) what is the relationship 
between the number and the percentage female independent directors and firm performance? This 
is the focus of the third empirical chapter-Chapter 4. 
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1.5 Why China? 
Why I focus on China to investigate the above questions? There are several reasons. Regarding 
AIDs, AIDs are pervasive in China and therefore China is an idea setting to investigate the 
corporate governance role of AID. In my sample, 76% companies in China have at least one 
academic professor (researcher) sitting on the board as non-executive directors. 44% companies 
in China have at least two academic professors (researchers) sitting on the board as non-executive 
directors. Second, the studies investigating the relationship between AIDs and firm performance 
in China has not been explored, most existing studies focus on western countries such as US. 
Francis, Hasan and Wu (2015) study the relationship between AIDs and firm performance 
focusing on US. White et.al. (2014) explored the appointment of academic directors in US.   
Regarding female (independent) directors, many listed firms in China have female (independent) 
directors. Around 69% listed firms in China has at least one female director sitting on the board 
as directors and around 34% listed firms in Chin has at least one female independent director 
sitting on the board as independent directors. Similar to AIDs, many existing studies investigating 
the corporate governance role of female (independent) directors focus on developed countries, 
such as US, few studies focus on developing countries, such as China.  
Compared with researches based on developed market economies such as Britain and the US, 
efforts targeted at identifying the governing function of independent directors in listed Chinese 
companies would probably face severer endogenous problems. Unlike European and American 
companies with decentralized shareholding structure, the ownership structure of listed Chinese 
companies is characterized by the highly centralized shareholding system, which puts the company 
under the control of one or a few owners. In addition, the Chinese legal system has provided 
relatively weak protection for the investors. The major shareholders are able to make sizeable 
personal gains through their controlling right over the company. As a result, they have strong 
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incentives to infringe upon the interests of small and medium shareholders through capital 
appropriation, related-party transactions, inter-company loans, etc. (Zengquan Li et al., 2004; Jian 
and Wong, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010). For such companies, the core issue of corporate governance 
is to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders from the infringing act of major 
shareholders and the management under their control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 
2000; Berkman et al., 2010). Major shareholders often have strong controlling power over the 
decision-making of the company. They can determine the size and structure of the board of 
directors to a very large extent, including the number of independent directors to be appointed 
and their proportion in the board of directors. In order to undermine the check and supervision 
such independent directors would have against the “hollowing-out” of the company, major 
shareholders are incentivized to use their sway over the board of directors to influence the selection 
and hiring process of independent directors. The greater the supervisory effect of independent 
directors on the major shareholders, the weaker the willingness of major shareholders to bring in 
independent directors. As a result, based on what we’ve observed, the proportion of independent 
directors in such companies is in fact lower. Therefore, given that China has different institutional 
background, the findings found based on Western developed countries may not apply to China. 
Overall, these are the main reasons why I focus on China in this dissertation.    
 
1.6 Main Research Findings 
The main research findings of the first empirical chapter-Chapter 4 include 1) there is no evidence 
about the effect of the presence of AIDs sitting on the board on firm performance; 2) there is no 
evidence about the effect of the number of AIDs sitting on the board on firm performance; 3) 
there is no evidence about the effect of school affiliation of AIDs on firm performance; 4) there 
is no evidence about the effect of administrative position of AIDs on firm performance; 5) there 
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is some evidence about the effect of academic position of AIDs on firm performance. Particularly, 
firms with AIDs with senior academic position perform better than firms with AIDs without 
senior academic position; 6) there is no evidence about the effect of subject expertise of AIDs on 
firm performance. Overall, based on the sample used in this study, I find no evidence about the 
effect of AIDs on firm performance.  
The main research findings of the second empirical chapter-Chapter 5 include 1) the market 
responds positively to the announcement of the departure of independent directors (IDs). In 
particular, the abnormal return is 0.018% on the announcement date (e.g., T=0) of departure of 
independent directors and is also significant at 1% significance level. 2) the CARs about the 
departure of independent directors (IDs) over various windows are positive and significant at 1% 
significance level. For example, CAR at window [-1,1] is 0.025% and significant at 1% significance 
level. These results indicate that investors do not view independent directors are beneficial to the 
firm based on the sample I used in this study. 3) the market responds positively to the 
announcement of the departure of AIDs. In particular, the abnormal return is 0.004% on the 
announcement date (e.g., T=0) of departure of independent directors and is also significant at 10% 
significance level. 4) the CARs about the departure of academic independent directors (AIDs) over 
various windows are positive and significant at 1% significance level. For example, CAR at window 
[-1,1] is 0.008% and significant at 1% significance level. These results indicate that investors do 
not view AIDs beneficial to the firm based on the sample I used in this study.  
The main research findings of the third empirical chapter-Chapter 6 include 1) the OLS estimation 
results about the relationship between female directors (FDs) and firm performance show that 
there is no relationship between the existence of female directors and firm performance. However, 
there is a significant positive association between the number of female directors and firm 
performance and there is a significant positive association between the percentage of female 
directors and firm performance. 2) The OLS estimation results about the relationship between 
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female independent directors (FIDs) and firm performance show that there is a significant positive 
association between the existence of female independent directors, the number of female 
independent directors, and percentage of female independent directors and firm performance. 3) 
The fixed effect estimation results show that there is no association between the presence of female 
directors, the number of female directors, the percentage of female directors and firm performance. 
There is a significant positive association between female independent directors, the number of 
female independent directors, the percentage of female independent directors and firm 
performance. 4) the system GMM results show that there is no association between the presence 
of female (independent) directors, the number of female (independent) directors, the percentage 
of female (independent) directors and firm performance.   
These findings indicate that different model specifications lead to different results. Given that OLS 
estimation results do not consider the endogeneity issue, the results are relatively weak. The fixed 
effect estimation results assume that there is a time-constant omitted variable bias, which is a 
strong assumption. The system GMM results might be more reliable considering the dynamic 
characteristics of model, which means that the current firm performance is related to past firm 
performance.  
In addition, chapter 6 also investigates the market reaction to the resignation of female 
(independent) directors. It uses market model, Fama-French three factor, Fama-French five factor 
model to calculate the expected return and in turn calculate the abnormal return and cumulative 
abnormal return. Both results show that there is no significant market reaction to the resignation 




This dissertation contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, this study contributes 
to the existing literature about the corporate board composition. Previous literature about 
corporate board composition mainly focuses on directors coming from financial outside directors 
(e.g., Guner, Malmendier, and Tate, 2008), venture capital investors (e.g., Baker and Gompers, 
2003), CEOs of other companies (e.g., Fich, 2005), employees of the firm (e.g., Faleye et al, 2006) 
etc. Few studies focus on academic professor and female sitting on the board as independent 
directors. This paper supplements and advances the recent literature on the academic and female 
director from the perspective of the agency problem.  
Secondly, this study contributes to the existing literature in findings as the main findings of this 
study are not consistent with the main findings of existing studies. For example, previous empirical 
studies about the relationship between AIDs and firm performance find a positive association 
between AIDs on firm performance (e.g., Francis, Hasan and Wu, 2015; White et.al., 2014). They 
argue that AIDs are beneficial to the firm because of their reputation, expertise, social ties etc. 
However, this study finds that there is no association between AIDs on firm performance unless 
the AIDs hold senior academic position. The findings of no association between AIDs and firm 
performance indicates that the roles played by academic professors as independent directors are 
not what the existing literature claimed. These may due to the reason that academic professors are 
too busy to play monitoring role and advising role effectively, or they do not have relevant 
knowledge about business practice etc. Thirdly, this study contributes to the broad literature about 
the corporate governance of board structure as the main literature investigating the corporate 
governance role of board structure focuses on Western countries and few studies focus on Eastern 
countries, like China.  
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Thirdly, through the skillful use of exogenous policy impact brought by the reform of independent 
director system, this paper constructs a difference-in-differences estimation model with panel data 
to examine how independent director governance system impacts the firm performance, and thus 
effectively addresses the endogenous problem. Finally, the research in this paper can provide new 
perspectives and evidences for understanding and evaluating the policy effects of independent 
director system inside the listed Chinese companies. 
1.8 Structure of  this dissertation 
Chapter 1 is introduction of this thesis, include background of Chinese listed company, motivation, 
aims, research questions, why China, main research findings and contribution. Chapter 2 is the 
first empirical chapter- the relationship between AIDs and firm performance. Chapter 3 is the 
second empirical chapter- the market reaction to the resignation of AIDs and IDs. Chapter 4 is 
the third empirical chapter- the relationship between female (independent) directors and firm 
performance. Chapter 5 is the conclusion.   
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Chapter 2 ACADEMIC INDEPENDENT 




Around the world, many companies have academic professors sitting on the board as non-
executive directors. For example, in US, approximately 40% of SP1,500 firms had at least one 
academic professor sitting on the board as non-executive directors during the period of 1998 to 
2011. More than 76% firms have at least one academic professor as non-executive director in 
China. These factors raise several interesting and important questions. Are academic directors 
effective monitors and/or important advisors? How do academic directors affect firm 
performance? How do academic directors play corporate governance role? This chapter attempt 
to shed light on the effectiveness of the oversight and advice functions performed by academic 
directors, and their impact on firm performance. However, little literature pay attention to the 
relationship between academic directors and corporate governance and firm performance. These 
are the motivation of this study.  
On the one hand, AIDs might play an important corporate governance role. The reasons include 
1) they are more independent, because AIDs have more critical and independent thinking, and 
whit their own opinions because they are outside directors with high reputation. AIDs are less 
likely to be influenced by managements. (Jiang and Murphy, 2007); 2) they care more about their 
reputation. Academic professors care more about their reputations, whereby they can play 
monitoring role more effectively relative to firms without AIDs. This is particularly true in 
countries with Confucius culture background, like China, as people in these countries show 
profound/high/great respect to teachers(Huang et al, 2016); 3) they have relevant 
expertise(Francis, Hasan and Wu, 2015), Audretsch and Lehmann (2006) argue that directors with 
academic background may enhance firm’s competitive advantage through accessing to and the 
absorption of external knowledge spillover. Thus, AIDs can increase firm performance by bringing 
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valuable advice to the firm. Secondly, board diversity can increase firm performance (Carter, 
Simkins, and Simpson, 2003; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011; Gul, Srinidhi, and 
Ng, 2011); 4) they have more external resources and social ties(Westphal, 1999) Resource 
dependence theory argues that corporations are combinations of tangible and intangible assets. 
Board of directors can be seen as a strategic resource, which bring value to the firm (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). AIDs will provide resource and networks to firms, such knowledge transfer 
(Audretsch and Stephan,1996), social networks (e.g., Lynall et al., 2003), or loans (e.g., Guner et 
al., 2008); 5) they receive pecuniary compensation. The average annual salary of AIDs is more than 
80,000 RMB in 2017. (annual report), so they have incentive to play corporate governance role etc.  
On the other hand, AIDs might not play corporate governance role effectively. The reasons 
include that 1) they do not have enough time in playing monitoring role and advising role; 2) they 
do not have relevant expertise in that business industry or business practice; 3) they are invited by 
controlling shareholders to attend the board as independent directors and they do not have 
incentive to play monitoring role etc. 
 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether AIDs sitting on the board as non-executive directors 
play corporate governance as they claimed. To achieve this aim, I focus on the following research 
questions: 1) what is the relationship between the presence of AIDs and firm performance? 2) 
what is the relationship between the number of AIDs sitting on the board and firm performance? 
3) what is the relationship between school affiliation of AIDs and firm performance? 4) what is 
the relationship between AIDs with administrative position and firm performance? 5) what is the 
relationship between academic position of AIDs and firm performance? 6) what is the relationship 
between AIDs with various subject expertise and firm performance?   
To address these research questions, I focus on listed companies in China. First, AIDs are 
pervasive in China. In my sample, 76% companies in China have at least one academic professor 
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(researcher) sitting on the board as non-executive directors. 44% companies in China have at least 
two academic professors (researchers) sitting on the board as non-executive directors. Second, the 
studies investigating the relationship between AIDs and firm performance in China has not been 
explored, most existing studies focus on western countries such as US. Francis, Hasan and Wu 
(2015) study the relationship between AIDs and firm performance focusing on US. White et.al. 
(2014) explored the appointment of academic directors in US.   
We find the following results. Firstly, I find no evidence about the effect of the presence of AIDs 
sitting on the board on firm performance. Secondly, find no evidence about the effect of the 
number of AIDs sitting on the board on firm performance. Thirdly, I find no evidence about the 
effect of school affiliation of AIDs on firm performance. Fourthly, I find no evidence about the 
effect of administrative position of AIDs on firm performance. Fifthly, I find some evidence about 
the effect of academic position of AIDs on firm performance. Particularly, firms with AIDs with 
senior academic position perform better than firms with AIDs without senior academic position. 
Lastly, I find no evidence about the effect of subject expertise of AIDs on firm performance. 
Overall, based on the sample used in this study, I find no evidence about the effect of AIDs on 
firm performance.  
This paper utilizes several approaches to address the endogeneity problem. I employ Fixed Effect 
to address endogeneity issue coming from time-constant omitted variable, i.e., individual firm 
effect. I also use difference-in-difference approach to address endogeneity issue coming from 
omitted variable. Both fixed effect results and difference-in-difference approaches provide the 
similar results.   
We contribute to the literature in the following aspects. Firstly, given the fact that much of the 
research in board composition is Western-based, this study helps extend existing research to a rich 
and complex context beyond that of developed counties and contribute to the international 
literature about the board composition in developing countries (i.e., emerging markets). Secondly, 
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most existing studies investigating the board composition focus on outside banker directors (e.g., 
Booth and Deli, 1996, Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005, Güner et al., 2008, Kroszner and Strahan, 2001), 
outside politically-connected outside directors (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001, Goldman et al., 
2009), outside CEO directors (e.g., Fich, 2005, Conyon and Read, 2006), labour representation 
(e.g., Faleye et al., 2006), and venture capitalists (e.g., Baker and Gompers, 2003). This study will 
investigate board composition by focusing on academic professors. This will fill the gap in the 
existing literature. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present a brief literature review. 
Section 3 presents hypothesis development. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. Section 
5 shows empirical results. Endogeneity check is showed in Section 6. Robustness check is 




2.2 Literature Review  
2.2.1 Literature Review of Academic Directors 
 
 
There are several studies investigating the corporate governance role of academic directors. Francis, 
Hasan, and Wu (FM2015) investigate the relationship between AIDs and firm performance. They 
focus on US firms and find evidence that firms with AIDs perform better than firms without. In 
addition, firms with AIDs are associated with greater acquisition performance, a higher number of 
patents and citations, higher stock price informativeness, lower discretionary accruals, lower CEO 
compensation, higher CEO forced turnover-performance sensitivity. All these results indicate that 
AIDs add value to the firm they serve.  
White, Woidtke, Black, and Schweitzer (JCF2014) investigate the market reaction to the 
appointment of AIDs. They find that AIDs tend to be appointed by small and mid-cap firms. 
AIDs in science, medicine, and engineering appear to be appointed for their expertise and the 
market reacts favorably. AIDs with administrative role appear to be appointed for their networks, 
and the market reacts favorably when this administrative role is affiliated with a business school; 
but negatively when this administrative role is not within close geographic proximity. In addition, 
AIDs with business professor title appear to be appointed for general expertise and reputation and 
no significant market reaction to the appointment of business professor as AIDs.  
Chen, Garel, Touani-Rad (JCF2019) examine the value of AIDs through investigating the market 
reaction to the resignation of AIDs. They focus on China and they find that there is a negative 
market reaction to the AIDs resignations. The results indicate a positive value effect of AIDs to 
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the firm.  
Huang, Lee, Lyu, and Zhu (IRFA2016) investigate whether accounting academics on the board 
affect firm’s financial reporting quality. They find that greater value relevance of reported earnings 
when accounting academics serve as financial experts in the board, especially in firms where their 
influence is expected to be more pronounced. 
Cho, Jung, Kwak, Lee, and Yoo (JBE2017) investigate the relationship between AIDs and CSR. 
They find that firms with AIDs have higher CSR performance ratings than those without. In 
addition, the influence of AIDs on CSR rating depends on their academic background. In 
particular, the positive association between AIDs and CSR rating is significant only when their 
academic background is science, engineering, or medicine. However, the positive association 
weakens when AIDs hold an administrative position at their universities. 
Overall, the findings of these studies indicate that AIDs play a positive corporate governance role 
to the firm and they are valuable to the firm they serve as well.  
However, little literature discusses academic independent director focus on Chinese listed 
companies. Under the institutional background of China, the motivation for the independent 
directors to perform their duties is to avoid reputational and legal risks (Qingquan T et al., 2006; 
Kangtao Y et al., 2011). From the perspective of reputational risk, the independent director system 
of listed Chinese companies is mainly comprised by prominent figures in education or business 
fields. These people are usually very successful in their own areas of focus, which means that they 
also hold relativity high social status and good reputation in their respective industry. More than 
76% firms have at least one academic professor as non-executive director in China. 
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On the other hand, little literature effectively to reduce the endogeneity problems. Compared with 
researches based on developed market economies such as Britain and the US, efforts targeted at 
identifying the governing function of independent directors in listed Chinese companies would 
probably face severer endogenous problems. Unlike European and American companies with 
decentralized shareholding structure, the ownership structure of listed Chinese companies is 
characterized by the highly centralized shareholding system, which puts the company under the 
control of one or a few owners. In addition, the Chinese legal system has provided relatively weak 
protection for the investors. The major shareholders are able to make sizeable personal gains 
through their controlling right over the company. As a result, they have strong incentives to 
infringe upon the interests of small and medium shareholders through capital appropriation, 
related-party transactions, inter-company loans, etc. (Zengquan L et al., 2004; Jian and Wong, 2010; 
Jiang et al., 2010). Therefore, there are the gaps I found. This chapter research the relationship 
between academic independent director and firm performance focus on China, and effectively to 
reduce the endogeneity problems.    
 
 
2.2.2 Literature Review of Board Composition  
 
There are substantial academic articles research the board composition on different sides of this 




Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that although larger boards have better monitoring capacities, this 
benefit are outweighed by costs such as less effective decision-making, less-candid discussions of 
CEO performance. Jensen (1993) point out that 'great emphasis on politeness and courtesy at the 
expense of truth and frankness in boardrooms' and ' when board get beyond seven or eight people, 
they are less likely to function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control'. Overall, these 
views indicate that larger boards are less effective due to communication problem among board 
of directors, while smaller boards are more effective in monitoring CEOs and more productive, 
thereby have better firm performance and valuation. 
Board Independence 
In corporate governance, the principal-agent problem is an important issue. Because there are 
different purposes between agents and clients. Appointed managers (agents) pay more attention 
to personal interests and developments, thus affecting the interests of shareholders (clients). In the 
principal-agent problem, independent directors are considered the most effective managers, can 
minimize the opportunism of managers. Independent directors are the primary role for avoiding 
the management of misappropriation, in the scattered ownership of the companies at United States 
and the United States. In concentrated ownership system at continental Europe, when the larger 
shareholder acquires a private interest by appointing other board members, the role of independent 
directors is to inhibit this behaviour. A widely accepted concept in academia is that, the board of 
supervisors depends on the effectiveness of the independent directors. (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; 
Adams et al., 2008; Bhagat and Black, 2002; Dyck and Zingales, 2004; Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2003). There are also some laws and regulations stated that, for example, the Commission of the 
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European Communities Recommendation, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance of 
2004, the final corporate governance rules of the New York Stock Exchange of 2009, as well as all 
relevant existing systems of corporate governance. In fact, the European Commission 
Recommendation of 2005 pointed out independent directors are effective in diversified ownership 
of firms. The main role is to make managers responsible for the interests of shareholders, as well 
as controlling large shareholder of the company must consider the interests of small shareholders.  
Board Composition 
With the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, there is a clear provision for board 
composition. It stipulates that most directors of the company must be independent directors. 
Moreover, the three most influential committees on the board, the audit, corporate governance 
committees and compensation must be independent. Linck et al. (2009) investigate the 
requirements of independence and they find that the number of outside directors increases 
significantly in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act period.  
Although there is no clear definition of board gender issues, but the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of gender 
diversity on the Board of Directors had an impact. Dalton and Dalton (2010) investigation the 
number of female directors who serve on the board and they find that there is a rising trend over 
the past 20 years. The promulgation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act further accelerates this trend. 
Female directors on the Fortune 500 boards rose by 30%, women held leadership positions on the 
board up by 200% after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
Overall, enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has a significant impact on board composition. 
Linck et al. (2009) and Valenti (2007) find that both the number of external directors and the 
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number of female directors in most companies increase after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act.  
Determinates of Board Structure 
The biggest issue of controversy for the modern corporate governance system is influence of the 
structure of the board of directors on the behavior of enterprises. State law regulates corporate 
governance, and widely respect for legal business transactions authorized by law, according to the 
business to determine the rules (Cox and Hazen, 2003, p. 185). Prior to SOX, Security Laws place 
no provisions on board structure. In addition, court did not provide any guide for the board 
structure, because it is difficult (Karmel, 1984). Fisch (1997) investigate legal flexibility and find 
that allowing companies to adjust the structure of the board to the most important functions is 
effective. Therefore, determinants of board structure are important to corporate governance. 
 
2.2.3 Review Relevant Theories about Academic Directors 
    
Agency Theory 
Due to the separation between ownership and control, (i.e., a firm is owned by shareholders while 
it is controlled by managers), there is a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. 
For example, inside managers are accustomed to investing the rest of the company's earnings in 
suboptimal marginal investments; managers have incentive to increase the size of firm to do empire 
building although this has no interest to shareholders; managers might have excessive wages and 
consumption etc. (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grosssman and Hart, 1988; Jensen, 1986). This is 
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referred as the principal-agent problem. In this case, the shareholders are the principal while the 
managers are the agent.  
Monitoring and resolving agency problems are generated because the conflict of interest between 
firm internal and external shareholders is the basic responsibility of corporate governance (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
In countries where company ownership is more dispersed, it is the appointed manager who 
exercises decisions on behalf of the shareholders, such as United Kingdom, United Status, and 
Canada. However, managers may be more concerned about their own interests, abuse company 
resources and time to seek benefits for themselves, rather than creating maximum shareholder 
value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
In most countries of the world, ownership of corporate is concentrated. Controlling shareholder 
is the principal owner, who control decision-making, even by their own management company (La 
Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999). In these countries, the main control of shareholder 
management is most likely to sacrifice the interests of external shareholders. Because external 
shareholders are likely to be a minority under normal circumstances. 
Compared with researches based on developed market economies such as Britain and the US, 
efforts targeted at identifying the governing function of independent directors in listed Chinese 
companies would probably face severer endogenous problems. Unlike European and American 
companies with decentralized shareholding structure, the ownership structure of listed Chinese 
companies is characterized by the highly centralized shareholding system, which puts the company 
under the control of one or a few owners. In addition, the Chinese legal system has provided 
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relatively weak protection for the investors. The major shareholders are able to make sizeable 
personal gains through their controlling right over the company. As a result, they have strong 
incentives to infringe upon the interests of small and medium shareholders through capital 
appropriation, related-party transactions, inter-company loans, etc. (Zengquan Li et al., 2004; Jian 
and Wong, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010). For such companies, the core issue of corporate governance 
is to protect the interests of small and medium shareholders from the infringing act of major 
shareholders and the management under their control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 
2000; Berkman et al., 2010). Major shareholders often have strong controlling power over the 
decision-making of the company. They can determine the size and structure of the board of 
directors to a very large extent, including the number of independent directors to be appointed 
and their proportion in the board of directors. In order to undermine the check and supervision 
such independent directors would have against the “hollowing-out” of the company, major 
shareholders are incentivized to use their sway over the board of directors to influence the selection 
and hiring process of independent directors. The greater the supervisory effect of independent 
directors on the major shareholders, the weaker the willingness of major shareholders to bring in 
independent directors. As a result, based on what we’ve observed, the proportion of independent 
directors in such companies is in fact lower. At this time, hiring independent directors can play the role to 
monitor managers. 
Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory argue that exclusive focus on shareholder interests has not held the key to good corporate 
governance. Good corporate governance should take care of  not just the interest of  shareholders (i.e., equity 
contributors), but also the interest of  other stakeholders, such as suppliers, society, government, employees, 
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managers, creditors, and customers etc. Therefore, the appointment independent directors are also valuable in 
order to ensure the interests of  stakeholders. Academic director will improve the better monitor than other 
independent director that because academic director pays more attention to reputation, and female director will 
more careful to monitor, so I have tested the effect of  academic and female directors to firm performance. 
Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory arise from economics and sociology subjects about the distribution 
of power in a firm. The resource dependence theory was developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
and later by Zahra and Pearce (1989). It argues that corporations are combinations of tangible and 
intangible assets. Board of directors can be seen as a strategic resource, which bring value to the 
firm. The theory of resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) assumes that companies rely 
on resources in the external environment to survive. In order to reduce the dependency and the 
surrounding uncertainty, companies can cultivate connections with external entities that control 
these resources. Given that all corporations depend on others to survive and thrive, resource 
dependence theory indicates that managing relationship with external parties is the major task of 
the board and board of directors should be selected based on their background, expertise, social 
ties etc.  
Overall, the resource dependence theory indicates that 1) corporations depend on others for 
survival and thrive; 2) board of directors bring value to the firm due to their background, expertise, 
social connections etc. 3) the major role or responsibility for the board of directors are managing 
their relationship with external parties; 4) board of directors may come from a network of other 
powerful people. Thus, this network of powerful people are important assets and resources to the 
firm. The usually, Academic director have more resource the other independent director, so I have 
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tested the effect of academic director to firm performance.     
 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
2.3.1 The relationship between the presence of AIDs and firm performance 
AIDs can play positive corporate governance role in a firm (Francis, Hasan and Wu, 2015). Firstly, 
AIDs are specialized professionals in their (research) field and therefore, they can play advising 
role more effectively through utilizing knowledge they possess relative to firms without AIDs. 
Audretsch and Lehmann (2006) argue that directors with academic background may enhance 
firm’s competitive advantage through accessing to and the absorption of external knowledge 
spillover. Thus, AIDs can increase firm performance by bringing valuable advice to the firm. 
Secondly, board diversity can increase firm performance (Carter, Simkins, and Simpson, 2003; 
Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Anderson et al., 2011; Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng, 2011). AIDs can increase 
board diversity through adding academic professors sitting on the board. Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) argue that job-related diversity, such as academic professors sitting on the board as 
independent directors, may broaden the skills on the board. Thirdly, academic professors care 
more about their reputations, whereby they can play monitoring role more effectively relative to 
firms without AIDs. This is particularly true in countries with Confucius culture background, like 
China, as people in these countries show profound/high/great respect to teachers. Under the 
institutional background of China, the motivation for the independent directors to perform their 
duties is to avoid reputational and legal risks (Qingquan T et al., 2006; Kangtao Y et al., 2011). 
From the perspective of reputational risk, the independent director system of listed Chinese 
companies is mainly comprised by prominent figures in education or business fields. These people 
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are usually very successful in their own areas of focus, which means that they also hold relativity 
high social status and good reputation in their respective industry. More than 76% firms have at 
least one academic professor as non-executive director in China. Overall, these arguments suggest 
that AIDs are beneficial to the firm they serve and can increase firm performance as well.   
Alternatively, AIDs might have no impact on firm performance. Firstly, academic directors might 
have not enough time on playing advising and monitoring role due to their busy work in research 
and teaching in universities their serve. Secondly, AIDs are nominated by members of nomination 
committee and appointed by shareholders. The effectiveness of monitoring of AIDs is reduced 
and limited if firms are controlled by controlling shareholders as essentially AIDs are appointed 
by controlling shareholders and represent the interest of controlling shareholders rather than 
minority shareholders. This might be the case in this study as many Chinese listed companies are 
controlled by large controlling shareholders. Thirdly, AIDs cannot play an effective monitoring 
role as they receive their service fees from companies they serve. As the Bible says “You shall not 
take gift, for gift blinds the wise, and perverts the words of the righteous”1 (Exodus, 23:8). Overall, 
AIDs cannot play effective corporate governance role and have no impact on firm performance. 
Therefore, based on the above discussion, I come up with the following hypotheses.  
H1-0: There is no association between AIDs and firm performance         
H1-1: There is a positive association between AIDs and firm performance 
As exposited in the introduction, I examine the relationship between AIDs and firm performance 
 
1 Some English proverbs express the similar meanings, such as “Gifts blind the eyes of the wise”. 
 48 
using pooled OLS regression model (Gormley and Matsa 2014). We will elaborate on the 
methodologies in chapter 2.5.1. 
2.3.2 The relationship between the number of AIDs and firm performance. 
Token status theory argue that female or minorities in top management team are regarded as 
“tokens” and the images of female token managers are more linked to femininity rather than to 
the qualities of leadership (Kanter, 1977; Liu, Wei and Xie, 2014). I borrow the same idea from 
token status theory in female managers and use them in AIDs. I argue that the impact of AIDs on 
firm decisions and performance might be limited because a solitary AID is seen as a mere “token” 
by both external and internal stakeholders. Thus, firms with only one academic professor sitting 
on the board as independent directors might not perform better.  
As an extension of the token status theory, the critical mass theory argues that “one is a token, two 
is a presence, and three is a voice” (Kristie, 2011). This critical mass theory suggests that firms 
with more AIDs perform better as more AIDs can voice their opinions compared to firms with 
less AIDs. Therefore, based on this discussion, I propose the following hypothesis.       
H2-0: There is no association between the number of AIDs and firm performance. 
H2-1: There is a positive association between the number of AIDs and firm performance. 
As exposited in the introduction, I examine the relationship between the number of AIDs and 
firm performance using pooled OLS regression model (Gormley and Matsa 2014). We will 
elaborate on the methodologies in chapter 2.5.2. 
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2.3.3 The relationship between school affiliation of AIDs and firm performance 
School affiliation of academic director might have impact on firm performance. Firstly, AIDs from 
top university care more about their reputations and thus they can play monitoring role more 
effective. Secondly, AIDs from top universities are more specialized professional in their research 
field. Therefore, they can enhance firm performance by bringing valuable advice to the firms. On 
the other hand, AIDs from top university might have no impact on firm performance as they have 
fewer time on firm’s advice and monitor role due to their busier work in top universities. Therefore, 
I propose the following hypotheses.  
H3-0: There is no association between school affiliation of AIDs and firm performance. 
H3-1: There is a positive association between school affiliation of AIDs and firm 
performance. 
As exposited in the introduction, I examine the relationship between school affiliation of AIDs 
and firm performance using pooled OLS regression model (Gormley and Matsa 2014). We will 
elaborate on the methodologies in chapter 2.5.3. 
 
2.3.4 The relationship between AIDs with administrative role and firm performance 
The relationship between AIDs and firm performance might depend on whether AIDs with 
administrative role or not (Francis, Hasan and Wu, 2015). On the one hand, based on resource 
dependence theory, AIDs with administrative role have a wider social network and are more likely 
to bring more valuable resources to the firm and thereby enhance firm performance. Moreover, 
AIDs with administrative have strong leadership and are capable of working with a complicated 
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group. This leadership and working experience can enhance the efficiency of work in a large board. 
Therefore, AIDs with administrative positions sitting on the board can increase firm performance.          
Alternatively, AIDs with administrative positions in their university might have no influence on 
firm performance. Firstly, academic directors with administrative positions might have no enough 
time in playing a monitor role or advising role due to their busy work. Prior studies find that busier 
directors are less effective (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2008). 
Secondly, AIDs with administrative positions may be less independent relative to those without 
administrative positions. For example, AIDs with university president position are less 
independent and do not have strong incentive to play monitoring role if the firm they serve denotes 
some money to the university. Cho, Jung, Kwak, Lee, and Yoo (JBE2017) investigate the positive 
association weakens when AIDs hold an administrative position at their universities. Based on the 
above discussion, I propose the following hypotheses:              
H4-0: There is no association between AIDs with administrative position and firm 
performance.         
H4-1: There is a positive association between AIDs with administrative position and firm 
performance. 
As exposited in the introduction, I examine the relationship between AIDs with administrative 
position and firm performance using pooled OLS regression model (Gormley and Matsa 2014). 
We will elaborate on the methodologies in chapter 2.5.4. 
 
 51 
2.3.5 The relationship between academic positions of AIDs and firm performance.  
Academic position of AIDs might have impact on firm performance as AIDs with senior academic 
positions are better in subject expertise and have more social resources. Francis, Hasan and Wu 
(2015) investigate whether academic directors having professor academic position have impact on 
firm performance. They find that firms with academic directors having professors perform better 
compared to firms without. The possible reasons include that professors care more about their 
reputation and are more independent. Thus, they can play effective monitoring role. In addition, 
professors are expert in their research area, and they can bring more value resources to the firm. 
In other words, they can play advising role more effectively.   
Alternatively, academic position of AIDs might have no influence on firm performance. Firstly, 
normally, senior academic position such as professors suggests that the person is doing very well 
in his or her area. But this does not mean that specific area is beneficial to the firm they serve as 
independent directors. For example, professors in accounting and finance as independent directors 
might be beneficial to the firm in terms of corporate governance, auditing, or corporate finance 
area. However, professors in art as independent directors might not beneficial to a firm. Secondly, 
senior academic position in one university does not mean he or she can hold the same academic 
position in better universities. Thus, AIDs with high academic position does not mean they can 
bring more value to the firm they serve as independent directors. For example, a professor working 
for non-ivy league universities in US does not mean that he or she can hold a same professorship 
in ivy league universities (Normally, the quality of professors working for ivy league universities is 
better than the quality of professors working for non-ivy league universities on average, but not 
the always the case). Therefore, I come up with the following hypothesis.  
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H5-0: There is no association between AIDs with senior academic position and firm 
performance.     
H5-1: There is a positive association between AIDs with senior academic position and 
firm performance. 
As exposited in the introduction, I examine the relationship between AIDs with senior academic 
position and firm performance using pooled OLS regression model (Gormley and Matsa 2014). 
We will elaborate on the methodologies in chapter 2.5.5. 
 
2.3.6 The relationship between AIDs with various subject expertise and firm 
performance.     
The relationship between AIDs and firm performance might depend on the subject background 
of AIDs. Based on subject background of academic directors, Francis, Hasan and Wu (2015) 
classify the academic directors into several groups including education, technology, business-
related, law, medicine, political science, and others. They find that different subject backgrounds 
have different impacts on firm performance. In particular, academic directors with business-related 
degrees, technology degrees, and political degrees have positive effect on firm performance, while 
academic directors with law, education, and medical degrees have no impact on firm performance. 
They argue that the better performance of firms with business-related degrees and technology 
degrees is consistent with the advising role played by academic directors. The better performance 
of firms with political degrees is consistent with the argument that firms select academic professors 
with political degrees because they want to reduce litigation risk. Cho, et, al (JBE2017) found that 
firms with AIDs have higher CSR performance ratings than those without. In addition, the 
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influence of AIDs on CSR rating depends on their academic background. In particular, the positive 
association between AIDs and CSR rating is significant only when their academic background is 
science, engineering, or medicine.  
In this study, I divide AIDs with various subject expertise into four groups including AIDs with 
business-related background (e.g., the subject expertise of academic director is economic, finance 
or accounting etc.), law background, science and engineering background, and art background. I 
use this category to test whether the AIDs with various subject expertise affect firm performance. 
The academic directors with business-related background might provide best business practices in 
playing a monitoring role or advisory role on board. Firms might have the best legal compliance 
when having academic directors with law background sitting on the board. In addition, professors 
with science and engineering background may play an effective role in advising rather than 
monitoring role. AIDs with art background might not play either monitoring role or advising role 
effectively. Therefore, I propose the following hypotheses.    
H6-0: There is no association between AIDs with art background and firm performance; 
H6-1: There is a positive association between AIDs with business, or law or science and 
engineering background and firm performance.  
As exposited in the introduction, I examine the relationship between AIDs with different 
background and firm performance using pooled OLS regression model (Gormley and Matsa 2014). 
We will elaborate on the methodologies in chapter 2.5.6. 
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2.4 Data and Methodology 
2.4.1 Data Selection Process and Sample Characteristics 
We create an Academic Independent Director Database based on information from CSMAR. To 
construct this academic director database, I first download data about profiles of directors, 
supervisors and senior managers from CSMAR database. The total number of observations is 
699,221. Based on profile information, I search records with the following fields as professor 
including assistant professor, associate professor and full professor, dean or head of school, (senior) 
research fellow, head of research institute, administer of research, VC (vice chancellor) or president 
of university, director, visiting scholar, supervisors, lecturer including assistant lecturer, lecturer, 
senior lectures. teacher. The total number of observations is 226,923. I focus on listed firms listed 
on main board and exclude firms listed on Small and Medium size board and ChiNext board. In 
addition, I exclude financial institutions. The total number of observation left is 147, 035. Since 
some academic professors are sitting on several board as non-executive directors and I only keep 
one record for each academic director in the database. The total number of observations is 35,453.   
I further delete records with directors, visiting professors, supervisor, and division chief. The total 
number of observations is 11,043. In addition, I further delete records with professor-level senior 
engineers, affiliated professors, and honorary professors. I only focus on academic professors with 
full-time employed at university or institute. The total number of observation left is 3,923. Finally, 
I only focus on academic directors sitting on the board of directors rather than supervisory board 
and senior management team. The total number of observations left is 3,815.   
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In addition, I use data including ownership structure, corporate governance, firm characteristics 
and financial data. The data source also comes from the CSMAR database developed by the 
Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co. This study focuses on all listed companies listed on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange excluding companies listed on SME (i.e., 
Small and Medium Enterprises) and ChiNext board. All financial companies and utility companies 
are dropped as their business models are different from other companies. I also delete the firm-
year observation with missing values. In addition, to avoid being affected by outliers, all variables 
are winsorized at 1% and 99%. In the end, I obtain 16815, 16815 firm-year observations from 
2004-2016. 
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Table 2.4.1(1): The distribution of  AIDs in Chinese listed companies between year 2004 to 2016. 
Panel A: By Year 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Number 1535 1649 1657 1655 1722 1733 1739 1806 1906 1955 2148 2237 2312 24054 
Percentage 6.38% 6.86% 6.89% 6.88% 7.16% 7.20% 7.23% 7.51% 7.92% 8.13% 8.93% 9.29% 9.61% 100% 
Panel B: By Title 
 Presidents Vicepresid Chairman Deans Director 
of 
Institute 
Divisionhe Professor NAE Lecture Phd_s Research 
Fellow 
Teacher Total  
Number 425 1186 7260 8101 1486 399 20813 2284 28 15555 1048 94 58679  
Percentage 0.72% 2.02% 12.37% 13.80% 2.53% 0.67% 35.46% 3.89% 0.05% 26.51% 1.79% 0.16% 100%  
Panel C: By Major 
 Efa Law Sci Art Total          
Number 17261 2527 4007 259 24054          
Percentage 71.76% 10.51% 16.66% 1.08% 100%          
Panel D: By School 
 985 211 No985/211 Total           
Number 11529 5714 6811 24054           
Percentage 47.93% 23.75% 28.32% 100%           
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Table 2.4.1(2). Variables Explanation  
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable  
TQ indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of total assets divided by 
book value of total assets. 
Independent Variables  
DUM_AID a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one academic 
independent director, and zero otherwise.  
AID Ratio represents the percent of academic independent directors on board. 
D1_AID a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has one academic director sitting 
in the board, and zero otherwise. 
D2_AID a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has two academic directors sitting 
in the board, and zero otherwise. 
D3_AID a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has three academic directors 
sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_985 a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs from 985 
group university, and zero otherwise 
DUM_211 a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs from 211 
group university, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_No985/211 a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one academic director 
from out of 985 and 211 groups university, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_PRES a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs is president 
sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_VPRES a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs is Vic president 
sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_Chairman a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs is chairman 
sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_Dean a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs is deans sitting 
in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_DOI   a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs is director of 
the institute sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_Division a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs has division 
chief sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_Administer  a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs with 
administered position sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_Professor a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs is professor in 
the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_AssoProf a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs is ass-professor 
sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_PhD 
Supervisor 
a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs is supervisor 
for PhD sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_Researcher a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AIDs is research 
fellow sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_EFA a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AID come from 
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economic, finance or accounting school, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_LAW a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AID come from law 
school, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_SCI a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AID come from 
science school, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_ART a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AID come from arts 
school, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_NAE a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AID is NAE sitting 
in the board, and zero otherwise. 
Treated a dummy variable that is equal to one if a firm has at least one AID prior to the 
introduction of the Regulation 11 (treated group) and equals to zero is this not the 
case (control group). 
Post a dummy variable a dummy variable that is equal to one in the year after Regulation 
11(after 2015) and 0 in the years preceding its introduction (before 2015). 
P*T indicates Pose multiply by Treated. 
Control Variables  
FS indicates nature log of firm size which is defined as total assets. 
LEV indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of total long-term liabilities to total 
assets. 
TANG indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. 
GROWTH indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-
year. 
CAPEX indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total 
assets. 
BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of directors on the board. 
INDE  indicates the ratio of independent director sitting in board. 
INVST indicates the investment of firms. 
AGE indicates the age of firms. 





Table 2.4.1(3). Summary Statistics 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. DUM_AID is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one academic independent director, and zero otherwise. AID Ratio represents the percent of  
academic independent directors on board. D1_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has one academic director sitting in the 
board, and zero otherwise. D2_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has two academic directors sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. D3_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has three academic directors sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_985 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs from 985 group university, and zero otherwise. DUM_211 is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs from 211 group university, and zero otherwise. DUM_No985/211 is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one academic director from out of  985 and 211 groups university, and zero otherwise. DUM_PRES 
is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is president sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_VPRESis a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is Vic president sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Chairman is 
a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is chairman sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Dean is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is deans sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_DOI is a dummy variable that 
is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is director of  the institute sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. Division is a dummy variable that 
is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is division head sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Administer is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs with administered position sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Professor is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is professor in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_AssoProfis a dummy variable that 
is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is ass-professor sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_PhD Supervisoris a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is supervisor for PhD sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Researcher is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is researcher sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_NAE is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AID is NAE sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_EFA is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if  a firm has at least one AID come from economic, finance or accounting school, and zero otherwise. DUM_LAW is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AID come from law school, and zero otherwise. DUM_SCI is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if  a firm has at least one AID come from science school, and zero otherwise. DUM_ART is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at 
least one AID come from arts school, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates 
leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets 
to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure 
defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the 
board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tq01 16,815 1.972781 1.780236 0.6367 12.7658 
Tq02 16,815 2.022735 1.812971 0.6791 13.05 
Tq03 16,815 1.607512 1.738995 0.1843 12.1255 
Tq04 16,815 1.656723 1.766675 0.2311 12.337 
Tq05 16,815 2.003357 1.824499 0.6627 13.33 
Tq06 16,815 2.05211 1.850052 0.707 13.4916 
DUM_AID 16,815 0.7577758 0.428442 0 1 
D1_AD 16,815 0.320785 0.4667922 0 1 
D2_AD 16,815 0.2635147 0.4405522 0 1 
D3_AD 16,815 0.1734761 0.3786696 0 1 
AID Ratio 16,815 0.1572045 0.1281252 0 0.8571429 
DUM_NO985/211 16,815 0.6249182 0.4841584 0 1 
DUM_985 16,815 0.478204 0.4995396 0 1 
DUM_211 16,815 0.2808207 0.4494134 0 1 
DUM_Administer 16,815 0.6207553 0.4852135 0 1 
DUM_PRES 16,815 0.0242046 0.1536884 0 1 
V President 16,815 0.066964 0.2499671 0 1 
DUM_Chairman 16,815 0.3493904 0.4767916 0 1 
DUM_Dean 16,815 0.3748439 0.484097 0 1 
DUM_DOI 16,815 0.0838537 0.2771765 0 1 
DUM_Division 16,815 0.0233125 0.1508986 0 1 
DUM_Professor 16,815 0.6980672 0.4591099 0 1 
DUM_AssoProf 16,815 0.1253643 0.3311413 0 1 
DUM_PhD 
Supervisor 
16,815 0.5818614 0.4932679 0 1 
DUM_Researcher 16,815 0.0588165 0.235288 0 1 
DUM_EFA 16,815 0.6580434 0.4743792 0 1 
DUM_LAW 16,815 0.1437407 0.3508371 0 1 
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DUM_SCI 16,815 0.1985132 0.3988925 0 1 
DUM_ART 16,815 .0148082 .1207882 0 1 
DUM_NAE 16,815 0.0279512 0.164838 0 1 
FS 16,815 21.98511 1.390357 18.78401 25.93746 
Leverage 16,815 0.5390341 0.2446105 0.07949 1.73615 
Tan 16,815 0.2724496 0.1931861 0 0.78 
Growth 16,815 0.2311031 0.7992419 -0.7255 6.2267 
Capex 16,815 0.0494345 0.0515514 0.00007 0.24924 
BS 16,815 9.200595 1.923764 5 15 
Independent  16,815 0.3636617 0.0543853 0 0.8 
2.4.2 Methodology 
2.4.2.1 The relationship between academic directors and firm performance 
The main method used to test the relationship between academic directors and firm performance 
is panel data fixed effect. To ensure robustness of our findings, I follow the Gormley and Matsa 
(2014) and carry out OLS regression with industry and year fixed effects. The model specification 
is as follows 
𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑓𝑠 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡                            
                                                                                                          
                   Model 1  
Dependent and Independent Variables: 
FIRM_PERFORMANCE is measured by Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q which is defined as market value 
of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. The book value of  total assets is obtained 
from the balance sheet, while the market value of  total assets is the sum of  the market value of  
total equity plus the market value of  total debt. However, there is either no market of  debt or no 
liquid market of  debt, hence there is no market value of  total debt. Following the previous 
literature about calculating Tobin’s Q, I use the book value of  total debt as the proxy of  market 
value of  the total debt. Regarding the market value of  total equity, given that there were/are 
tradable shares and non-tradable shares in listed companies in China, the market value of  tradable 
 61 
shares is equal to the product of  the market price of  tradable shares and the total number of  
tradable shares. Regarding the market value of  non-tradable shares, I use the following methods 
to calculate market value of  non-tradable shares: 1) using the 20% of  tradable shares as the proxy 
of  market price of  corresponding non-tradable shares, the corresponding Tobin’s Q is referred as 
TQ_01; 2) using the 30% of  tradable shares as the proxy of  market price of  corresponding non-
tradable shares, the corresponding Tobin’s Q is referred as TQ_02, 3) using the net asset value per 
share as the proxy of  market value of  corresponding non-tradable shares, the corresponding 
Tobin’s Q is referred as TQ_03 and TQ_04; 4) using the market price of  tradable shares as the 
proxy of  market price of  corresponding non-tradable shares, the corresponding Tobin’s Q is 
referred as TQ_05 and TQ_06. Using 20% and 30% of  tradable shares as the proxy of  market 
price pf  corresponding non-tradable shares are due to the illiquidity discount (e.g., Cai, Hillier and 
Wang, 2015). In addition, I also use the net asset value per share as another proxy due to illiquidity 
discount (net asset value per share can be obtained directly from balance sheet). Finally, I use the 
market price of  tradable shares as the proxy of  market price of  non-tradable shares. 
 
The key independent variable is 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐 and 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 . 𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐  is a dummy 
variable and it takes one if a firm has at least one AID sitting on the board and zero otherwise. 
𝐴𝑐𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 is the ratio of AIDs sitting on the board to the board size.  
 
Control Variables: 
Independence is the percentage of independent directors (excluding academic directors) on the board. 
Board Size is the natural log of the total number of directors. Firm Size is the natural log of the 
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firm’s total assets. Leverage is the book value of debt over the total assets. Tangitable indicates 
tangibility which is defined as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth 
which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure 
defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets.  
 
2.5 Empirical Analysis 
2.5.1 The Relationship between the presence of AIDs and firm performance.  
In this section, I test the relationship between AIDs and firm performance. Particularly, I focus 
on whether firms have AIDs sitting on the board. Under the institutional background of  China, 
the motivation for the independent directors to perform their duties is to avoid reputational and 
legal risks (Qingquan T et al., 2006; Kangtao Y et al., 2011). From the perspective of  reputational 
risk, the independent director system of  listed Chinese companies is mainly comprised by 
prominent figures in education or business fields. These people are usually very successful in their 
own areas of  focus, which means that they also hold relativity high social status and good 
reputation in their respective industry. As an elite social group, they attach great importance to 
their personal reputation (Qingquan T et al., 2006). Under such circumstances, when major legal 
or operational problem emerge in the company where the independent director performs his/her 
duty, the social reputation of  the director himself/herself  would also be severely undermined. 
Existing empirical studies have shown that reputational incentive is the main mechanism for the 
performance of  governance function by the independent directors in listed Chinese companies 
(Fan Zhou et al., 2008; Yan Li et al., 2011). 
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Table 2.5.1 shows that the coefficients of  DUM_AID is significant and negative across various 
models. The results indicate that firms having AIDs do not perform better than firms without. 
They actually perform worse than firms without AIDs sitting on the board. These results are not 
consistent with previous studies. The possible reasons might be: Firstly, academic directors might 
have no enough time on playing advising and monitoring role due to their busy work in research 
and teaching in universities their serve. Secondly, AIDs are nominated by members of  nomination 
committee and appointed by shareholders. The effectiveness of  monitoring of  AIDs is reduced 
and limited if  firms are controlled by controlling shareholders as essentially AIDs are appointed 
by controlling shareholders and represent the interest of  controlling shareholders rather than 
minority shareholders. This might be the case in this study as many Chinese listed companies are 
controlled by large controlling shareholders. Thirdly, AIDs cannot play an effective monitoring 
role as they receive their service fees from companies they serve. As the Bible says, “You shall not 
take gift, for gift blinds the wise, and perverts the words of  the righteous” (Exodus, 23:8). Overall, 
AIDs cannot play effective corporate governance role and have no impact on firm 
performance.The coefficients of  most control variables are consistent with the expectation. Small 
firms perform better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high leverage 
perform better because of  the tax shield benefits. Higher growth firms perform better because 
there are more growth opportunities. Firm with more capital expenditure performance better 
because more investment has been taken and eventually this will be transformed to enhance firm 
performance. Firm with higher independent directors perform better as that will reduce the agency 
cost. Previous literature document that small board perform better. They argue that this is because 
the communication cost is large in large board. However, in this study I find that large board 
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perform better. The possible reason is that the more external resources can be brought into the 
firm and that will increase firm performance.   
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Table 2.5.1: The relationship between the presence of  AIDs and firm performance (OLS) 
TQ01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_AID is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one academic independent director, and 
zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which 
is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio 
of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-
on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS 
indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio 
of  independent director sitting in board. 
Independent 
Variable 
TQ01 TQ02 TQ03 TQ04 TQ05 TQ06 
       
DUM_AID -0.060** -0.064** -0.070*** -0.072*** -0.066** -0.068** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) 
FS -0.775*** -0.794*** -0.748*** -0.766*** -0.785*** -0.802*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Leverage 1.081*** 1.072*** 0.979*** 0.964*** 1.119*** 1.099*** 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.090) (0.091) (0.097) (0.098) 
Tan -0.552*** -0.574*** -0.100 -0.120 -0.575*** -0.594*** 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.072) (0.073) (0.076) (0.077) 
Growth 0.035* 0.048** 0.035* 0.048** 0.034* 0.047** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Capex 1.778*** 1.880*** 1.993*** 2.091*** 1.784*** 1.875*** 
 (0.225) (0.230) (0.220) (0.224) (0.234) (0.237) 
BS 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Independent  1.993*** 2.057*** 1.915*** 1.973*** 2.108*** 2.160*** 
 (0.233) (0.238) (0.230) (0.234) (0.241) (0.245) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 15.869*** 16.300*** 14.944*** 15.348*** 16.013*** 16.397*** 
 (0.308) (0.314) (0.304) (0.308) (0.321) (0.324) 
       
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.423 0.423 0.409 0.411 0.414 0.416 
Adj. R-squared 0.422 0.422 0.408 0.409 0.413 0.414 






2.5.2 The Relationship between the number of AIDs and Firm Performance 
In this section, I test the relationship between the number of  AIDs and firm performance. Based 
on token status theory, firms with only one academic professor sitting on the board as independent 
directors might not perform better. Based on critical mass theory, firms with three and more AIDs 
perform better.   
Table 2.5.2 shows that the coefficients of  D1_AID and D2_AID are significant and negative 
across various models. The results indicate that firms having one or two AIDs sitting on the board 
do not perform better. They actually perform worse compared to firms without one or two AIDs 
sitting on the board. In addition, the coefficient of  D3_AID is positive, although it is not 
significant. These results are not consistent with critical mass theory as the coefficient of  D3_AID 
is not significant. Overall, the results are closer to token status theory, which indicates that the 
AIDs do not play corporate governance role.   
Compared with researches based on developed market economies such as Britain and the US, 
efforts targeted at identifying the governing function of  independent directors in listed Chinese 
companies would probably face severer endogenous problems. Unlike European and American 
companies with decentralized shareholding structure, the ownership structure of  listed Chinese 
companies is characterized by the highly centralized shareholding system, which puts the company 
under the control of  one or a few owners. In addition, the Chinese legal system has provided 
relatively weak protection for the investors. The major shareholders are able to make sizeable 
personal gains through their controlling right over the company. As a result, they have strong 
incentives to infringe upon the interests of  small and medium shareholders through capital 
appropriation, related-party transactions, inter-company loans, etc. (Zengquan Li et al., 2004; Jian 
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and Wong, 2010; Jiang et al., 2010). For such companies, the core issue of  corporate governance 
is to protect the interests of  small and medium shareholders from the infringing act of  major 
shareholders and the management under their control (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Johnson et al., 
2000; Berkman et al., 2010). Sometime, there are three AIDs sitting on the board is not enough. 
Therefore, government regulatory authorities must probe deeper into further improving the 
independent director system, such as promoting the professionalization of  independent directors, 
including setting position-related thresholds, building an education system, establishing assessment 
mechanism, and building industry associations for independent directors. Therefore, government 
regulatory authorities must probe deeper into further improving the independent director system, 
such as promoting the professionalization of  independent directors, including setting position-
related thresholds, building an education system, establishing assessment mechanism, and building 
industry associations for independent directors. 
The coefficients on most control variables are consistent with the expectation. Small firms perform 
better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high leverage perform better 
because of  the tax shield benefits. Higher growth firms perform better because there are more 
growth opportunities. Firm with more capital expenditure performance better because more 
investment has been taken and eventually this will be transformed to enhance firm performance. 
Firm with higher independent directors perform better as that will reduce the agency cost. 
Previous literature document that small board perform better. They argue that this is because the 
communication cost is large in large board. However, in this study I find that large board perform 
better. The possible reason is that the more external resources can be brought into the firm and 
that will increase firm performance.   
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Table 2.5.2 The relationship between the number of  AIDs and firm performance (OLS) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
D1_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has one academic director sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. D2_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has two academic directors sitting in the board, 
and zero otherwise. D3_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has three academic directors sitting 
in the board, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage 
indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility 
which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the 
percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure 
divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. 
Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
Independent 
Variable 
TQ01 TQ02 TQ03 TQ04 TQ05 TQ06 
D1_AD -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.102*** -0.105*** -0.099*** -0.101*** 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
D2_AD -0.068** -0.070** -0.079*** -0.081*** -0.074** -0.076** 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) 
D3_AD 0.033 0.029 0.018 0.013 0.022 0.018 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
FS -0.775*** -0.795*** -0.749*** -0.767*** -0.786*** -0.803*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Leverage 1.079*** 1.071*** 0.977*** 0.963*** 1.118*** 1.098*** 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.090) (0.091) (0.097) (0.098) 
Tan -0.546*** -0.568*** -0.095 -0.114 -0.569*** -0.588*** 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.071) (0.073) (0.076) (0.077) 
Growth 0.036* 0.049** 0.036* 0.049** 0.035* 0.048** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Capex 1.771*** 1.873*** 1.985*** 2.084*** 1.777*** 1.868*** 
 (0.225) (0.230) (0.220) (0.224) (0.234) (0.237) 
BS 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Independent  1.910*** 1.975*** 1.838*** 1.897*** 2.031*** 2.084*** 
 (0.233) (0.238) (0.230) (0.234) (0.242) (0.246) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
       
Industry 
Dummy 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 15.946*** 16.376*** 15.015*** 15.418*** 16.084*** 16.466*** 
 (0.310) (0.315) (0.306) (0.310) (0.322) (0.326) 
       
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.423 0.424 0.410 0.411 0.415 0.416 




2.5.3 The Relationship between school affiliation of AIDs and Firm Performance 
In this section, I test the relationship between school affiliation of  AIDs and firm performance. I 
classify the AIDs into three categories based on their affiliation of  universities they serve. They 
are AIDs from group 985, AIDs from group 211, and AIDs from group non985&211 universities. 
Group 985 universities are top universities in China, and they are equivalent or similar to G5 in 
UK. Group 211 universities in China are second tier top universities in China and they are 
equivalent or similar to Russel group universities in UK.  The rest universities are referred as 
non985&211 universities.  
Table 2.5.3 shows that the coefficients of  DUM_985, DUM_211, and DUM_NO985&211 are 
not significant across various models. The results indicate that school affiliation of  AIDs has no 
association with firm performance.   
The coefficients on most control variables are consistent with the expectation. Small firms perform 
better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high leverage perform better 
because of  the tax shield benefits. Higher growth firms perform better because there are more 
growth opportunities. Firm with more capital expenditure performance better because more 
investment has been taken and eventually this will be transformed to enhance firm performance. 
Firm with higher independent directors perform better as that will reduce the agency cost. 
Previous literature document that small board perform better. They argue that this is because the 
communication cost is large in large board. However, in this study I find that large board perform 
better. The possible reason is that the more external resources can be brought into the firm and 
that will increase firm performance.   
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Table 2.5.3 The Relationship Between School Affiliation of  AIDs and Firm Performance 
(OLS) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_985 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs from 985 group university, and 
zero otherwise. DUM_211 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs from 211 group 
university, and zero otherwise. DUM_No985/211 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one 
academic director from out of  985 and 211 groups university, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size 
which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities 
to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates 
sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure 
defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total 
number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
DUM_985 0.032   
 (0.021)   
DUM_211  -0.019  
  (0.022)  
DUM_NO985&211   0.000 
   (0.022) 
FS -0.776*** -0.775*** -0.775*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Leverage 1.088*** 1.086*** 1.086*** 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
Tan -0.543*** -0.549*** -0.549*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Growth 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Capex 1.788*** 1.786*** 1.785*** 
 (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
BS 0.037*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Independent  1.950*** 1.973*** 1.968*** 
 (0.233) (0.232) (0.233) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES 
    
Industry Dummy YES YES YES 
    
Constant 15.882*** 15.855*** 15.861*** 
 (0.309) (0.308) (0.308) 
    
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.423 0.423 0.423 
Adj. R-squared 0.422 0.421 0.421 




2.5.4 The Relationship between administrative position of AIDs and Firm Performance 
In this section, I test the relationship between AIDs with administrative positions and firm 
performance. I classify the AIDs into seven categories based on their administrative positions.  
They are AIDs with administrative position of  university president, AIDs with administrative 
position of  university vice-president, AIDs with administrative of  Chairman, AIDs with 
administrative position of  dean (i.e., school head), AIDs with administrative of  director of  the 
institute, AIDs with administrative of  department head (i.e., division head), AIDs with 
administrative of  administrator.   
Table 2.5.4 shows that the coefficients on the variables are not significant across various models 
except the coefficient on the variables of  DUM_PRESIDENT. The results indicate that only firms 
with AIDs with administrative position of  university president perform better. On the one hand, 
based on resource dependence theory, AIDs with administrative role have a wider social network 
and are more likely to bring more valuable resources to the firm and thereby enhance firm 
performance. Moreover, AIDs with administrative have strong leadership and are capable of  
working with a complicated group. This leadership and working experience can enhance the 
efficiency of  work in a large board. Therefore, AIDs with administrative positions sitting on the 
board can increase firm performance.   
The coefficients on most control variables are consistent with the expectation. Small firms perform 
better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high leverage perform better 
because of  the tax shield benefits. Higher growth firms perform better because there are more 
growth opportunities. Firm with more capital expenditure performance better because more 
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investment has been taken and eventually this will be transformed to enhance firm performance. 
Firm with higher independent directors perform better as that will reduce the agency cost. 
Previous literature document that small board perform better. They argue that this is because the 
communication cost is large in large board. However, in this study I find that large board perform 
better. The possible reason is that the more external resources can be brought into the firm and 
that will increase firm performance. 
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Table 2.5.4 The Relationship between Administration Position and Firm Performance (OLS) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. DUM_PRES is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm 
has at least one AIDs is president sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_VPRESis a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is Vic president 
sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Chairman is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is chairman sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_Dean is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is deans sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_DOI is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is director of  the institute sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Division is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at 
least one AIDs is division head sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Administer is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs with administered 
position sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total 
long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage 
change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total 
number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
        
DUM_PRES  0.263***       
 (0.072)       
DUM_VPRES  0.000      
  (0.032)      
DUM_Chairman    0.019     
   (0.022)     
DUM_Dean     -0.039*    
    (0.021)    
DUM_DOI      0.018   
     (0.037)   
DUM_Division       -0.278***  
      (0.060)  
DUM_Administer        -0.029 
       (0.022) 
FS -0.777*** -0.775*** -0.776*** -0.775*** -0.775*** -0.776*** -0.775*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Leverage 1.092*** 1.086*** 1.086*** 1.085*** 1.086*** 1.082*** 1.084*** 
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 (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
Tan -0.548*** -0.549*** -0.547*** -0.550*** -0.549*** -0.547*** -0.550*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Growth 0.034* 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Capex 1.798*** 1.785*** 1.788*** 1.784*** 1.785*** 1.778*** 1.782*** 
 (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
BS 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Independent  1.942*** 1.968*** 1.963*** 1.982*** 1.967*** 1.995*** 1.982*** 
 (0.232) (0.232) (0.232) (0.233) (0.232) (0.233) (0.233) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 15.891*** 15.861*** 15.864*** 15.858*** 15.862*** 15.873*** 15.859*** 
 (0.309) (0.308) (0.308) (0.308) (0.308) (0.308) (0.308) 
        
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.423 0.423 0.423 0.423 0.423 0.423 0.423 
Adj. R-squared 0.422 0.421 0.421 0.422 0.421 0.422 0.422 




2.5.5 The Relationship between academic positions of AIDs and Firm Performance 
In this section, I test the relationship between AIDs with academic positions and firm performance. 
The data of academic positions of AIDs is manual collected. I divide academic positions into five 
groups including professor, associate professor, supervisor of PhD, research fellow and NAE 
(National Academy Engineering). I use this category to test whether the academic positions of 
AIDs affect firm performance. I argue that AIDs with senior academic positions might play a 
better advice role due to their professorial expertise and wider social network relative to AIDs with 
junior academic position. 
Table 2.5.5 shows that the coefficients on the variables PhD supervisor, research fellow, and NAE 
are positive and significant at 1% or 5% significance level. The results indicate that firms with 
AIDs with academic position of  PhD supervisor, research fellow, and NAE perform better 
compared to other firms without academic position of  PhD supervisor, researcher, and NAE. 
Academic position of  AIDs might have impact on firm performance as AIDs with senior 
academic positions are better in subject expertise and have more social resources. Francis, Hasan 
and Wu (2015) investigate whether academic directors having professor academic position have 
impact on firm performance. They find that firms with academic directors having professors 
perform better compared to firms without. The possible reasons include that professors care more 
about their reputation and are more independent. Thus, they can play effective monitoring role. 
In addition, professors are expert in their research area, and they can bring more value resources 
to the firm. In other words, they can play advising role more effectively.   
The coefficients on most control variables are consistent with the expectation. Small firms perform 
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better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high leverage perform better 
because of  the tax shield benefits. Higher growth firms perform better because there are more 
growth opportunities. Firm with more capital expenditure performance better because more 
investment has been taken and eventually this will be transformed to enhance firm performance. 
Firm with higher independent directors perform better as that will reduce the agency cost. 
Previous literature document that small board perform better. They argue that this is because the 
communication cost is large in large board. However, in this study I find that large board perform 
better. The possible reason is that the more external resources can be brought into the firm and 
that will increase firm performance. 
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Table 2.5.5 The Relationship between Academic Position and Firm Performance (OLS) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_Professor is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is professor in the board, 
and zero otherwise. DUM_AssoProfis a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is ass-
professor sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_PhD Supervisor is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if  a firm has at least one AIDs is supervisor for PhD sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Researcher is 
a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is researcher sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. DUM_NAE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AID is NAE sitting in the 
board, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates 
leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is 
defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage 
change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by 
total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. Independent 
indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model 
      
DUM_Professor -0.060**     
 (0.024)     
DUM_AssoProf  -0.050    
  (0.034)    
DUM_PhD 
Supervisor  
  0.051**   
   (0.022)   
DUM_Researcher     0.217***  
    (0.051)  
DUM_NAE      0.255*** 
     (0.065) 
FS -0.774*** -0.776*** -0.777*** -0.775*** -0.777*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Leverage 1.080*** 1.087*** 1.092*** 1.089*** 1.091*** 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
Tan -0.552*** -0.546*** -0.545*** -0.538*** -0.539*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Growth 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 0.036* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Capex 1.778*** 1.786*** 1.785*** 1.765*** 1.778*** 
 (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
BS 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Independent  1.997*** 1.977*** 1.937*** 1.954*** 1.949*** 
 (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) (0.232) (0.233) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 15.854*** 15.877*** 15.891*** 15.850*** 15.906*** 
 (0.308) (0.309) (0.309) (0.308) (0.309) 
      
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
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R-squared 0.423 0.423 0.423 0.423 0.423 
Adj. R-squared 0.422 0.422 0.422 0.422 0.422 
Standard Errors 1.354 1.354 1.354 1.353 1.353 
2.5.6 The Relationship between AIDs with various subject expertise and Firm 
Performance 
In this section, I test the relationship between AIDs with various subject expertise and firm 
performance. The data on various subject expertise of AIDs is manually collected. I divide subject 
expertise into four categories including economics, finance and accounting (EFA), law (LAW), 
science (SCI), art (ART). I use this category to test whether AIDs with various subject expertise 
affect firm performance. AIDs with various subject expertise might or might not have any 
association with firm performance based on the discussion in hypothesis development section.  
Table 4.5.6 shows that the coefficients on the variables EFA, LAW, SCI are not significant and the 
coefficient on variable ART is even negative and significant at 10% significance level. There results 
indicate that there is no association between AIDs with various subject expertise and firm 
performance except the AIDs with art subject expertise.  
The coefficients on most control variables are consistent with the expectation. Small firms perform 
better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high leverage perform better 
because of  the tax shield benefits. Higher growth firms perform better because there are more 
growth opportunities. Firm with more capital expenditure performance better because more 
investment has been taken and eventually this will be transformed to enhance firm performance. 
Firm with higher independent directors perform better as that will reduce the agency cost. 
Previous literature document that small board perform better. They argue that this is because the 
communication cost is large in large board. However, in this study I find that large board perform 
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better. The possible reason is that the more external resources can be brought into the firm and 
that will increase firm performance. 
 80 
Table 2.5.6 The relationship between the major of  academic director and Tobin’s Q 
(OLS) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_EFA is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AID come from economic, finance or 
accounting school, and zero otherwise. DUM_LAW is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one 
AID come from law school, and zero otherwise. DUM_SCI is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at 
least one AID come from science school, and zero otherwise. DUM_ART is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if  a firm has at least one AID come from arts school, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which 
is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total 
assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales 
growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined 
as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  
directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
DUM_EFA 0.013    
 (0.023)    
DUM_LAW  -0.013   
  (0.029)   
DUM_SCI   -0.017  
   (0.026)  
DUM_ART    -0.135* 
    (0.078) 
FS -0.776*** -0.775*** -0.776*** -0.775*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Leverage 1.087*** 1.086*** 1.085*** 1.084*** 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) 
Tan -0.549*** -0.549*** -0.550*** -0.550*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Growth 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 0.035* 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Capex 1.788*** 1.785*** 1.791*** 1.782*** 
 (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
BS 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Independent  1.963*** 1.973*** 1.976*** 1.973*** 
 (0.233) (0.232) (0.233) (0.232) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES 
 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 15.863*** 15.859*** 15.861*** 15.862*** 
 (0.308) (0.308) (0.308) (0.308) 
     
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.423 0.423 0.423 0.423 
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Adj. R-squared 0.421 0.421 0.421 0.422 
Standard Errors 1.354 1.354 1.354 1.354 
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2.6 Endogeneity Issue 
In this section, I address endogeneity issues. Specifically, I consider (1) endogeneity issue due to 
time-constant omitted variable; (2) endogeneity issue due to inverse causality.  
2.6.1 Endogeneity Issue due to time constant omitted variable (Fixed Effect) 
To address endogeneity due to time constant omitted variable, I use Fixed Effect analysis. Table 
10 shows that there is no association between the presence of AIDs and firm performance. This 
results and results in Table 2 both indicate that the existence of AID sitting on the board is not 
beneficial to the firm. Table 2.6.1(2) shows that there is no association between the number of 
AIDs sitting on the board and firm performance. These results are similar to the results in Table 
5 when using OLS to run regression. Table 2.6.1(3) shows that there is no association between 
school affiliation of AIDs and firm performance. Firms with AIDs coming from group 211 
universities perform even worse compared to firms with AIDs not coming from group 211 
universities.  
The coefficients in Table 2.6.1(4) on the variables representing administrative post are not 
significant across various models. These results indicate that there is no association between 
administrative position of  AIDs and firm performance. These results are similar to the results 
when using OLS to run regression in Table 2.5.4.  
Table 14 shows that the coefficients on the variables PhD supervisor and NAE are positive and 
significant at 5% or 10% significance level. The results indicate that firms with AIDs with academic 
position of  PhD supervisor and NAE perform better compared to other firms without academic 
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position of  PhD supervisor and NAE. The reason might be that the AIDs with these academic 
positions have more knowledge on their area and have more resource to play advising role as 
independent directors. The results in Table 2.6.1(5) is similar to the results in Table 2.5.5 when 
using OLS to run regression.  
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Table 2.6.1(1) The relationship between the presence of  AIDs and firm performance (FIXED EFFECT) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. DUM_AID is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm 
has at least one academic independent director, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined 
as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is 
defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size 
which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model 
       
DUM_AID  -0.017 -0.016 -0.022 -0.022 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) 
FS -1.324*** -1.347*** -1.288*** -1.309*** -1.360*** -1.377*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Leverage 1.046*** 1.018*** 0.940*** 0.908*** 1.071*** 1.033*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) 
Tan -0.578*** -0.581*** -0.163* -0.162* -0.597*** -0.596*** 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.088) (0.089) 
Growth 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.066*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.341*** 2.427*** 2.599*** 2.683*** 2.411*** 2.487*** 
 (0.209) (0.212) (0.207) (0.210) (0.215) (0.217) 
BS 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Independent  0.953*** 0.950*** 0.956*** 0.951*** 0.989*** 0.981*** 
 (0.225) (0.228) (0.223) (0.226) (0.231) (0.234) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 28.141*** 28.702*** 26.901*** 27.400*** 28.890*** 29.338*** 
 (0.355) (0.361) (0.352) (0.356) (0.365) (0.369) 
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Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.455 0.451 0.450 0.447 0.451 0.449 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
Adj. R-squared 0.399 0.395 0.393 0.391 0.395 0.392 
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Table 2.6.1(2) The relationship between the number of  AIDs and firm performance (FE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
D1_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has one academic director sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. D2_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has two academic directors sitting in the board, 
and zero otherwise. D3_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has three academic directors sitting 
in the board, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage 
indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility 
which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the 
percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure 
divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. 
Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model 
       
D1_AD -0.012 -0.012 -0.019 -0.019 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
D2_AD -0.035 -0.031 -0.036 -0.032 -0.034 -0.030 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
D3_AD 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.005 0.003 0.002 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
FS -1.323*** -1.347*** -1.288*** -1.308*** -1.359*** -1.377*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Leverage 1.046*** 1.018*** 0.939*** 0.907*** 1.070*** 1.033*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) 
Tan -0.578*** -0.581*** -0.164* -0.163* -0.598*** -0.596*** 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.088) (0.089) 
Growth 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.340*** 2.427*** 2.598*** 2.683*** 2.410*** 2.487*** 
 (0.209) (0.212) (0.207) (0.210) (0.215) (0.217) 
BS 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Independent  0.941*** 0.939*** 0.944*** 0.940*** 0.977*** 0.971*** 
 (0.226) (0.229) (0.224) (0.227) (0.232) (0.235) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 28.141*** 28.702*** 26.902*** 27.401*** 28.890*** 29.338*** 
 (0.355) (0.361) (0.352) (0.357) (0.365) (0.369) 
       
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.455 0.451 0.450 0.447 0.451 0.449 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
Adj. R-squared 0.399 0.395 0.393 0.391 0.395 0.392 
 
 87 
Table 2.6.1(3) The relationship between school affiliation of  AIDs and firm performance 
(FE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_985 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs from 985 group university, and 
zero otherwise. DUM_211 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs from 211 group 
university, and zero otherwise. DUM_No985/211 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one 
academic director from out of  985 and 211 groups university, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size 
which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities 
to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates 
sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure 
defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total 
number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
DUM_985 -0.004   
 (0.024)   
DUM_211  -0.078***  
  (0.026)  
DUM_NO985/211   -0.035 
   (0.024) 
FS -1.324*** -1.322*** -1.323*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Leverage 1.047*** 1.044*** 1.044*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) 
Tan -0.577*** -0.575*** -0.578*** 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Growth 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.340*** 2.335*** 2.340*** 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) 
BS 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Independent  0.945*** 0.972*** 0.963*** 
 (0.225) (0.225) (0.225) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES 
 
Constant 28.143*** 28.102*** 28.125*** 
 (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) 
    
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.455 0.455 0.455 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 





Table 2.6.1(4) The relationship between administrative position of  AIDs and firm performance (FE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. DUM_PRES is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm 
has at least one AIDs is president sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_VPRESis a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is Vic president 
sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Chairman is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is chairman sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_Dean is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is deans sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_DOI is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is director of  the institute sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Division is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at 
least one AIDs is division head sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Administer is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs with administered 
position sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total 
long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage 
change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total 
number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
        
DUM_PRES  0.032       
 (0.067)       
DUM_VPRES  -0.016      
  (0.043)      
DUM_Chairman    0.003     
   (0.023)     
DUM_Dean     0.005    
    (0.023)    
DUM_DOI      0.060   
     (0.040)   
DUM_Division       -0.078  
      (0.071)  
DUM_Administer        -0.029 
       (0.022) 
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FS -1.324*** -1.324*** -1.325*** -1.325*** -1.326*** -1.324*** -0.775*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Leverage 1.048*** 1.047*** 1.048*** 1.048*** 1.046*** 1.048*** 1.084*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.092) 
Tan -0.578*** -0.577*** -0.576*** -0.577*** -0.578*** -0.578*** -0.550*** 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.073) 
Growth 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.035* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) 
Capex 2.341*** 2.342*** 2.341*** 2.341*** 2.341*** 2.340*** 1.782*** 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.225) 
BS 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.039*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Independent  0.939*** 0.944*** 0.941*** 0.939*** 0.938*** 0.943*** 1.982*** 
 (0.225) (0.224) (0.225) (0.225) (0.224) (0.224) (0.233) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 28.145*** 28.145*** 28.145*** 28.146*** 28.164*** 28.136*** 15.859*** 
 (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.308) 
        
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.423 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541  






Table 2.6.1(5) The relationship between academic position and firm performance (FE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_Professor is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is professor in the board, 
and zero otherwise. DUM_AssoProfis a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is ass-
professor sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_PhD Supervisor is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if  a firm has at least one AIDs is supervisor for PhD sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Research is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is research fellow sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. DUM_NAE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AID is NAE sitting in the 
board, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates 
leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is 
defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage 
change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by 
total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. Independent 
indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model 
      
DUM_Professor -0.023     
 (0.025)     
DUM_AssoProf  -0.025    
  (0.033)    
DUM_PhD 
Supervisor  
  0.052**   
   (0.024)   
DUM_Research     0.025  
    (0.048)  
DUM_NAE      0.113* 
     (0.068) 
FS -1.324*** -1.325*** -1.326*** -1.324*** -1.325*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Leverage 1.045*** 1.048*** 1.053*** 1.048*** 1.050*** 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) 
Tan -0.578*** -0.577*** -0.576*** -0.576*** -0.576*** 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Growth 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.339*** 2.342*** 2.336*** 2.340*** 2.341*** 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) 
BS 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Independent  0.958*** 0.945*** 0.913*** 0.939*** 0.936*** 
 (0.225) (0.224) (0.225) (0.224) (0.224) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
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Constant 28.134*** 28.151*** 28.171*** 28.145*** 28.158*** 
 (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) 
      
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.455 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 





Table 2.6.1(6): The relationship between AIDs with various subject expertise and firm performance (FE) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model 
      
DUM_EFA -0.009    -0.008 
 (0.025)    (0.025) 
DUM_LAW  0.054   0.052 
  (0.033)   (0.033) 
DUM_SCI   -0.047  -0.046 
   (0.030)  (0.031) 
DUM_ART    -0.034 -0.038 
    (0.093) (0.093) 
FS -1.324*** -1.324*** -1.325*** -1.324*** -1.324*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Leverage 1.047*** 1.049*** 1.047*** 1.047*** 1.048*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Tan -0.577*** -0.576*** -0.576*** -0.578*** -0.576*** 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Growth 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.054*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.340*** 2.340*** 2.344*** 2.338*** 2.340*** 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) 
BS 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Independent  0.947*** 0.924*** 0.951*** 0.944*** 0.940*** 
 (0.225) (0.225) (0.224) (0.224) (0.225) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
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Constant 28.141*** 28.145*** 28.146*** 28.144*** 28.142*** 
 (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) 
      
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.455 0.455 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 








2.6.2 Endogeneity Issue due to Omitted Variable Bias 
In this section, I employ difference-in-difference approach to further address the concerns that 
the findings on the causal relationship between AIDs and firm performance. I use the resignation 
of academic directors plausibly exogenous to firm characteristics to test the role of academic 
directors in the company. The exogenous shock I used was Regulation 11, issued by the Chinese 
Ministry of Education, and the enactment time was 3rd of November 2015. The regulation 
requires that AIDs with administrative positions cannot serve as directors in listed companies, 
triggering a wave of AID resignations. 
The Regulation 11 evolved from the Rule 18, issued by the Communist Party of China on October 
19, 2013. 
It prohibits government officials as directors in listed companies, to reduce corruption. (Hope et 
al. 2017; Hu et al., 2019). The Regulation 11 is suitable for AIDs, when AID have an administrative 
rank comparable to government officials. 
Because the main advantage to firm of academic director include REPUTATION EFFECT, 
EXPERTISE EFFECT, INDEPENDENT EFFECT, Academic director has more 
prominent these characteristics when he has administrative positions in University. Therefore, the 
retreat of University leaders can explain the impact of academic director changes on the firm 









Treatment Group Firm has academic director (with 
administer position) sitting in the board 
Firm change to no academic director (with 
administer position) sitting in the board 
Control Group Firm without academic director sitting in 
the board 
Firm without academic director sitting in 
the board 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1  ∗  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2  ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽3  ∗  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖   
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖,𝑡+𝛽5𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡      
                                                                                     
           Model 2 
 
To check the effect of  AIDs on firm performance, I are interested in the coefficient of  interactive 
term 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖, i.e., 𝛽3. Based on the discussion before, the 𝛽3 should be negative, 
which means that departure of  AIDs has negative impact on firm performance or AIDs have 
positive impact on firm performance. The results in Table 4.6.2(1) and Table 4.6.2(2) show that 
the coefficients on interactive term 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ∗  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 are not significant at 10% significance 
level. These results indicate that AIDs sitting on the boards are not beneficial to the firm 
performance. The difference-in-difference analysis results are similar to the results using OLS and 




Table 2.6.2(1): Difference-in-Difference Analysis (TQ) 
Tq01-04 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
Treated is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AID prior to the introduction of  the 
Regulation 11 (treated group) and equals to zero is this not the case (control group). Post is a dummy variable a 
dummy variable that is equal to one in the year after Regulation 11(after 2015) and 0 in the years preceding its 
introduction (before 2015). P*T indicates Pose multiply by Treated. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is 
defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total 
assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales 
growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined 
as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  
directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board. Inv indicates the 
investment of  firms. Age indicates the age of  firms. NFA indicates net fixed assets of  firms. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
P*T 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) 
Treated 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
Post 1.037*** 1.066*** 0.985*** 1.012*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) 
Inv -0.889*** -0.843*** -0.249 -0.193 
 (0.185) (0.191) (0.184) (0.188) 
Lev -1.096*** -1.184*** -1.013*** -1.100*** 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.061) (0.062) 
Age 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ta -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NFA -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
BS -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.057*** -0.059*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Independent 0.187 0.199 0.117 0.125 
 (0.193) (0.198) (0.194) (0.196) 
Year Dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Constant 2.147*** 2.277*** 1.747*** 1.873*** 
 (0.111) (0.114) (0.112) (0.114) 
     
Observations 20,393 20,393 20,393 20,393 
R-squared 0.232 0.230 0.219 0.219 
Adj. R-squared 0.230 0.229 0.218 0.218 
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Table 2.6.2(2): Difference-in-Difference Analysis (ROA) 
ROA indicates net income divided by total assets. Treated is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a company has 
at least one AID after the Regulation 11 (treated group) and equals to zero is this not AID (control group). Post Is a 
dummy variable a dummy variable that is equal to one in the year after Regulation 11(after 2015) and 0 in the years 
before Regulation 11 (before 2015). P*T indicates Pose multiply by Treated. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which 
is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total 
assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales 
growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined 
as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  
directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board. Inv indicates the 
























Year Dummy YES 
 
 








Adj. R-squared 0.175 
 
 98 
2.7 Robustness Check 
2.7.1. Alternative dependent variable 
To check the robustness of results, I use the ROA as the dependent variable and rerun regression 
for main results. To save space, I only report the fixed effect results. The results using other 
methods are similar to these results. The results in Table 2.7.1(1) to 2.1.7(6) are quite similar to the 








Table 2.7.1(1) The relationship between the presence of  AIDs and firm performance 
(ROA, ROE+ FE) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
DUM_AID  0.002 0.012** 
 (0.001) (0.006) 
FS 0.005*** -0.009** 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
Leverage -0.146*** -0.064*** 
 (0.003) (0.012) 
Tan -0.051*** -0.076*** 
 (0.005) (0.019) 
Growth 0.014*** 0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Capex 0.120*** 0.393*** 
 (0.011) (0.046) 
BS -0.001* -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
Independent  0.005 -0.062 
 (0.012) (0.050) 
Year Dummy YES YES 
   
Constant -0.006 0.306*** 
 (0.019) (0.079) 
   
Observations 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.229 0.031 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 




Table 2.7.1(2)：the relationship between have one academic director sitting in the board 
or have two or have three and more, and ROA, ROE (FIXED EFFECT) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Model Model 
   
D1_AD 0.002 0.014** 
 (0.001) (0.006) 
D2_AD 0.003 0.010 
 (0.002) (0.007) 
D3_AD 0.001 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.009) 
FS 0.005*** -0.009** 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
Leverage -0.146*** -0.064*** 
 (0.003) (0.012) 
Tan -0.051*** -0.076*** 
 (0.005) (0.019) 
Growth 0.014*** 0.033*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Capex 0.120*** 0.392*** 
 (0.011) (0.046) 
BS -0.001* -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) 
Independent  0.007 -0.059 
 (0.012) (0.050) 
Year Dummy YES YES 
   
Constant -0.006 0.306*** 
 (0.019) (0.079) 
   
Observations 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.229 0.031 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 





Table 2.7.1(3)：the relationship between the level of  university and ROA (FIXED 
EFFECT) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
DUM_985 0.001   
 (0.001)   
DUM_211  -0.000  
  (0.001)  
DUM_NO985/211   0.001 
   (0.001) 
FS 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tan -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Growth 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capex 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
BS -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Independent  0.006 0.007 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES 
 
Constant -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
    
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.229 0.228 0.229 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 






Table 2.7.1(4)：the relationship between academic position and ROA (FIXED EFFECT) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model 
      
DUM_Professor 0.001     
 (0.001)     
DUM_AssoProf  0.001    
  (0.002)    
DUM_PhD Supervisor    -0.000   
   (0.001)   
DUM_Researcher     0.003  
    (0.003)  
DUM_NAE      -0.002 
     (0.004) 
FS 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tan -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Growth 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capex 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
BS -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Independent  0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
      
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.229 0.228 0.228 0.229 0.229 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
Adj. R-squared 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 2.1.7(5)：the relationship between administration position and ROA (FIXED EFFECT) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
        
DUM_PRES  0.002       
 (0.004)       
DUM_VPRES  0.005**      
  (0.002)      
DUM_Chairman    -0.001     
   (0.001)     
DUM_Dean     -0.000    
    (0.001)    
DUM_DOI      -0.002   
     (0.002)   
DUM_Division       -0.000  
      (0.004)  
DUM_Administer        0.003*** 
       (0.001) 
FS 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.011*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.123*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Tan -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.046*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
Growth 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capex 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.182*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
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BS -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Independent  0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 -0.033*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.144*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.010) 
        
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.228 0.229 0.229 0.228 0.229 0.228 0.279 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541  







Table 2.1.7(6)：the relationship between the major of  academic director and ROA 
(FIXED EFFECT) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_EFA is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AID come from economic, finance or 
accounting school, and zero otherwise. DUM_LAW is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one 
AID come from law school, and zero otherwise. DUM_SCI is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at 
least one AID come from science school, and zero otherwise. DUM_ART is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if  a firm has at least one AID come from arts school, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which 
is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total 
assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales 
growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined 
as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  
directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
DUM_EFA 0.002    
 (0.001)    
DUM_LAW  0.000   
  (0.002)   
DUM_SCI   -0.000  
   (0.002)  
DUM_ART    0.007 
    (0.005) 
FS 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146*** -0.146*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Tan -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Growth 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capex 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
BS -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Independent  0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
     
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.229 0.228 0.228 0.229 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
Adj. R-squared 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 
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2.7.2. Alternative independent variable 
In addition, to check the robustness of results, I focus on the ratio of  AIDs sitting on the board 
and use this as alternative independent variable and investigate the relationship between the ratio 
of  AIDs and firm performance. Table 2.7.2(1) shows that there is no relationship between the 
ratio of  AIDs and firm performance as the coefficients of  variable AID_RATIO is insignificant 






Table 2.7.2(1): The relationship between the ratio of  AIDs and firm performance (OLS) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
AID Ratio represents the percent of  academic independent directors on board. FS indicates nature log of  firm size 
which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities 
to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates 
sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure 
defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total 
number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model 
       
AID Ratio 0.049 0.042 0.009 0.003 0.016 0.010 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.092) (0.093) (0.096) (0.097) 
FS -0.776*** -0.795*** -0.749*** -0.767*** -0.786*** -0.803*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Leverage 1.087*** 1.079*** 0.985*** 0.971*** 1.126*** 1.106*** 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.090) (0.091) (0.097) (0.098) 
Tan -0.548*** -0.570*** -0.097 -0.116 -0.572*** -0.590*** 
 (0.073) (0.075) (0.072) (0.073) (0.076) (0.077) 
Growth 0.035* 0.048** 0.035* 0.047** 0.034* 0.047** 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Capex 1.785*** 1.887*** 2.000*** 2.099*** 1.791*** 1.883*** 
 (0.225) (0.229) (0.219) (0.223) (0.233) (0.237) 
BS 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Independent  1.954*** 2.019*** 1.884*** 1.942*** 2.076*** 2.129*** 
 (0.235) (0.240) (0.232) (0.236) (0.244) (0.247) 




YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 15.862*** 16.292*** 14.935*** 15.338*** 16.005*** 16.387*** 
 (0.308) (0.314) (0.304) (0.308) (0.321) (0.324) 
       
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.423 0.423 0.409 0.410 0.414 0.415 





Table 2.7.2(2) The relationship between academic ratio and tq1,2,3,4,5,6(FIXED 
EFFECT) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
AID Ratio represents the percent of  academic independent directors on board. FS indicates nature log of  firm size 
which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities 
to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates 
sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure 
defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total 
number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model 
       
AID Ratio -0.033 -0.030 -0.034 -0.030 -0.031 -0.028 
 (0.099) (0.100) (0.098) (0.099) (0.101) (0.102) 
FS -1.324*** -1.348*** -1.289*** -1.309*** -1.360*** -1.378*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
Leverage 1.047*** 1.019*** 0.941*** 0.909*** 1.072*** 1.034*** 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) 
Tan -0.577*** -0.580*** -0.162* -0.161* -0.596*** -0.595*** 
 (0.086) (0.087) (0.085) (0.086) (0.088) (0.089) 
Growth 0.055*** 0.065*** 0.052*** 0.062*** 0.055*** 0.066*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.340*** 2.427*** 2.598*** 2.683*** 2.410*** 2.486*** 
 (0.209) (0.212) (0.207) (0.210) (0.215) (0.217) 
BS 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Independent  0.952*** 0.949*** 0.952*** 0.946*** 0.987*** 0.980*** 
 (0.226) (0.230) (0.224) (0.227) (0.233) (0.235) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 28.146*** 28.706*** 26.908*** 27.406*** 28.895*** 29.343*** 
 (0.355) (0.360) (0.352) (0.356) (0.365) (0.369) 
       
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared 0.455 0.451 0.450 0.447 0.451 0.449 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 





2.7.3. Alternative method addressing time-constant omitted variable.  
I also use the random effect to run regression to check the robustness of  the main results. Results 
in Table 2.7.3(1)-2.7.3(7) show the similar results to previous results, which indicates that the results 






Table 2.7.3(1)：The relationship between the presence of  AIDs and firm performance 
(RE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_AID is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one academic independent director, and 
zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which 
is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio 
of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-
on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS 
indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio 
of  independent director sitting in board. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model 
       
DUM_AID  -0.039 -0.039 -0.044* -0.044* -0.040 -0.040 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
FS -1.032*** -1.060*** -0.998*** -1.024*** -1.056*** -1.081*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Leverage 1.093*** 1.064*** 0.987*** 0.953*** 1.124*** 1.084*** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) 
Tan -0.492*** -0.504*** -0.061 -0.070 -0.510*** -0.518*** 
 (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.077) (0.079) (0.080) 
Growth 0.032*** 0.043*** 0.030*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.043*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.169*** 2.280*** 2.420*** 2.529*** 2.225*** 2.326*** 
 (0.206) (0.209) (0.204) (0.206) (0.212) (0.214) 
BS 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Independent  1.441*** 1.453*** 1.420*** 1.429*** 1.503*** 1.506*** 
 (0.216) (0.219) (0.214) (0.216) (0.222) (0.224) 















       
Constant 21.335*** 21.981*** 20.208*** 20.811*** 21.784*** 22.361*** 
 (0.305) (0.312) (0.302) (0.307) (0.315) (0.320) 
       
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
Adj. R-squared ) ) ) ) ) ) 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 2.7.3(2)：The relationship between academic ratio and firm performance (RE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
AID Ratio represents the percent of  academic independent directors on board. FS indicates nature log of  firm size 
which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities 
to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates 
sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure 
defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total 
number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model 
       
AID Ratio -0.013 -0.013 -0.024 -0.023 -0.020 -0.020 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.091) (0.093) (0.095) (0.096) 
FS -1.033*** -1.061*** -0.999*** -1.025*** -1.057*** -1.082*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Leverage 1.096*** 1.067*** 0.990*** 0.957*** 1.127*** 1.087*** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) 
Tan -0.490*** -0.502*** -0.059 -0.068 -0.509*** -0.516*** 
 (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.077) (0.079) (0.080) 
Growth 0.032*** 0.043*** 0.030*** 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.043*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.170*** 2.281*** 2.421*** 2.530*** 2.226*** 2.327*** 
 (0.206) (0.209) (0.204) (0.206) (0.212) (0.214) 
BS 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Independent  1.424*** 1.436*** 1.403*** 1.411*** 1.487*** 1.490*** 
 (0.217) (0.220) (0.215) (0.218) (0.223) (0.226) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 21.339*** 21.985*** 20.213*** 20.815*** 21.789*** 22.366*** 
 (0.305) (0.312) (0.302) (0.307) (0.315) (0.320) 
       
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
Adj. R-squared ) ) ) ) ) ) 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 2.7.3(3)：The relationship between the number of  AIDs and firm performance 
(RE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
D1_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has one academic director sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. D2_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has two academic directors sitting in the board, 
and zero otherwise. D3_AD is a dummy variable, equals to one when the board has three academic directors sitting 
in the board, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage 
indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility 
which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the 
percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure 
divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. 
Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model 
       
D1_AD -0.043 -0.044 -0.049* -0.050* -0.043 -0.044 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) 
D2_AD -0.049 -0.047 -0.052* -0.050 -0.051 -0.049 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
D3_AD 0.014 0.011 0.005 0.003 0.011 0.009 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) 
FS -1.032*** -1.060*** -0.998*** -1.024*** -1.056*** -1.081*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Leverage 1.092*** 1.063*** 0.986*** 0.953*** 1.123*** 1.083*** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) 
Tan -0.492*** -0.504*** -0.061 -0.069 -0.510*** -0.518*** 
 (0.077) (0.078) (0.076) (0.077) (0.079) (0.080) 
Growth 0.032*** 0.043*** 0.030*** 0.041*** 0.032*** 0.043*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.170*** 2.281*** 2.422*** 2.531*** 2.226*** 2.327*** 
 (0.206) (0.209) (0.204) (0.206) (0.212) (0.214) 
BS 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Independent  1.405*** 1.418*** 1.386*** 1.396*** 1.467*** 1.472*** 
 (0.217) (0.220) (0.215) (0.217) (0.223) (0.225) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 21.352*** 21.997*** 20.225*** 20.828*** 21.802*** 22.378*** 
 (0.305) (0.312) (0.302) (0.307) (0.315) (0.320) 
       
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
Adj. R-squared ) ) ) ) ) ) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 2.7.3(4): The relationship between school affiliation of  AIDs and firm performance 
(RE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_985 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs from 985 group university, and 
zero otherwise. DUM_211 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs from 211 group 
university, and zero otherwise. DUM_No985/211 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one 
academic director from out of  985 and 211 groups university, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size 
which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities 
to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates 
sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure 
defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total 
number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
DUM_985 0.007   
 (0.023)   
DUM_211  -0.067***  
  (0.025)  
DUM_NO985/211   -0.028 
   (0.023) 
FS -1.033*** -1.032*** -1.032*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Leverage 1.097*** 1.094*** 1.093*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Tan -0.489*** -0.489*** -0.492*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Growth 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.170*** 2.166*** 2.169*** 
 (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) 
BS 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Independent  1.416*** 1.442*** 1.435*** 
 (0.216) (0.215) (0.216) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES 
 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES 
 
Constant 21.341*** 21.313*** 21.326*** 
 (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) 
    
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 
Adj. R-squared ) ) ) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 2.7.3(5)：The relationship between academic position and firm performance (RE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_Professor is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is professor in the board, 
and zero otherwise. DUM_AssoProf  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is ass-
professor sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_PhD Supervisor is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if  a firm has at least one AIDs is supervisor for PhD sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Researcher is 
a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is researcher sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. DUM_NAE is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AID is NAE sitting in the 
board, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates 
leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is 
defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage 
change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by 
total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. Independent 
indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model 
      
DUM_Professor -0.041*     
 (0.024)     
DUM_AssoProf  -0.037    
  (0.032)    
DUM_PhD Supervisor    0.055**   
   (0.023)   
DUM_Researcher     0.073  
    (0.046)  
DUM_NAE      0.155** 
     (0.066) 
FS -1.032*** -1.034*** -1.035*** -1.032*** -1.034*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Leverage 1.092*** 1.097*** 1.103*** 1.098*** 1.100*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Tan -0.493*** -0.490*** -0.489*** -0.488*** -0.488*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Growth 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.166*** 2.171*** 2.167*** 2.166*** 2.170*** 
 (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) 
BS 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Independent  1.446*** 1.424*** 1.389*** 1.414*** 1.411*** 
 (0.216) (0.215) (0.216) (0.215) (0.215) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 21.323*** 21.349*** 21.368*** 21.316*** 21.357*** 
 (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) 
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Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
Adj. R-squared ) ) ) ) ) 
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Table 2.7.3(6)：The relationship between administrative position of  AIDs and firm performance (RE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. DUM_PRES is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm 
has at least one AIDs is president sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_VPRESis a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is Vic president 
sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Chairman is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is chairman sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. 
DUM_Dean is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is deans sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_DOI is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs is director of  the institute sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Division is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at 
least one AIDs is division head sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. DUM_Administer is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AIDs with administered 
position sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total 
long-term liabilities to total assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage 
change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total 
number of  directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model Model Model Model 
        
DUM_PRES  0.102       
 (0.067)       
DUM_VPRES  0.007      
  (0.042)      
DUM_Chairman    0.011     
   (0.023)     
DUM_Dean     -0.009    
    (0.022)    
DUM_DOI      0.028   
     (0.039)   
DUM_Division       -0.159**  
      (0.070)  
DUM_Administer        -0.029 
       (0.022) 
FS -1.033*** -1.033*** -1.033*** -1.033*** -1.033*** -1.033*** -0.775*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.016) 
Leverage 1.098*** 1.097*** 1.096*** 1.096*** 1.096*** 1.096*** 1.084*** 
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 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.092) 
Tan -0.492*** -0.490*** -0.490*** -0.490*** -0.491*** -0.492*** -0.550*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.073) 
Growth 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.035* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019) 
Capex 2.172*** 2.169*** 2.171*** 2.169*** 2.170*** 2.167*** 1.782*** 
 (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.225) 
BS 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
Independent  1.410*** 1.419*** 1.416*** 1.425*** 1.418*** 1.424*** 1.982*** 
 (0.215) (0.215) (0.215) (0.216) (0.215) (0.215) (0.233) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 21.338*** 21.340*** 21.339*** 21.332*** 21.342*** 21.332*** 15.859*** 
 (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) (0.308) 
        
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
R-squared       0.423 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541  
Adj. R-squared ) ) ) ) ) ) 0.422 




Table 2.7.3(7): The relationship between the subject area of  AIDs and firm performance 
(RE) 
Tq01-06 indicates Tobin’s Q which is defined as the market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
DUM_EFA is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one AID come from economic, finance or 
accounting school, and zero otherwise. DUM_LAW is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at least one 
AID come from law school, and zero otherwise. DUM_SCI is a dummy variable that is equal to one if  a firm has at 
least one AID come from science school, and zero otherwise. DUM_ART is a dummy variable that is equal to one 
if  a firm has at least one AID come from arts school, and zero otherwise. FS indicates nature log of  firm size which 
is defined as total assets. Leverage indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total 
assets. Tan indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. Growth indicates sales 
growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. Capex indicates capital expenditure defined 
as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  
directors on the board. Independent indicates the ratio of  independent director sitting in board.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
DUM_EFA -0.007    
 (0.024)    
DUM_LAW  0.039   
  (0.032)   
DUM_SCI   -0.046  
   (0.029)  
DUM_ART    -0.076 
    (0.089) 
FS -1.033*** -1.033*** -1.033*** -1.033*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Leverage 1.096*** 1.097*** 1.095*** 1.095*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Tan -0.491*** -0.490*** -0.490*** -0.492*** 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Growth 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Capex 2.169*** 2.169*** 2.176*** 2.165*** 
 (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) 
BS 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Independent  1.424*** 1.407*** 1.431*** 1.424*** 
 (0.216) (0.216) (0.215) (0.215) 
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES 
 
Industry Dummy YES YES YES YES 
 
Constant 21.336*** 21.338*** 21.343*** 21.337*** 
 (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) 
     
Observations 16,815 16,815 16,815 16,815 
Number of stkcd 1,541 1,541 1,541 1,541 
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This paper investigates the corporate governance role of academic professors sitting on the board 
as independent directors. This study focuses on the relationship between AIDs and firm 
performance, particularly focusing on the impact of the presence of AIDs, the number of AIDS, 
the school of affiliation of AIDs, the academic position of AIDs, and administrative position of 
AIDs, and subject expertise of AIDs on firm performance.  
This study finds no evidence about the effect of the presence of AIDs sitting on the board on firm 
performance, no evidence about the effect of the number of AIDs sitting on the board on firm 
performance, no evidence about the effect of school affiliation of AIDs on firm performance; no 
evidence about the effect of administrative position of AIDs on firm performance; some evidence 
about the effect of academic position of AIDs on firm performance; no evidence about the effect 
of subject expertise of AIDs on firm performance. Overall, based on the sample used in this study, 
I find no evidence about the effect of AIDs on firm performance. 
To address endogeneity issue, I use the fixed effect and difference-in-difference analysis. Both 
approaches have the similar results as OLS regression analysis. In addition, I use alternative 
dependent variable, alternative independent variables, and alternative methods to do data analysis. 
The main results do not change. Overall, the results indicate that there is no effect of AIDs on 
firm performance. This result is different from the previous studies. The main reason could be 
that the institutional background of this study is different from the institutional background of 
other studies. This deserves to do further study in the future.  
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Chapter 3 MARKET REACTION TO ACADEMIC 







A big challenge happened by empirical researchers when investigating the value of  AIDs to the 
company is that directors are endogenously determined (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Raheja, 
2005; Harris and Raviv, 2006; Wintoki, Linck, Netter, 2012). For example, some firms are more 
likely to appoint AIDs sitting on the board than other firms due to uniqle demoneds for academic 
professors’ expertise, social connections or reputations (White, Woidtke, Black, and Schweitzer, 
2014). In addition, Dewally and Peck (2010) document that a significant part of  directors resigns 
from company with poor financial performance and weak boards. This suggests that appointments 
or resignations of  AIDs cannot be regarded as exogenous to firms’ needs and the market reaction 
to such appointments or resignations is not informative to evaluate the value of  AIDs. To avoid 
this concern, I need to find a “true” exogeneous shock causing the appointments or resignation 
of  AIDs.  Luckily, I find one.  
Regulation 11 was published by the Ministry of  Education of  the People’s Republic of  China on 
the 3rd of  November 2015. The aim of  this regulation was to prohibit university staff  from holding 
any directorship in Chinese listed companies. Since the issue of  Regulation 11, many university 
professors resigned their directorship from the listed companies they serve. Regulation 11 was not 
expected by the listed companies. Thus, resignations of  AIDs can be regarded as exogenous to 
firms’ needs and the market reaction to such resignations is informative on evaluating the value of  
AIDs.  
We exploit this exogeneous change to board composition-Regulation 11. I find that the market 
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responds positively to the announcement of  the departure of  independent directors. In particular, 
the abnormal return is 0.018% on the announcement date (e.g., T=0) of  departure of  independent 
directors and is also significant at 1% significance level. I also find that the CARs over various 
windows are positive and significant at 1% significance level. For example, CAR at window [-1,1] 
is 0.025% and significant at 1% significance level. These results indicate that investors do not view 
independent directors are beneficial to the firm based on the sample I used in this study.  
In addition, I investigate the market reaction to the resignation of  AIDs. I find that the market 
responds positively to the announcement of  the departure of  AIDs. In particular, the abnormal 
return is 0.004% on the announcement date (e.g., T=0) of  departure of  independent directors and 
is also significant at 10% significance level. I also find that the CARs over various windows are 
positive and significant at 1% significance level. For example, CAR at window [-1,1] is 0.008% and 
significant at 1% significance level. These results indicate that investors do not view AIDs 
beneficial to the firm based on the sample I used in this study.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present a brief literature review. 
Section 3 presents hypothesis development. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. Section 







3.2 Literature Review  
Davidson III, Xie, and Xu (JAPP2004) investigate the market reaction to the appointment of  
directors to audit committees. They find that firms respond positively when new members of  audit 
committee have expertise. The finding suggests that markets rewards firms that appoint financial 
experts to their audit committees.  
Lin, Pope, and Young (JBFA2003) investigate the market reaction to the appointment of  outside 
directors focusing on UK listed firms. It finds that the market response to the appointment of  
outside directors is more favorable when the ownership of  the board is low and the outside 
directors possess strong monitoring incentives, and the appointment of  independent and manager-
connected outside directors does not have that characteristics. 
 Defond, Hann, and Hu (JAR2005) investigate whether the market responds positively to the 
appointment of  directors with financial expertise to the audit committee. They find that there is a 
positive market response to the appointment of  accounting financial experts, but no significant 
market reaction to the non-accounting financial experts to the audit committees. It also finds that 
the positive market reaction is concentrated among firms with good corporate governance. Overall, 
these findings suggest that financial expertise on audit committees help to improve corporate 
governance. 
Huang, Hsu, Khan, and Yu (EMFT2008) investigate the market reaction to the appointment of  
outside directors. It finds that there is a positive market reaction to the appointment of  outside 
directors. Also, the market reaction is higher when firms have poor corporate governance, CEO 
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and chairman is the same person, have more free cash flows and a higher degree of  information 
asymmetry. The findings indicate that the appointment of  outside directors is more beneficial to 
firms with poor corporate governance mechanism. 
Ismail and Manaf  (JMFM2016) investigate the market reaction to the appointment of  female 
directors to the board. They find that market responds positively when the female directors are 
prominent, young and non-internationally exposed directors. Also, they find that the market 
responds negatively when the female directors have family relationship with other directors.  
Kang, Ding and Charoenwong (JBR2010) investigate the market reaction to the appointment of  
female directors sitting on the board focusing on Singaporean firms. They find that there is a 
significant positive market reaction to the appointment of  female directors sitting on the board. 
Also they find that the market responds more favorably when the female is more independent and 
less favorably when the female takes the CEO role as well. 
White, Woidtke, Black and Schweitzer (2014) investigate the appointments of  academic directors. 
This study focuses on two main questions. The first one is what factors influence the appointment 
of  an academic directors. The second one is if  investors view academic directors differently based 
on firm, board and director heterogeneities. Based on 284 academic director appointments 
available in their sample, they find that academic directors tend to be appointed by small- and mid-
cap firms. In addition, they find that the factors influencing appointments vary with the type and 
characteristics of  AIDs. In particular, firms with greater advertising needs are more likely to 
appoint AIDs with administrative role and sitting on other boards, and AIDs from non-top 25 
Universities. The market responds insignificantly to the appointment of  AIDs with administrative 
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role on average. It responds positively when AIDs have administrative role in business school, and 
it responds negatively when AIDs do not have administrative role in a business school. These 
results indicate that companies appoint AIDs with administrative role to supplement the advising 
and monitoring role of  existing directors through their business ties.  
In addition, they find that smaller firms with general business expertise needs are more likely to 
appoint AIDs with business background. The market reaction to the appointment of  AIDs with 
business background is not significant on average. The reaction is larger for lower risk firms and 
firms investing more in advertising. The reaction is smaller when AIDs with business background 
are connected with CEOs. These results indicate that companies appoint AIDs with business 
background to enhance their monitoring and advising role through their reputation and business 
expertise. In addition, they find no significant market reaction to the appointment of  academic 
directors.   
Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Lel (JF2014) investigate the market reaction to the deaths of  directors 
and CEO at interlocked firms. They find a significant negative market reaction. The results indicate 
that directors’ busyness is detrimental to board monitoring effectiveness and shareholder value. 
Nguyen and Nielsen (JFE2010) investigates the market reaction to the sudden deaths of  
independent directors focusing on US firms. They find that the market responds negatively, and 
the degree of  market reaction is determined by the degree of  independence and board structure. 
In addition, independence is more valuable in board function. The results suggest that independent 
directors are beneficial to shareholder value. 
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Overall, these previous literatures have researched the market reaction to the appointment of  
female director, appointment of  directors to audit committees and appointment of  directors with 
financial expertise to the audit committee. However, little literature investigates the market reaction 
to the resignation of  academic independent director. In addition, it is weak in controlling 
endogeneity problems from the existing literature on academic independent director. To avoid this 
concern, I need to find a “true” exogeneous shock causing the appointments or resignation of  
AIDs. Regulation 11 was published by the Ministry of  Education of  the People’s Republic of  
China on the 3rd of  November 2015. The aim of  this regulation was to prohibit university staff  
from holding any directorship in Chinese listed companies. Since the issue of  Regulation 11, many 
university professors resigned their directorship from the listed companies they serve. Regulation 
11 was not expected by the listed companies. Thus, resignations of  AIDs can be regarded as 
exogenous to firms’ needs and the market reaction to such resignations is informative on 
evaluating the value of  AIDs. I can design an event study to research the market reaction to the 
resignation of  academic director through regulation 11. Then study the value of  academic director 




3.3 Event Study Method   
The impact of  an economic event on market reaction is a popular question in financial research. 
How to measure market reaction is difficult. However, I can use event-study analysis to solve this 
problem though constructing a metric by financial market data. The usefulness come from event-
study that the impact of  an event is immediately reflected in asset price in the rationality financial 
market. Conversely, a long time of  observation might be used by other method.   
According to the duration of  the impact of  events, the event study method is usually divided into 
short-term event research and long-term event research in the literature (Brown and Warner, 1980; 
Fama, 1991). In the field of  corporate finance, the Dailey Event Study provides a good metric for 
measuring the impact of  an event on the wealth of  a company's shareholders, namely Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs). 
Three basic assumptions that the short-term event research approach relies on: First, according to 
the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), financial markets are efficient, that is, stock prices reflect 
all known public information; Secondly, the researched event is unexpected by the market, so this 
abnormal return can measure the degree of  abnormal response of  the stock price to the 
occurrence of  the event or information disclosure; Third, there is no mixed effect of  other events 
during the window of  events. 
The short-term event research method focuses on the announcement effect within a few days of  
the event's announcement date, which provides relevant evidence for investors to understand the 
company's decision on dividend distribution, mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Edmans, 2011; Deng 
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et al., 2013). 
 
The main concepts of  short-term event-study analysis are as follows: 
Event date: The date the specific event occurred (t=0). 
Event window: The time period during which the stock price involved in the event was examined 
([𝑡1, 𝑡2]), usually ([𝑡1 < 0)And(𝑡2 > 0).  
Estimation window: The estimation window is generally selected to be a period of  time before 
the event occurs, usually from 210 trading days to 11 trading days before the event. The estimation 
window and the event window must not have intersected. 
Normal Returns:  stock return this event does not occur. 
Abnormal Returns, Ars: The difference between the actual return rate of  each stock and the 
normal return rate, the abnormal return rate can reflect the economic impact of  the event. 
Cumulative abnormal returns. CARs: The simple sum of  the abnormal returns of  each stock 
in the event window. 
 
3.3.1 Models for Measuring Normal Performance 
 
 
                             T1              T2  
 
 




𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖,𝑡                 
                     E[𝜉𝑖,𝑡] = 0           𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜉𝑖,𝑡] = 𝜎𝜉𝑖
2 ,      
 130 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡, represent the period -t return on security i, 𝜉𝑖,𝑡 represent the disturbance term, 𝜎𝜉𝑖
2  
represent the (i, i) element of Ω (Edmans, 2011).  
 
3.3.1.2 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
E𝑅𝑖 = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) 
E𝑅𝑖 represent expected return of investment. 𝑅𝑓 represent the risk-free rate. 𝛽𝑖 is beta 
of the investment. (𝐸𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) equal to market risk premium (Fama, French, 2003). 
 
3.3.1.3 Market Model 
If  the market is valid, an event is unexpected, and the occurrence of  the event is related to the 
value of  certain companies in the market, then the actual returns (ARs) of  the company's stocks 
after the event are subtracted from the normal returns estimated by the statistical model The rate 
can get the abnormal return of  the stock. According to the estimation steps of  MacKinlay (1997), 
before the abnormal rate of  return estimation, the window period of  the event needs to be defined 
first. Usually, it includes the day of  the event and the days before and after the event. Then define 
the estimation window and select the estimation model to calculate the expected rate of  return. 
Taking the market model to estimate the expected rate of  return, the abnormal rate of  return (AR) 
can be expressed as: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡           
E[𝜖𝑖,𝑡] = 0            𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜖𝑖,𝑡] = 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2 , 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represent the period -t return on security i and, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represent the market portfolio, 
𝜖𝑖,𝑡  represent the zero mean disturbance term. 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖  and 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2   represent the 
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parameters of the market model. 
 
3.3.1.4 Market-adjusted-return Model 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represent the period -t return on security i and, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represent the market portfolio, 
𝜖𝑖,𝑡 represent the zero mean disturbance term. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 represent the parameters of 
the market-adjusted-return model. 
 
3.3.1.5 Fama-French Three Factor Model 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1[𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡] + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represent the total return of a stock or portfolio i at time t, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 represent the risk-
free rate of return at time t. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represent the total market portfolio return at time t. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 equal to expected excess return. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 equal to excess return on the 
market portfolio (index). 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 represent the size premium (small minus big). 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  
represent value premium (high minus low). 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖,2,3 represent the parameters of 
the Fama-French Three Factor model (Fama, 1997).      
 
3.3.1.6 Fama-French Plus Momentum 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1[𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡] + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represent the total return of a stock or portfolio i at time t, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 represent the risk-
free rate of return at time t. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represent the total market portfolio return at time t. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 equal to expected excess return. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 equal to excess return on the 
market portfolio (index). 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 represent the size premium (small minus big). 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  
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represent value premium (high minus low). 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡  is described as the tendency for a 
stock to continue moving in the direction it moved last period. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖,2,3,4 represent 
the parameters of the Fama-French Four Factor model.    
   
3.3.1.7 Fama-French Five factor Model  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1[𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡] + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡) + 𝛽5(𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡  
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represent the total return of a stock or portfolio i at time t, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 represent the risk-
free rate of return at time t. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represent the total market portfolio return at time t. 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 equal to expected excess return. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 equal to excess return on the 
market portfolio (index). 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 represent the size premium (small minus big). 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  
represent value premium (high minus low). 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡  is the profitability represent the 
robust minus weak OP. 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 is a investment factor represent the conservative minus 
aggressive inv. 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖,2,3,4 represent the parameters of the Fama-French Five Factor 
model(Fama, French 2013).      
 
3.3.1.8 Arbitrage Pricing Model (APT) 
𝑅?̃? = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽i𝛿 + ĩ 
𝐄[𝛿] = 𝟎,          𝐄[ ĩ] = 𝟎 
𝑅?̃?  represent the realized return of asset i, 𝜇𝑖  represent the unconditional expected 
return, 𝛿 represent the vector of different risk factors, 𝛽i is a vector denotes the impact 
every risk factor has on the asset return, ĩ is an error term summarizing the effects not 
covered by the model.  
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3.3.2 Measuring and Analysing Abnormal Returns 
τ represent returns in event time. τ = 0 denote the event date, τ = 𝑇1 + 1 to τ = 𝑇2 denote 
the event window, τ = 𝑇0 + 1 to τ = 𝑇1 represent the estimation window. Respectively, 𝐿1 =
𝑇1 +  𝑇0  represent the length of  the estimation window, 𝐿2 = 𝑇2 +  𝑇1  represent the event 
window. If  use the announcement to event, then 𝑇2 = 𝑇1 +  1 and 𝐿2 = 1. If  suitable, the post-
event window will be from 𝜏 = 𝑇2 +  1 and τ = 𝑇3 , its length is 𝐿3 = 𝑇3 − 𝑇2 . The figure 
shows the timing sequence. 
 
                             T1              T2  
 
 




3.3 Hypothesis Development 
3.3.1 Market Reaction to the Resignation of Independent Directors (IDs) 
Firstly, independent directors are supposed to play monitoring role in the board, i.e., independent 
directors are supposed to monitor the misbehaviour of  managers and reduce the agency cost given 
that these directors are independent. For example, Lin, Pope, and Young (2003) investigate the 
market reaction to the appointment of  outside directors focusing on UK listed firms. They find 
that the market responds positively to the appointment of  outside directors (e.g., independent 
directors) and particularly when the ownership of  the board is low, and the outside directors 
possess strong monitoring incentives. Secondly, independent directors are supposed to play 
advising role in the board. The board diversity literature argues that the more diverse board, the 
more advising role they can play because difference independent directors have different 
background including educational background and work background. Thus, these independent 
directors with different background can enhance firm value based on their expertise they can 
provide and play advising role more effectively. If  that is the case, the market should respond 
positively to the appointment of  independent directors or respond negatively to the departure of  
independent directors as independent directors can bring value to the firm.   
Alternatively, independent directors may not play monitoring role effectively if  independent 
directors are not truly independent. For example, previous literature find that some outside 
directors have close relationship with management team. They are good friends of  incumbent 
CEOs. If  that is the case, outside directors cannot play monitoring role effectively. In addition, 
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outside directors may not play advising role effectively as well. This is because that these outside 
directors may not have industry experience and they do not have relevant knowledge on relevant 
practices in industry. Thus, they cannot play advising role effectively. If  that is the case, there is no 
significant market response to the departure of  independent directors, or even negatively to the 
departure of  independent directors as independent directors are detrimental to the value of  the 
firm.  
Therefore, based on the above discussions, I propose the following hypotheses.  
H1-0: Market response positively or no response to the resignation of independent 
directors (IDs) 
H1-1: Market response negatively to the resignation of independent directors (IDs) 
I examine the market reaction to the resignation of independent directors using event study. I will 
elaborate on the methodologies in section 3.5. 
3.3.2 Market Reaction to the Resignation of Academic Independent Directors (AIDs) 
Under the institutional background of  China, the motivation for the independent directors to 
perform their duties is to avoid reputational and legal risks (Qingquan T et al., 2006; Kangtao Y et 
al., 2011). From the perspective of  reputational risk, the independent director system of  listed 
Chinese companies is mainly comprised by prominent figures in education or business fields. 
These people are usually very successful in their own areas of  focus, which means that they also 
hold relativity high social status and good reputation in their respective industry. More than 76% 
firms have at least one academic professor as non-executive director in China. The advantages 
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include the following. Firstly, firms may appoint AIDs to play monitoring role using their expertise. 
Audretsch and Stephan (1996) and Audretsch and Lehmann (2006) argue that AIDs have the 
ability to process complex issues, which would benefit firm they serve. Secondly, firms may appoint 
AIDs to perform an advisory role instead of  monitoring role. AIDs may enhance the advisory 
role of  the board through introducing a wider range of  ideas to the board (Anderson, Reeb, 
Upadhyay, Zhao, 2011). Science- and technology-based firms often appoint academic professors 
sitting on the board to remedy deficiencies in specialized knowledge. Thirdly, AIDs may contribute 
to greater coordination costs among directors. Knyazeva, Knyazeva, Raheja (2013) suggest that 
the coordination cost can outweigh the benefits of  increased director heterogeneity at high level 
of  board of  directors. Fourth, firms may appoint AIDs because of  social connections. Investors 
may value appointments of  AIDs with social ties positively if  the ties are viewed as facilitating 
recruitment of  qualified directors or improving board effectiveness. Fifthly, firms may appoint 
AIDs because of  their access to networks. AID networks may assist firms in facilitating access to 
external resources, such as bank loans (Guner, Malmendier, and Tate, 2008), social networks 
(Lynall, Golden, and Hillman, 2003) or knowledge transfer (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996). 
Appointing AIDs may provide firms with additional networking opportunities in attracting talent 
or access university resources. Finally, AIDs from prestigious universities may be viewed as 
enhancing firm’s reputation or as a signal of  firm quality (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996). 
Appointing AIDs from a prestigious institution can be perceived as a way restoring a firm’s 
integrity and credibility. Overall, these arguments suggest that the market should respond positively 
when academic professors are appointed as independent directors or respond negatively when 
AIDs resign as independent directors.  
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However, firstly, investors may not value AIDs as effective monitors if  AIDs are perceived as 
lacking industry experience or being less familiar with current business practices. Secondly, 
investors may view AIDs as being less qualified advisors or experts than executives or inside 
directors. Thirdly, potential advisory benefits from diverse perspectives are lower for independent 
directors (Liu, Wei, Xie, 2014). Fourth, investors may value appointments of  AIDs with social ties 
negatively if  the ties are viewed as decreasing the likelihood of  board dissent (Hwang and Kim, 
2009). Fifthly, investors may view socially connected AIDs to be less independent if  firms are 
more likely to contribute to their universities. Finally, investors may not view university reputation 
as an adequate certification as a qualified director. Overall, there discussions suggest that there is 
no significant market reaction to the resignation of  AIDs or even positive market reaction to the 
resignation of  AIDs.   
Therefore, based on the above discussion, I propose the following hypotheses.  
H2-0: Market response positively to the resignation of academic independent directors 
(AIDs) 
H2-1: Market response negatively to the resignation of academic independent directors 
(AIDs) 
I examine the market reaction to the resignation of academic independent directors using event 
study. I will elaborate on the methodologies in section 3.5. 
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3.4 Data and Methodology 
3.4.1 Data Sources  
I create an academic director database based on information from CSMAR. The total number of  
observation left is 3,923. Finally, I only focus on academic directors rather than member of  
supervisory board and senior management team. The total number of  observations left is 3,815.   
The data used in this study includes ownership structure, corporate governance, firm 
characteristics and financial data. The main data source comes from the CSMAR financial database 
developed by the Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co.  
The source of  the data, the information about the name of  the university ranking is from Ministry 
of  Education of  the People’s Republic of  China. The announcement of  the resignation of  the 
independent director came from Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange. 
3.4.2 Sample Construction 
The data in this article includes all the resignation announcements from the independent directors 
who sitting in the main board listed companies in China from 2005 to 2019. 
During the manual collection process, I restricted the resignation announcements to only come 
from independent directors on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In 
this way, the resignation information of  independent directors with main control variables is 
obtained. 
 139 
Figure 1: ID Resignations 
 
 
Figure 2: AID Resignations 
 
3.4.3 Methodology 
We use the standard Event Study approach to investigate the market reaction to the resignation of  
AID in China. Based on market model and Fama-French three factor model, I calculate the 
expected return. Based on expected return I calculated, I calculate the abnormal return and 
cumulative abnormal return over event window.  
3.3.3.1 Market Model 
Taking the market model to estimate the expected rate of  return, the abnormal rate of  return (AR) 
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can be expressed as: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                    
E[𝜖𝑖,𝑡] = 0            𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝜖𝑖,𝑡] = 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2 , 
             Model 3 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represent the period -t return on security i and, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represent the market portfolio, 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
represent the zero mean disturbance term. 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖  and 𝜎𝜖𝑖
2  represent the parameters of  the 
market model. 
 
3.4.3.2 Fama-French Three Factor Model 
                 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1[𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡] + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡                
                  Model 4 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 represent the total return of  a stock or portfolio i at time t, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 represent the risk-free rate 
of  return at time t. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 represent the total market portfolio return at time t. 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 equal 
to expected excess return. 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 equal to excess return on the market portfolio (index). 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  represent the size premium (small minus big). 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  represent value premium (high 







3.5 Empirical Results 
3.5.1 Market Model 
3.5.1.1 Market Reaction to the Resignation of  Independent Directors (IDs) 
In this section, I investigate the market reaction to the resignation of  independent directors. I use 
the market model to calculate the expected return and subtract from realized return to calculate 
the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return as well. The results are reported in Table 
3.1.1.1(1).  
Table 3.1.1.1(1) shows that the market responds positively on the date when independent directors 
resign. In particular, the abnormal return is 0.018% on the announcement date and is also 
significant at 1% significance level. Also, the abnormal return is positive and significant on the date 
one day before the announcement date, which indicates that there might be some information 
leakage before the event date. For the rest of  days around the announcement date, there is no 
significant market reaction to the announcement of  independent directors’ resignation except on 
date T=2 and T=10.  
Furthermore, I calculate various CARs over different windows. I find that all CARs are positive 
significant at 1% significance level. For example, CAR at window [-1,1] is 0.025% and significant 
at 1% significance level. CAR at window [-2,2] is 0.026% and also significant at 1% significance 
level. CAR at window [-20,20] is 0.029% and significant at 1% significance level. Figure 3 and 4 
also show that the market responds positively on the date when independent directors resign. All 
these results on abnormal returns and on cumulative abnormal returns show that the market 
responds positively when independent directors resign their post as directors. These results 
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indicate that independent directors do not bring value to the firm and the departure of  
independent directors from a firm is viewed as good news to the investors. These results are 






Table 3.1.1.1(1): Abnormal Return (AR) on Resignation of  Independent Director (ID) 
This table presents the results on abnormal return about the resignation of  independent directors from T=-5 to T=20. T=0 represents the event date and the model used 
to calculate the expected return is market model. The number of  events is 1761.    
 T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 
_cons 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 0.001 0.003*** 0.018** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.23) (-1.67) (0.84) (0.89) (3.42) (2.09) (0.35) (2.83) (1.00) (-0.37) (1.53) (-0.44) (-1.64) (0.02) (0.71) (2.95) (-0.02) (-0.01) 






Table 5.1.1.1(2): Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) on Resignation of  Independent Director (ID) 
This table presents the results on cumulative abnormal return about the resignation of  independent directors from T=-5 to T=20. T=0 represents the event date and the 
model used to calculate the expected return is market model. The number of  events is 1761.    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-4,4] [-5,5] [-10,10] [-15,15] [-20,20] 
_cons 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 
 (2.64) (2.74) (2.82) (2.74) (2.74) (2.73) (2.75) (2.82) 
N 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761 
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3.5.1.2 Market Reaction to the Resignation of  Academic Independent Directors (AIDs) 
In this section, I investigate the market reaction to the resignation of  AIDs. I use the market model 
to calculate the expected return and subtract from realized return to calculate the abnormal return 
and cumulative abnormal return as well. The results are reported in Table 3.5.1.2(1) and (2).  
Table 3.5.1.2(1) shows that the market responds positively on the date when AIDs resign. In 
particular, the abnormal return is 0.004% on the announcement date and is also significant at 10% 
significance level. Also, the abnormal return is positive and significant on the date one day before 
the announcement date, which indicates that there might be some information leakage before the 
event date. For the rest of  days around the announcement date, there is no significant market 
reaction to the announcement of  AIDs’ resignation except on date T=4 and T=10.  
Furthermore, I calculate various CARs over different windows. I find that all CARs are positive 
significant at 1% significance level. For example, CAR at window [-1,1] is 0.008% and significant 
at 1% significance level. CAR at window [-2,2] is 0.008% and also significant at 5% significance 
level. CAR at window [-15,15] is 0.010% and significant at 10% significance level, which the 
significance is slightly weaker relative to the window at [-1, 1] and [-2,2].  
Figure 5 and 6 also show that the market responds positively on the date when AIDs resign. All 
these results on abnormal returns and on cumulative abnormal returns show that the market 
responds positively when AIDs resign their post as directors. These results indicate that AIDs do 
not bring value to the firm and the departure of  AIDs from a firm is viewed as good news to the 






Table 3.5.1.2(1) : Abnormal Return (AR) on Resignation of  Academic Independent Director (AIDs) 
This table presents the results on abnormal return about the resignation of  independent directors from T=-5 to T=20. T=0 represents the event date and the model used 
to calculate the expected return is market model. The number of  events is 743.    
 T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 
_cons 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.003** 0.004* -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.61) (-0.59) (-0.04) (-0.60) (2.37) (1.71) (-0.49) (1.35) (0.94) (-2.16) (-0.44) (-0.92) (-0.90) (0.24) (1.51) (2.22) (-0.27) (-0.13) 




Table 3.5.1.2(2): Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) on Resignation of  Academic Independent Director (AIDs) 
This table presents the results on cumulative abnormal return about the resignation of  independent directors from T=-5 to T=20. T=0 represents the event date and the 
model used to calculate the expected return is market model. The number of  events is 743.    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-4,4] [-5,5] [-10,10] [-15,15] [-20,20] 
_cons 0.008*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008* 0.010** 0.010* 0.008 
 (2.76) (2.49) (2.40) (1.99) (1.93) (2.03) (1.81) (1.27) 











Figure 6: Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) on Resignation of  Academic 




3.5.2 Fama-French Three Factor Model 
3.5.2.1 Market Reaction to the Resignation of  Independent Directors (IDs) 
In this section, I investigate the market reaction to the resignation of  independent directors. I use 
the Fama-French three factor model to calculate the expected return and subtract from realized 
return to calculate the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return as well. The results are 
reported in Table 3.5.2.1(1) and (2).  
Table 3.5.2.1(1) shows that the market responds positively on the date when independent directors 
resign. In particular, the abnormal return is 0.017% on the announcement date (i.e., T=0) and is 
also significant at 1% significance level. Also, the abnormal return is positive and significant on 
the date one day before the announcement date, which indicates that there might be some 
information leakage before the event date. For the rest of  days around the announcement date, 
there is no significant market reaction to the announcement of  independent directors’ resignation 
except on date T=2 and T=10.  
Furthermore, I calculate various CARs over different windows. I find that all CARs are positive 
significant at 1% significance level. For example, CAR at window [-1,1] is 0.025% and significant 
at 1% significance level. CAR at window [-2,2] is 0.025% and also significant at 1% significance 
level. CAR at window [-20,20] is 0.024% and significant at 1% significance level. Figure 7 and 8 
also show that the market responds positively on the date when independent directors resign. All 
these results on abnormal returns and on cumulative abnormal returns show that the market 
responds positively when independent directors resign their post as directors. These results 
indicate that independent directors do not bring value to the firm and the departure of  
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independent directors from a firm is viewed as good news to the investors. These results are 
consistent with H1-1 and against the H1-0.  
Overall, these results are similar to the results when using market model to calculate the expected 




Table 3.5.2.1(1): Abnormal Return (AR) on Resignation of  Independent Director (ID) 
This table presents the results on abnormal return about the resignation of  independent directors from T=-5 to T=20. T=0 represents the event date and the model used 
to calculate the expected return is Fama-French three factor model. The number of  events is 1761.    
 T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 
_cons -0.000 -0.001** 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.017** -0.000 0.002** 0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 0.002** -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.06) (-2.16) (0.23) (0.30) (2.87) (2.04) (-0.30) (2.06) (0.38) (-0.41) (1.26) (-0.98) (-1.69) (-0.42) (-0.24) (2.31) (-0.19) (-0.38) 
N 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761 1761 1762 1762 1762 1762 1762 1761 1761 1761 
 
 
Table 3.5.2.1(2): Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) on Resignation of  Independent Director (ID) 
This table presents the results on cumulative abnormal return about the resignation of  independent directors from T=-5 to T=20. T=0 represents the event date and the 
model used to calculate the expected return is Fama-French three factor model. The number of  events is 1761.    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-4,4] [-5,5] [-10,10] [-15,15] [-20,20] 
_cons 0.025** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.024** 0.024** 
 (2.54) (2.60) (2.63) (2.53) (2.51) (2.44) (2.32) (2.24) 





















3.5.2.2 Market Reaction to the Resignation of  Academic Independent Directors (AIDs) 
In this section, I investigate the market reaction to the resignation of  AIDs. I use the Fama-French 
three factor model to calculate the expected return and subtract from realized return to calculate 
the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return as well. The results are reported in Table 
3.5.2.2(1) and (2).  
Table 3.5.2.2(1) shows that the market responds positively on the date one day before AIDs resign. 
In particular, the abnormal return is 0.003% on the date of  T=-1 and is also significant at 5% 
significance level. This indicates that there might be some information leakage before the event 
date. For the rest of  days around the announcement date, abnormal returns are significant only on 
data T=9 and T=10. Overall, the results show that the market response positively when AIDs 
resign as independent directors.  
Furthermore, I calculate various CARs over different windows. I find that almost all CARs are 
positive significant at 5% or 10% significance level. For example, CAR at window [-1,1] is 0.007% 
and significant at 5% significance level. CAR at window [-2,2] is 0.007% and also significant at 5% 
significance level. CAR at window [-10,10] is 0.008% and significant at 10% significance level, in 
which the significance is slightly weaker relative to the window at [-1, 1] and [-2,2].  
Figure 9 and 10 also show that the market responds positively on the date around AIDs resign. All 
these results on abnormal returns and on cumulative abnormal returns show that the market 
responds positively when AIDs resign their post as independent directors. These results indicate 
that AIDs do not bring value to the firm and the departure of  AIDs from a firm is viewed as good 
news to the investors. These results are consistent with H2-1 and against the H2-0.  
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Overall, these results are similar to the results when using market model to calculate the expected 




Table 3.5.2.2(1) : Abnormal Return (AR) on Resignation of  Academic Independent Director (AIDs) 
This table presents the results on abnormal return about the resignation of  AIDs from T=-5 to T=20. T=0 represents the event date and the model used to calculate the 
expected return is Fama-French three factors. The number of  events is 743. 
 T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= T= 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 
_cons -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.003** 0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002* 0.002* -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.04) (-0.77) (-0.27) (-1.12) (1.98) (1.50) (-0.64) (1.27) (0.37) (-1.67) (-0.02) (-1.01) (-0.63) (0.38) (1.67) (1.85) (-0.63) (-0.05) 






Table 3.5.2.2(2): Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) on Resignation of  Academic Independent Director (AIDs) 
This table presents the results on cumulative abnormal return about the resignation of  AIDs T=-5 to T=20. T=0 represents the event date and the model used to calculate 
the expected return is Fama-French three factor model. The number of  events is 743. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-4,4] [-5,5] [-10,10] [-15,15] [-20,20] 
_cons 0.007** 0.007** 0.007** 0.006* 0.006 0.008* 0.007 0.003 
 (2.50) (2.15) (2.03) (1.66) (1.50) (1.66) (1.25) (0.50) 
N 743 743 743 743 743 743 743 743 
r2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 










Figure 10: CAR AID 
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusion  
This chapter investigates the market reaction to the resignation of  independent directors and AIDs. 
The market will respond negatively if  independent directors are beneficial to the firm and can 
bring value to the firm. Alternatively, the market will respond positively if  independent directors 
are detrimental to the firm value. Same discussion applies to the resignation of  AIDs. 
Based on the sample I used in this study, I find that the market responds positively to the 
announcement of  the departure of  independent directors. In particular, the abnormal return is 
0.018% on the announcement date (e.g., T=0) of  departure of  independent directors and is also 
significant at 1% significance level. I also find that the CARs over various windows are positive 
and significant at 1% significance level. CAR at window [-1,1] is 0.025% and significant at 1% 
significance level. Similar results exist about the market reaction to the resignation of  AIDs.  
The results about the market reaction to the resignation of  independent directors and AIDs 
suggest that investors do not view independent directors (and AIDs) beneficial to the firm. These 
results are not consistent with the previous studies (e.g., White, Woidtke, Black and Schweitzer, 
2014). There are several possible reasons why the findings based on this study are different from 
previous studies. Firstly, given that the sample used in this study focuses on Chinese listed firms, 
the institutional background of  Chinese listed firms is different from firms in other countries. For 
example, the ownership structure in Chinese listed firms are concentrated and particularly 
concentrated in large shareholders, i.e., controlling shareholders. Thus, it is not supervised that 
many firms in China are controlled by controlling shareholders, including the appointment of  
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independent directors. If  that is the case, the monitoring role played by independent directors will 
be reduced and limited as independent directors are not independent at all, i.e., the independent 
directors are closely associated with controlling shareholders and they cannot monitor the behavior 
of  controlling shareholders (By the way, the main agency problem in firms with concentrated 
ownership structure is not the conflict between managers and outside investors, it is the conflict 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders). Furthermore, independent directors 
might represent the interest of  controlling shareholders instead of  minority shareholders. They 
may ignore the misbehavior of  controlling shareholders when controlling shareholders act in their 
interest at the expense of  minority shareholders, which mean that independent directors cannot 
play monitoring role effectively. Thus, investors would view the departure of  independent directors 
(and AIDs) as good news and accordingly the market respond positively.  
Secondly, the independent directors might not possess the relevant knowledge on business 
practices, particularly for academic independent directors. These directors are viewed as “vase 
directors”-they are beautiful, but not intelligent. They do not have relevant skills and expertise to 
be qualified independent directors. These directors are sitting on the board and just tick the box, 
particularly that these directors receive decent compensation from the firms they serve as 
independent directors. As an English proverb says, “gifts blind the eyes of  the wise”. This might 
be the case in Chinese listed firms.  




















Many studies investigate the impact of female directors on firm performance. However, their findings are mixed. 
For example, Carter, Simkings, and Simpson (2003) and Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) find that the 
percentage of female directors has positive impact on firm performance. Levi, Li, Zhang (2014) find that female 
directors are beneficial in creating shareholder value through reducing bid premium. Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) find 
a positive association between female directors and firm performance. On the contrary, Ahern and Dittmar (2012), 
Bohren and Staubo (2014) document that imposing the quota of 40% female directors sitting on the board is 
detrimental to the firm value. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find a positive association between female directors and 
corporate governance, such as attending board meeting and playing monitoring role. However, they did not find 
evidence about the positive association between female directors and firm performance. Triana, Miller, and 
Trzebiatowski (2013) show that board gender diversity is a double-edged sword as it depends on the firm 
performance and the power of female directors.   
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the corporate governance role of female directors. To achieve this aim, 
this chapter focuses on these research questions. Firstly, what is the relationship between the presence of female 
directors and firm performance? Secondly, what is the relationship between the number and the percentage of 
female directors and firm performance? Thirdly, what is the relationship between the presence of female 
independent directors and firm performance? Fourthly, what is the relationship between the number and the 
percentage f female independent directors and firm performance.  
To address these research questions, this study focuses on Chinese listed companies as in China, many listed 
companies have female directors or female independent directors. This study finds the following results. Firstly, 
the OLS estimation results about the relationship between female director and firm performance show that there 
is no relationship between the existence of female directors and firm performance. However, there is a significant 
positive association between the number of female directors and firm performance and there is a significant 
positive association between the percentage of female directors and firm performance. The OLS estimation results 
about the relationship between female independent directors and firm performance show that there is a significant 
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positive association between the existence of female independent directors, the number of female independent 
directors, and percentage of female independent directors and firm performance.  
We use the fixed effect estimation and system GMM approach to address the endogeneity issue. The fixed effect 
estimation results show that there is no association between the presence of female directors, the number of 
female directors, the percentage of female directors and firm performance. There is a significant positive 
association between female independent directors, the number of female independent directors, the percentage 
of female independent directors and firm performance. However, the system GMM results show that there is no 
association between the presence of female (independent) directors, the number of female (independent) directors, 
the percentage of female (independent) directors and firm performance.   
These findings indicate that different model specifications lead to different results. Given that OLS estimation 
results do not consider the endogeneity issue, the results are relatively weak. The fixed effect estimation results 
assume that there is a time-constant omitted variable bias, which is still a strong assumption. The system GMM 
results might be more reliable considering the dynamic characteristics of model, which means that the current 
firm performance is related to past firm performance. In general, 2SLS is used to solve problems with the identified 
endogenous variable. When it’s not sure whether there is an endogenous variable, and yet a potential endogenous 
problem needs to be solved, system GMM can be applied instead. If some variables in the model are endogenous 
ones, the regression results of the ordinary panel would be biased. The dynamic panel method can eliminate the 
endogenous bias of the model and arrive at more effective estimation results. 
In fact, all dynamic panels contain endogenous problems in them. In the dynamic panel data model, since the 
economic growth (1-phase lag) was used as the explanatory variable, this can lead to a correlation between dynamic 
terms and random disturbance terms, resulting in endogeneity. In addition, the introduction of economic growth 
lag into the model would lead to a correlation between unobserved individual effects from factors affecting 
economic growth and the explanatory variable, which would also result in endogeneity and mitigate the setting 
bias of the econometric model. Therefore, all dynamic panels and problems that can be transformed into dynamic 
panel problems are suitable for applying system GMM.  
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In addition, this chapter also investigates the market reaction to the resignation of female (independent) directors. 
This study uses both market model, Fama-French three factor, Fama-French five factor model to calculate the 
expected return and in return calculate the abnormal return and cumulative abnormal return. Both results show 
that there is no market reaction to the resignation of female (independent) directors. These results are consistent 
with the regression analysis results.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present a brief literature review. In section 3, 
hypothesis development is presented. Section 4 describes the data and methodology. Section 5 presents our core 
empirical results. Endogeneity check is presented in Section 6. Further check on market reaction to the resignation 
of female (independent) directors is showed in section 7. Section 8 is the robustness check. Finally, discussion and 
conclusion are showed in Section 9. 
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4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Literature Review for Gender of Board 
Adams. R. B, Ferreira. D (2009) investigate investigates whether gender diversity has impact on board room input, 
such as committee assignments and attendance, and whether the women directors sitting in board will affect the 
measures of  company governance, such as compensation and turnover of  CEO, and whether the gender diversity 
has an impact on firm performance. This paper finds gender diversity on board have important effect for board 
inputs-attendance behavior. They find that female directors are less likely to have attendance problems. When the 
proportion of  female directors sitting in the board is growing, the attendance of  male directors will be better than 
before. In addition, female directors are more likely to serve on the monitoring related committees than male 
directors, such as audit committee. Female directors have a significant impact on corporate governance. Gender-
diversified boards are more likely to hold CEOs accountable for poor stock performance. Also, it has a significant 
impact on CEO turnover. But there is no statistical relationship between gender-diversification and CEO 
compensation. Furthermore, because female directors have under-represented in the remuneration committee, it 
is less involved in participation in the decision of  CEO compensation. This article finds that gender diversity of  
board is good for firms having weak shareholder rights. It will increase the company's value due to the additional 
monitors from gender diverse board. Regarding to firms with strong shareholder rights, gender diversity board 
has negative impact on company, such as making decisions on mergers and acquisitions. There are two potential 
endogeneity problems for relevant studies in this area. One of  them comes from the unobservable features in 
different companies and the other one is the endogenous problem due to the reverse causal relationship. This 
article solves these problems.  This is the first paper studying the effect of  gender diversity on board input, 
corporate governance, and firm performance; This paper provides evidence about effect of  gender diversity in 
the governance of  the board of  directors. This article also provides some evidence against the tokenism of  female 
directors. 
Liu. Y, Wei. Z. B, Xie. F. X (2014) investigates the relationship between female directors and firm performance. 
By focusing on Chinese listed companies, they find that female directors have significant influence on ROA and 
ROE. In particularly, executive directors with female gender have larger impact on firm performance compared 
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to independent directors with female gender. In addition, boards including three or more female directors have 
larger influence on firm performance compared to boards including one or two female directors. Thirdly, this 
study finds that female directors only play roles in legal person-controlled companies, play no roles in state-
controlled companies. Overall, female directors have significant impact on firm value in publicly traded companies 
in China. 
Sila. V, Gonzalez. A, and Hagendorff. J (2016) investigate the effect of  gender diversity to company risk. This 
study examines the relationship between boardroom gender diversity and firm risk. To address endogeneity issues 
coming from unobservable factors and reverse causality, this study uses a dynamic panel system GMM estimator 
to estimate the dynamic relationship between boardroom gender diversity and firm risk. They find no significant 
association between boardroom gender diversity and firm risk. They also use difference-in-difference methods, 
and various risk measures, their results are still the same. They contribute the existing literature by extending 
relevant studies to non-financial companies. In addition, by focusing on firm risk, this study contributes the 
literature by presenting that firm risk is not a channel through which gender diversity have impact on firm value.  
Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) investigate the relationship between board gender diversity and informativeness of  
stock prices. It finds that stock prices of  firms with gender-diverse boards reflect more firm-specific information. 
In addition, the relationship is stronger for firms with weak corporate governance which indicates that gender-
diverse boards could act as a substitute mechanism for corporate governance. Finally, board gender diversity 
improves stock price informativeness through the mechanism of  increased public disclosure in large firms and by 
encouraging private information collection in small firms.  
Adams and Funk (MS2012) find that female and male directors differ systematically in their core values and risk 
attitudes, but in ways that differ from gender differences in the general population. In addition, they find that 
female directors are more benevolent and universally concerned but less power oriented than male directors. 
Furthermore, female directors are less tradition and security oriented than their male counterparts. Overall, these 
results indicate that having a woman on the board need not lead to more risk-averse decision making 
Ahern and Dittmar (QJE2012) find a large negative impact of  the mandated board changes on firm value. Event 
study results show that on the days around the announcement, it finds that the average industry-adjusted stock 
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return for firms with no female directors was -3.54%, relative to -0.02% for firms with at least one female director. 
IV estimation indicates that the quota caused a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q. These results indicate that 
the constraint imposed by the law had a large negative effect on firm value, which is consistent with the argument 
that the massive reorganization of  corporate boards is not benefit to a firm. In addition, it investigates how the 
quota influenced the characteristics of  the board. It finds that the new female directors are substantially different 
than the existing male directors. In particular, the new female directors had significantly less CEO experience and 
were younger, more highly educated, and more likely to employed as a nonexecutive manager, relative to retained 
male directors. In addition, it investigates the mechanism through which the board may have affected firm value. 
It finds that the quota led firms to increase in size, undertake more acquisitions, increase leverage, and reduce cash 
holdings. Finally, given that the quota leads to negative effect to firm value, it expects that some firms may avoid 
the law by becoming a private limited firm or incorporate outside of  Norway. It finds that there is a significant 
negative association between the probability of  delisting after the quota is passed and the number of  women on 
the board before the quota is passed. 
Bohren and Staubo (JCF2014) document that after the law of  gender balance mandated and passed, half  the firms 
exit to an organizational form not exposed to the law. This suggests that forced gender balance is costly. Also, 
these costs are firm specific. Furthermore, certain unexposed firms hesitate to become exposed. Overall, the 
results indicate that mandatory gender balance man produce firms with inefficient organizational forms or 
inefficient boards. 
Cumming, Leung, Rui (AMJ2015) investigate the relationship between board gender diversity and securities fraud. 
They find that board gender diversity can operate as a significant moderator for the frequency of  fraud. In addition, 
the stock market response to fraud from a more gender-diverse board is significantly less pronounced. Also, 
women are more effective in male-dominated industries in reducing both the frequency and severity of  fraud. 
Adams and Kirchmaier (AER2016P&P) document that the fraction of  women on the board is lower for firms in 
the STEM and Finance sectors than in the non-STEM sector. In addition, women are most underrepresented on 
the boards in the natural resources and mining, manufacturing, financial activities sectors. Moreover, women are 
less represented on corporate boards in STEM and Finance sector suggests that women’s underrepresentation in 
STEM sector may get worse at higher levels of  the corporate hierarchy. 
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Agarwal, Qian, Reeb, Sing (AER2016_P&P) show that the participation of  women in golf  game significantly 
increases the likelihood of  their serving on a board of  directors. In addition, they find that the likelihood increased 
by 116 percent if  a woman plays a golf  relative to a woman does not play a golf. These results suggest that 
becoming part of  the boys’ network increase a woman’s chance of  serving on the board. 
Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (JCF2016) examines the relationship between CEO gender and corporate risk-taking. 
It finds that firms run by female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of  survival 
than firms run by male CEOs. Firms transferred from male to female CEOs are associated with significant 
reductions in corporate risk-taking. In addition, the risk-avoidance behavior leads to distortion in capital allocation 
process. 
Kim and Starks (AER2016) investigates the mechanism through which board gender diversity improve firm value. 
It finds that female who are appointed as corporate directors diversify the set of  boards’ expertise more than do 
their male counterparts. In addition, female bring unique skills to corporate boards. These findings indicate that 
female directors can enhance boards’ advisory effectiveness and has the potential to increase firm value. 
Chen, Leung, Georgen (JCF2017) examine the relationship between female independent directors and dividend 
policy. They find that firms with a larger fraction of  female directors on their board have greater dividend payouts. 
In addition, board gender composition significantly increases the dividend payout only for firms with weak 
corporate governance, which indicates that female directors use dividend payout policy as a corporate governance 
mechanism.  
Evgeniou and Vermaelen (JCF2017) investigates the relationship between board gender diversity and share 
buyback. It finds that board gender diversity increases the likelihood that firms buy its shares back. However, the 
long-term excess returns are significantly smaller when there is larger female representation on the board. This 
result is consistent with the hypothesis that board gender diversity makes it more likely that firms buy back shares 
to reduce agency costs of  free cash flow. In addition, board gender diversity improves the quality of  public 
information disclosure, share buyback is less driven by marketing timing. 
Liu (JCF2018) investigates the relationship between board gender diversity and corporate environmental violations. 
It finds that firms with greater board gender diversity are less often sued for environmental infringements. In 
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addition, female CEO are significantly associated with reduced environmental litigation, but only in firms with 
low female board representation. These findings indicate a corporate governance role of  female leaders. 
Ye, Deng, Liu, Szewczyk, and Chen (JCF2019) investigate the relationship between board gender diversity and 
payout policy across many countries around the world. They find that the impact of  board gender diversity on 
dividend payout is significant positive. In addition, both the number and the proportion of  female directors sitting 
on the board affect the likelihood and the level of  dividend payouts. They also find that the effect of  board gender 
diversity on dividend payouts is smaller in good institutional environments. They also investigate the impact of  
financial crisis, national culture, family-controlled ownership, and state-controlled ownership on the relationship 
between board gender diversity and payout policy. These results imply that board gender diversity promotes 
effective corporate governance.  
Greene, Intintoli, and Kahle (JCF2020) investigate the market reaction to the first mandated board gender diversity 
quota in US- requiring public firms headquartered in California to have at least one female director by the end of  
2019 and at least two (three) female directors on five (six or more) member boards by the end of  2021. They find 
a significantly and economically negative stock market reaction to this announcement. This result indicates that 
mandated board gender diversity is a cost to a firm. 
Overall, the findings of  these previous literature are mixed. For example, some literature has found that female 
directors have a good effect on firm (Carter, Simkings, and Simpson 2003; Campbell, Minguez-Vera 2008; Levi, 
Li, Zhang 2014; Liu, Wei, and Xie 2014). On the contrary, some literature has found that female directors sitting 
on the board is detrimental to the firm (Ahern, Dittmar 2012; Bohren, Staubo 2014; Adams, Ferreira 2009; Triana, 
Miller, and Trzebiatowski 2013). In addition, many existing studies investigating the corporate governance role of 
female (independent) directors focus on developed countries, such as US, few studies focus on developing 
countries, such as China. One of literature focus in China have some problems, firstly, it uses ROA to dependent 
variables, not Tobin’s. but Tobin’s Q can better express firm performance. Secondy, the methodology of this 
paper use FE, FE with l, FE with IV, Arellano-bond. But normal use system GMM or matching firms PSM. In 
this thesis, attention will be paid to these problems. Hence, this chapter will better investigate the effect of female 
directors on firm performance.   
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4.2.2 Review Relevant Theories about Female Directors   
 
Except the theories related to independent directors (agency theory, stakeholder theory and resource dependence theory). 
Token status theory is important to female directors. Token status theory argue that female or minorities in top 
management team are regarded as “tokens” and the images of female token managers are more linked to femininity 
rather than to the qualities of leadership (Kanter, 1977; Liu, Wei and Xie, 2014). Thus, firms with only one female 
director sitting on the board as directors might not perform better.  
On the other hand, the critical mass theory argues that “one is a token, two is a presence, and three is a voice” 
(Kristie, 2011). This critical mass theory suggests that firms with more female directors perform better as more 
female directors can voice their opinions compared to firms with less female directors. Therefore, based on this 
discussion, I propose the following hypothesis.       
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4.3 Hypothesis Development 
4.3.1 The Relationship between the Presence of Female Directors (FD), Female CEO and Firm 
Performance 
Resource dependence theory argue that resources are key to organizational success. To survive, businesses depend 
on resources in their external environments and firms can connect with external entities having these resources. 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) point out that firms can benefit from external resources through advising and 
counselling, legitimacy, and communication etc. For example, female leaders, due to their different experience and 
opinion, are better equipped to connect their firms to female customers, female in the labour markets and society 
at large. Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) investigate board gender diversity focusing U.S. firms and they 
find that firms with more board gender diversity can accrue these benefits. Agency theory pointed out that to 
reduce agency cost, one approach is to enhance monitoring by the board of  directors. Empirical evidence shows 
that female directors tend to be more active in playing monitoring role. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
find that female directors have better attendance records than male directors and female directors are more likely 
to join monitoring committees. These results suggest that boards with female directors allocate more effort to 
monitoring.  
In addition, Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that the effect of  board gender diversity on corporate decisions 
depends on firm’s corporate governance quality. In particular, board gender diversity can be detrimental to firm 
value in well-governed firms due to unnecessary over-monitoring role. However, Gul, Srinidhi, and Ng (2011) argue 
that gender-diverse boards are beneficial to the firm and can remedy the weak governance of  the firm through 
having gender-diverse boards. Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) focus on Chinese listed companies and argue that over-
monitoring is less likely in China and firms with gender-diverse boards have positive effect on firm performance 
because of  the substitute effect of  gender-diverse board. Overall, based on these discussions, this chapter will 
better investigate the effect of  female directors on firm performance. I propose the following hypotheses.  
H1-0: There is no association between the presence of  female directors (FDs) and firm performance. 
H1-1: There is positive association between the presence of  female directors (FDs) and firm performance. 
As exposited in the introduction, I examine the relationship between FDs and firm performance using pooled 
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OLS regression model (Gormley and Matsa 2014). We will elaborate on the methodologies in chapter 4.5.1. 
 
4.3.2 The Relationship between the Presence of Female Independent Directors (FIDs) and Firm 
Performance 
The main tasks for independent directors are advising and monitoring. In terms of  monitoring role, female 
independent directors can play more effective role compared to male independent directors. Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) find that female directors have better attendance records than male directors and female directors are more 
likely to join monitoring committees. Particularly, female directors are more likely to join in audit, nominating, and 
corporate governance committees and are less likely to join in compensation committees.  
On the other hand, female independent directors can be just rubber stamps. That explains why people call these 
independent directors "rubber-stamps." Independent directors are supposed to play the role of  keeping large 
shareholders and top managers in check, as the owners of  the firm (e.g., controlling shareholders in China) tend 
to act in their own interest or make wrong managerial judgments. However, independent directors seem to raise 
few objections at board meetings, and they are often called as “rubber-stamps” or “vase independent directors” 
(flower vase are often used to describe ladies who are beautiful, but not intelligent or not experts in that area) in 
China. Thus, if  female independent directors are vase independent directors, they cannot play monitoring role 
effectively and therefore have no effect on firm performance. Based on these discussions, I propose the following 
hypotheses.  
H2-0: There is no association between the presence of  female independent directors (FIDs) and firm 
performance. 
H2-1: There is positive association between the presence of  female independent directors (FIDs) and 
firm performance. 
As exposited in the introduction, I examine the relationship between FIDs and firm performance using pooled 
OLS regression model (Gormley and Matsa 2014). We will elaborate on the methodologies in chapter 4.5.2. 
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4.3.3 The Relationship between the Number of Female Directors (FDs) on Firm Performance 
Token status theory argue that female or minorities in top management team are regarded as “tokens” and the 
images of female token managers are more linked to femininity rather than to the qualities of leadership (Kanter, 
1977; Liu, Wei and Xie, 2014). Thus, firms with only one female director sitting on the board as directors might 
not perform better. However, the critical mass theory argues that “one is a token, two is a presence, and three is 
a voice” (Kristie, 2011). This critical mass theory suggests that firms with more female directors perform better as 
more female directors can voice their opinions compared to firms with less female directors.  
On the other hand, may be ineffective when there is more than one female director sitting in the board. Greene 
(2020) investigate the market reaction to the first mandated board gender diversity quota in US- requiring public 
firms headquartered in California to have at least one female director by the end of  2019 and at least two (three) 
female directors on five (six or more) member boards by the end of  2021. They find a significantly and 
economically negative stock market reaction to this announcement. This result indicates that mandated board 
gender diversity is a cost to a firm. 
Therefore, based on this discussion, I propose the following hypothesis.       
 
H3-0: There is no association between the number of  female directors (FDs) and firm performance. 
H3-1: There is positive association between the number of  female directors (FDs) and firm performance. 
As exposited in the introduction, I examine the relationship between the number of FDs (the variables name is 
FD_NUM, in table 4.5.1(2)) and firm performance using pooled OLS regression model (Gormley and Matsa 2014). 
We will elaborate on the methodologies in chapter 4.5.1. 
 
 
4.3.4 The Relationship between the Number of Female Independent Directors (FIDs) on Firm 
Performance 
Similar to the above argument about the relationship between the number of female directors and firm 
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performance, because of token status theory, firms with only one female director sitting on the board as 
independent directors might not perform better. On the other hand, because of the critical mass theory, firms 
with more female independent directors perform better as more female independent directors can voice their 
opinions compared to firms with less female independent directors. Therefore, based on this discussion, I propose 
the following hypotheses.       
H4-0: There is no association between the number of  female independent directors (FIDs) and firm 
performance. 
H4-1: There is positive association between the number of  female independent directors (FIDs) and 
firm performance. 
As exposited in the introduction, I examine the relationship between the number of FDs (the variables name is 
FID_NUM, in table 4.5.2) and firm performance using pooled OLS regression model (Gormley and Matsa 2014). 






4.4 Data and Methodology 
4.4.1 Data  
The data of  this paper included board composition data, firm value and other firm characteristics data. This data 
base shows the all Chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2016. The source of  data in this paper mainly comes 
from CSMAR data base. CSMAR data base is produced by Shenzhen GTA Data Company in China. In addition, 
some data comes from both Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange website and post annual 
reports. Moreover, some data are crosschecked and manually collected from some officially designated and public 
websites, such as www.cninfo.com.cn. The original data have 33065 data that includes all listed companies on 
Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. Initiate start, I clean the original data. At first, I deleted all companies 
from growth enterprise market, small and medium enterprise board and new over-the-counter market. Because 
the regulatory is different between those companies and the companies from main-board market. In China, main-
board market has higher quality monitor than second-board market, financial data from the annually report will 
be more realistic. In addition, I use data from main-board market listed companies, received the data have 24234. 
Next, I delete all missing variables, and received the number of  firm year observations is 21921. To reduce the 
influence of  extreme values, all variables are subsequently winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Table 1 was 







Table 4.4.1 Summary Statistics of  All Variables 
This table presents summary statistics of  all variables used in this chapter. The sample period is from 1999 to 
2016 and the sample consists of  all listed firms listed on Main board in Chinese stock exchange excluding financial 
firms. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile 
values. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TQ_01 21,921 1.4912 1.4007 0.2076 9.3257 
TQ_02 21,921 1.5622 1.4318 0.2504 9.5126 
TQ_03 21,921 1.5204 1.3019 0.3978 9.0613 
TQ_04 21,921 2.0597 1.7904 0.4398 11.4594 
MTB_01 21,921 1.8438 1.4067 0.6513 9.6565 
MTB_02 21,921 1.9154 1.4429 0.6960 9.9100 
MTB_03 21,921 1.8730 1.3070 0.8558 9.3858 
MTB_04 21,921 2.4141 1.8144 0.8608 11.9779 
ROA 21,921 0.0239 0.0733 -0.3613 0.1922 
ROE 21,921 0.0463 0.2310 -1.3574 0.9245 
FD_NUM 21,921 1.2384 1.1751 0.0000 8.0000 
FD_PER 21,921 0.1143 0.1079 0.0000 0.7000 
FD_DUM 21,921 0.6934 0.4611 0.0000 1.0000 
D1_FD 21,921 0.3475 0.4762 0.0000 1.0000 
D2_FD 21,921 0.2130 0.4094 0.0000 1.0000 
D3_FD 21,921 0.1329 0.3395 0.0000 1.0000 
FID_NUM 21,921 0.4310 0.6565 0.0000 5.0000 
FID_PER 21,921 0.0394 0.0605 0.0000 0.4444 
FID_DUM 21,921 0.3494 0.4768 0.0000 1.0000 
D1_FID 21,921 0.2802 0.4491 0.0000 1.0000 
D2_FID 21,921 0.0625 0.2421 0.0000 1.0000 
D3_FID 21,921 0.0090 0.0946 0.0000 1.0000 
FCEO_DUM 17,768 0.0548 0.2275 0.0000 1.0000 
FS 21,921 8440.0000 20500.0000 173.0000 150000.0000 
LEV 21,921 0.5190 0.2273 0.0822 1.5135 
TANGI 21,921 0.2777 0.1885 0.0023 0.7781 
GROWTH 21,921 0.2203 0.7005 -0.7381 5.1940 
CAPEX 21,921 0.0517 0.0542 0.0001 0.2623 
BS 21,921 9.3039 2.0932 0.0000 19.0000 







4.4.2.1 The relationship between female directors (FDs) and firm performance (OLS) 
 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷_𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐷_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽12𝐷𝑈𝑀_𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐷𝑈𝑀_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                   
                      Model 5 
                                                                         
In this model, the dependent variable is FIRM_PERFORMANCE and is measured by Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is 
defined as market value of  total assets divided by book value of  total assets. The book value of  total assets is 
obtained from the balance sheet, while the market value of  total assets is the sum of  the market value of  total 
equity plus the market value of  total debt. However, there is either no market of  debt or no liquid market of  debt, 
hence there is no market value of  total debt. Following the previous literature about calculating Tobin’s Q, I use 
the book value of  total debt as the proxy of  market value of  the total debt. Regarding the market value of  total 
equity, given that there were/are tradable shares and non-tradable shares in listed companies in China, the market 
value of  tradable shares is equal to the product of  the market price of  tradable shares and the total number of  
tradable shares. Regarding the market value of  non-tradable shares, I use the following methods to calculate market 
value of  non-tradable shares: 1) using the 20% of  tradable shares as the proxy of  market price of  corresponding 
non-tradable shares, the corresponding Tobin’s Q is referred as TQ_01; 2) using the 30% of  tradable shares as 
the proxy of  market price of  corresponding non-tradable shares, the corresponding Tobin’s Q is referred as 
TQ_02, 3) using the net asset value per share as the proxy of  market value of  corresponding non-tradable shares, 
the corresponding Tobin’s Q is referred as TQ_03; 4) using the market price of  tradable shares as the proxy of  
market price of  corresponding non-tradable shares, the corresponding Tobin’s Q is referred as TQ_04. Using 20% 
and 30% of  tradable shares as the proxy of  market price pf  corresponding non-tradable shares are due to the 
illiquidity discount (e.g., Cai, Hillier and Wang, 2015). In addition, I also use the net asset value per share as another 
proxy due to illiquidity discount (net asset value per share can be obtained directly from balance sheet). Finally, I 
use the market price of  tradable shares as the proxy of  market price of  non-tradable shares.  
The key independent variable is FD_NUM represents the number of  Female directors on board. FD_PER 
represents the percent of  woman directors on board. FD_DUM is a dummy variable and equals one when the 
board have female director sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals 0 when the board does not have female 
director sitting in the board. FCEO_DUM is a dummy variable, the dummy variable equals one when the board 
have female CEO sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals zero when the board not have female CEO 
sitting in the board. FS indicates firm size which is defined as total assets. LEV indicates leverage which is defined 
as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. TANGI indicates tangibility which is defined as the ratio 
of  fixed assets to total assets. GROWTH indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales 
year-on-year. CAPEX indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. 
BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. IN_DIR indicates the 
number of  independent directors on the board. Thus, our regression model (1) use OLS regression, I use 𝜆𝑡 to 
control for macroeconomic yearly fluctuations. 
 
4.4.2.2 The relationship between female independent directors (FIDs) on firm performance (OLS) 
 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝐷𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝐷_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝐷_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑈𝑀_𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽12𝐷𝑈𝑀_𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                             
                                                                        
  Model 6 
In this model, the dependent variable is FIRM_PERFORMANCE and is measured by Tobin’s Q. The key 
independent variable is FID_NUM is the number of  independent female director on board. FID_PER is the 
percent of  female independence director on board. FID_DUM is a dummy variable, the dummy variables equals 
one when the board has independent female director sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals zero when 
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the board does not have independent female director sitting in the board. The control variables are some with 
before.    
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4.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, I investigate the influence of  female directors on firm performance. In particular, I investigate the 
relationship between the presence of  female directors and firm performance, the relationship between the 
presence of  female independent directors and firm performance, the relationship between the number of  female 
directors and firm performance, and the relationship between the number of  female independent directors and 
firm performance.  
Correlation matrix suggests that the multicollinearity issue is not a big problem as the correlations among 
independent variables are not very high.  
 
4.5.1 The Relationship between Female Directors (FDs) and Firm Performance 
The table 4.5.1(2) shows that the existence of  female directors has no impact on firm performance as the 
coefficient on female director is not significant. However, the coefficient on the number of  female directors is 
positive and also significant at 5% significance level. The coefficient on the percentage of  female directors is also 
positive and significant at 5% significance level. These results indicate that the number of  female directors and 
the percentage of  female directors have positive impact on firm performance. Agency theory pointed out that to 
reduce agency cost, one approach is to enhance monitoring by the board of  directors. Empirical evidence shows 
that female directors tend to be more active in playing monitoring role. For example, Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
find that female directors have better attendance records than male directors and female directors are more likely 
to join monitoring committees. These results suggest that boards with female directors allocate more effort to 
monitoring. 
In addition, I find that when CEO is a female, firm performs better. This might because female CEOs are more 
diligent and considerate. Resource dependence theory argue that resources are key to organizational success. To 
survive, businesses depend on resources in their external environments and firms can connect with external 
entities having these resources. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) point out that firms can benefit from external resources 
through advising and counselling, legitimacy, and communication etc. For example, female leaders, due to their 
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different experience and opinion, are better equipped to connect their firms to female customers, female in the 
labour markets and society at large. Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) investigate board gender diversity 
focusing U.S. firms and they find that firms with more board gender diversity can accrue these benefits. Liu, Wei, 
and Xie (2014) focus on Chinese listed companies and argue that over-monitoring is less likely in China and firms 
with gender-diverse boards have positive effect on firm performance because of  the substitute effect of  gender-
diverse board. 
The coefficients of  some control variables are consistent with the expectation. For example, small firms perform 
better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high leverage perform better because of  the 
tax shield benefits.  
However, I need to careful in interpreting the results here as the analysis did not consider the endogeneity issue. 





Table 4.5.1(1) Correlation Matrix of  All Independent Variables 
 FD_NUM FD_PER FD_DUM D1_ FD D2_ FD D3_ FD FID_NUM FID_PER FID_DUM D1_FID D2_FID D3_FID FCEO_DUM FS LEV TANGI GROWTH CAPEX BS IN_DIR 
FD_NUM 1                    
FD_PER 0.9394 1                   
FD_DUM 0.7008 0.7046 1                  
D1_ FD -0.148 -0.1103 0.4853 1                 
D2_ FD 0.3372 0.3507 0.346 -0.3796 1                
D3_ FD 0.7529 0.6888 0.2603 -0.2857 -0.2037 1               
FID_NUM 0.5959 0.5494 0.4367 -0.073 0.207 0.446 1              
FID_PER 0.5542 0.5838 0.4338 -0.0524 0.2158 0.4025 0.9577 1             
FID_DUM 0.5233 0.5039 0.4873 0.0245 0.2432 0.3344 0.8961 0.8901 1            
D1_FID 0.3152 0.3197 0.4149 0.1384 0.1994 0.1289 0.557 0.5784 0.8514 1           
D2_FID 0.3688 0.3398 0.1718 -0.1885 0.1233 0.349 0.6173 0.5873 0.3525 -0.1611 1          
D3_FID 0.2564 0.1884 0.0635 -0.0697 -0.0497 0.2439 0.3905 0.3066 0.1303 -0.0037 -0.0247 1         
FCEO_DUM 0.0187 0.0164 0.0143 0.0042 -0.0007 0.0144 0.0156 0.0134 0.0125 0.0064 0.0085 0.0117 1        
FS -0.041 -0.0784 -0.0329 -0.0024 -0.0055 -0.0346 0.0139 -0.0124 0.0138 0.0069 0.0165 -0.0071 0.0076 1       
LEV 0.0118 0.0085 0.0264 0.0103 0.0314 -0.0165 0.018 0.0173 0.0272 0.0266 0.0054 -0.0142 0.0192 0.1503 1      
TANGI -0.0579 -0.0718 -0.0566 -0.002 -0.0303 -0.0375 0.0367 0.0251 0.031 0.0162 0.0228 0.0186 -0.0333 0.0415 -0.0084 1     
GROWTH 0.0106 0.0027 0.0058 0.0048 -0.005 0.0072 0.001 -0.0027 0.0034 0.0063 -0.0075 0.0029 0.0107 0.0073 0.0174 -0.0626 1    
CAPEX -0.0532 -0.0638 -0.0446 0.0081 -0.0336 -0.0315 -0.0012 -0.0071 0.0034 0.0056 0.0002 -0.0126 -0.0363 0.0434 -0.1176 0.3095 0.033 1   
BS 0.0993 -0.0781 0.065 -0.0217 0.0372 0.0739 0.0308 -0.0725 0.0201 0.0044 0.0241 0.0237 -0.0432 0.1143 0.0114 0.1295 -0.0134 0.1116 1  
IN_DIR 0.1053 0.0147 0.1 0.0052 0.0518 0.0661 0.2506 0.1983 0.2664 0.2141 0.1117 0.0522 0.0419 0.2331 0.1155 0.0278 -0.0065 0.0305 0.3494 1 
FD_NUM represents the number of  female directors on board. FD_PER represents the percent of  woman directors on board. FD_DUM is a dummy variable and equals one when the 
board have female director sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals 0 when the board does not have female director sitting in the board. D1_ FD is a dummy variable, equals one when 
the board has one female director sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. D2_ FD is a dummy variable, equals one when the board has two female directors sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. D3_ FD is a dummy variable, equals one when the board has three female directors sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. FID_NUM is the number of  independent female 
director on board. FID_PER is the percent of  female independence director on board. FID_DUM is a dummy variable, the dummy variables equals one when the board has independent 
female director sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals zero when the board does not have independent female director sitting in the board. D1_FID is a dummy variable, equals one 
when the board has one independent female director sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. D2_FID is a dummy variable, equals one when the board has two independent female directors 
sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. D3_FID is a dummy variable, equals one when the board has three independent female directors sitting in the board, and zero otherwise. FCEO_DUM 
is a dummy variable, the dummy variable equals one when the board have female CEO sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals zero when the board not have female CEO sitting in 
the board. FS indicates firm size which is defined as total assets. LEV indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets.  TANGI indicates tangibility 
which is defined as the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. GROWTH indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage change in sales year-on-year. CAPEX indicates capital 
expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. IN_DIR indicates the 






Table 4.5.1(2): The Relationship Between the Presence of  Female Directors (FDs), Female CEO, and 
Firm Performance (OLS) 
This table presents the results of  OLS regression with industry and year fixed effect. The dependent variable is 
TQ_01. The sample period is from 1999 to 2016 and the sample consists of  all listed firms listed on Main board 
in Chinese stock exchange excluding financial firms. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. All variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.   
 (3) (1) (2) (7) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
FD_DUM 0.009    
 (0.019)    
FD_NUM  0.041***   
  (0.009)   
FD_PER   0.372***  
   (0.090)  
FCEO_DUM    0.079* 
    (0.046) 
BS -0.044*** -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.049*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
IN_DIR -0.029** -0.028** -0.028** -0.025* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) 
FS -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.462*** 0.471*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.082) 
TANGI 0.049 0.052 0.051 0.036 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.067) 
GROWTH -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 -0.031* 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
CAPEX -0.412** -0.410** -0.411** -0.495*** 
 (0.162) (0.161) (0.161) (0.189) 
DUM_YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DUM_IND Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.567*** 1.568*** 1.531*** 1.667*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.091) 
     
Observations 21,921 21,921 21,921 17,768 














4.5.2 The Relationship between Female Independent Directors (FIDs) and Firm Performance 
Table 4.5.2 shows that the coefficient on dummy variable FID_DUM is positive and significant at 1% significance 
level.  This result indicates that firms with female independent directors perform better compared to firms 
without female independent directors. This result is consistent with the finding of  Adams and Ferreira (2009) as 
they find that female directors have better attendance records than male directors and female directors are more 
likely to join monitoring committees, although they do not find a positive association between firms with female 
directors and firm performance.  
Table 4.5.2 also shows that the more female independent directors sitting on the board, the firm performs better. 
The coefficients on dummy variable FID_NUM and on dummy variable FID_PER are positive and significant at 
1% significant level. Token status theory argue that female or minorities in top management team are regarded as 
“tokens” and the images of female token managers are more linked to femininity rather than to the qualities of 
leadership (Kanter, 1977; Liu, Wei and Xie, 2014). Thus, firms with only one female director sitting on the board 
as directors might not perform better.  
On the other hand, the critical mass theory argues that “one is a token, two is a presence, and three is a voice” 
(Kristie, 2011). This critical mass theory suggests that firms with more female directors perform better as more 
female directors can voice their opinions compared to firms with less female directors. 
The coefficients of  some control variables are consistent with the expectation. For example, small firms perform 
better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high leverage perform better because of  the 
tax shield benefits.  
However, I need to careful in interpreting the results here as the analysis did not consider the endogeneity issue. 






Table 4.5.2 The Relationship Between Female Independent Directors (FID) and Firm Performance 
(OLS) 
This table presents the results of  OLS regression with industry and year fixed effect. The dependent variable is 
TQ_01. The sample period is from 1999 to 2016 and the sample consists of  all listed firms listed on Main board 
in Chinese stock exchange excluding financial firms. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. All variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.   
 (6) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
FID_DUM 0.053***   
 (0.019)   
FID_NUM  0.030**  
  (0.015)  
FID_PER   0.426*** 
   (0.164) 
BS -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.043*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
IN_DIR -0.032** -0.032** -0.031** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
FS -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV 0.461*** 0.462*** 0.462*** 
 (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
TANGI 0.042 0.042 0.041 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
GROWTH -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
CAPEX -0.419*** -0.416** -0.418*** 
 (0.161) (0.162) (0.161) 
DUM_YEAR Yes Yes Yes 
DUM_IND Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.575*** 1.574*** 1.564*** 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
    
Observations 21,921 21,921 21,921 
















4.6 Endogeneity Check 
4.6.1 Fixed Effect estimation 
We use the fixed effect estimation to address endogeneity issue coming from time-constant omitted variable. The 
models about the relationship between female directors and firm performance and the relationship between 
female independent directors and firm performance as follows.  
The Relationship Between Female Directors and Firm Performance (Fixed Effect) 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷_𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐷_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽12𝐷𝑈𝑀_𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                               
                        
                      Model 7 
In this model, the dependent variable is FIRM_PERFORMANCE and is measured by Tobin’s Q. The key 
independent variable is FD_NUM represents the number of  Female directors on board. FD_PER represents 
the percent of  woman directors on board. FD_DUM is a dummy variable and equals one when the board have 
female director sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals 0 when the board does not have female director 
sitting in the board. FCEO_DUM is a dummy variable, the dummy variable equals one when the board have 
female CEO sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals zero when the board not have female CEO sitting 
in the board. The control variables are same with before. Thus, our regression model uses Fixed effect regression. 
 
Effect of  Female Independent Directors (FID) on Firm Performance (Fixed Effect) 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝐷𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝐷_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝐷_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐷𝑈𝑀_𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 +
𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                                                                            
                                                                          
                      Model 8 
In this model, the dependent variable is FIRM_PERFORMANCE and is measured by Tobin’s Q. The key 
independent variable is FID_NUM is the number of  independent female director on board. FID_PER is the 
percent of  female independence director on board. FID_DUM is a dummy variable, the dummy variables equals 
one when the board has independent female director sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals zero when 
the board does not have independent female director sitting in the board. The control variables are same with 






Table 6.6.1.(1) shows that there is no relationship between female directors and firm performance. Firstly, the 
coefficient on dummy variable FD_DUM is not significant at 10% significance level. Secondly, the coefficients on 
variable FD_NUM and FD_PER are not significant at 10% significance level. In addition, the coefficient on 
variable FCEO_DUM is not significant at 10% significance level.  
The coefficients of  some control variables are consistent with the expectation. For example, small firms perform 
better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high leverage perform better because of  the 
tax shield benefits. Firm with more capital expenditure performance better because more investment has been 
taken and eventually this will be transformed to enhance firm performance. Firms with more tangibility assets 
perform better.  
Table 4.6.1 (2) shows that female independent directors have positive influence on firm performance. Firstly, the 
coefficient on dummy variable FID_DUM is positive and significant at 10% significance level. Secondly, the 
coefficients on variable FID_NUM and FID_PER are positive and significant at 10% significance level.  
Similar to female directors’ results, the coefficients of  some control variables are consistent with the expectation. 
For example, small firms perform better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high 
leverage perform better because of  the tax shield benefits. Firm with more capital expenditure performance better 
because more investment has been taken and eventually this will be transformed to enhance firm performance. 





Table 4.6.1(1): The Relationship Between Female Directors (FDs), Female CEO, and Firm 
Performance (Fixed Effect) 
This table presents the results of  FE regression with industry and year fixed effect. The dependent variable is 
TQ_01. The sample period is from 1999 to 2016 and the sample consists of  all listed firms listed on Main board 
in Chinese stock exchange excluding financial firms. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. All variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.   
 (3) (1) (2) (7) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
FD_DUM -0.017    
 (0.019)    
FD_NUM  0.013   
  (0.008)   
FD_PER   0.065  
   (0.091)  
FCEO_DUM    -0.013 
    (0.046) 
BS -0.024*** -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.033*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
IN_DIR 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.015 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
FS -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.511*** 0.523*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.053) 
TANGI 0.295*** 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.242*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.076) 
GROWTH -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.062*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
CAPEX 1.020*** 1.019*** 1.019*** 1.131*** 
 (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) (0.184) 
DUM_YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.047*** 1.040*** 1.035*** 1.154*** 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.086) 
     
Observations 21,921 21,921 21,921 17,768 
R-squared 0.278 0.278 0.278 0.282 
Number of  stkcd 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,550 




Table 4.6.1(2): The Relationship Between Female Independent Directors (FIDs) and Firm 
Performance (Fixed Effect) 
This table presents the results of  FE regression with industry and year fixed effect. The dependent variable is 
TQ_01. The sample period is from 1999 to 2016 and the sample consists of  all listed firms listed on Main board 
in Chinese stock exchange excluding financial firms. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. All variables 
are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.   
 (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
FID_NUM 0.026*   
 (0.014)   
FID_PER  0.430***  
  (0.151)  
FID_DUM   0.058*** 
   (0.019) 
BS -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
IN_DIR 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
FS -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV 0.512*** 0.512*** 0.512*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
TANGI 0.293*** 0.292*** 0.293*** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
GROWTH -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.053*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
CAPEX 1.019*** 1.017*** 1.016*** 
 (0.157) (0.157) (0.157) 
DUM_YEAR Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.042*** 1.035*** 1.042*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
    
Observations 21,921 21,921 21,921 
R-squared 0.279 0.279 0.279 
Number of  stkcd 1,589 1,589 1,589 





4.6.2 System GMM 
In general, 2SLS is used to solve problems with the identified endogenous variable. When it’s not sure whether 
there is an endogenous variable, and yet a potential endogenous problem needs to be solved, system GMM can 
be applied instead. If  some variables in the model are endogenous ones, the regression results of  the ordinary 
panel would be biased. The dynamic panel method can eliminate the endogenous bias of  the model and arrive at 
more effective estimation results. 
In fact, all dynamic panels contain endogenous problems in them. In the dynamic panel data model, since the 
economic growth (1-phase lag) was used as the explanatory variable, this can lead to a correlation between dynamic 
terms and random disturbance terms, resulting in endogeneity. In addition, the introduction of  economic growth 
lag into the model would lead to a correlation between unobserved individual effects from factors affecting 
economic growth and the explanatory variable, which would also result in endogeneity and mitigate the setting 
bias of  the econometric model. Therefore, all dynamic panels and problems that can be transformed into dynamic 
panel problems are suitable for applying system GMM. 
 
There are the following judgement criteria in system GMM: 
1. Over-identification, Hansen test, H0: IV is joint effective. Therefore, it should not be significant; that is, the p-
value should be no less than 0.1. If  it is significant, this means that the null hypothesis is rejected and IV is not 
jointly effective. However, if  the p-value is greater than 0.25, this means there are too many IV, and thus the effect 
of  the Hansen test is compromised. Therefore, the proper range of  p-value should be 0.1-0.25. Sargan test is also 
an over-identification test. In most cases, the Hansen test results are reported while the Sargan test results are not. 
The statistics of  the Sargan test are not robust but are highly immune to the excessive number of  IV. In contrast, 
the statistics of  the Hansen test are robust but are affected by the excessive number of  IV. 
2. Autocorrelation in errors. Generally, autocorrelation in first-differenced errors is allowed, which means that the 
p-value of  AR (1) should be less than 0.1. However, autocorrelation in second-differenced errors is not allowed, 
which means the p-value of  AR (2) should be greater than 0.1. Zhang Haiyang (2015) explained the use of  the 





                                                             𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝑘1𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑘2𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝛾𝒁𝒊𝒕 + 𝜃𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                        
 t=1999, 2000, …, 2016. 
                      Model 9 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 is FIRM_PERFORMANCE and is measured by Tobin’s Q. 𝑿𝒊𝒕 include FD_NUM represents the number 
of  Female directors on board. FD_PER represents the percent of  woman directors on board. FD_DUM is a 
dummy variable and equals one when the board have female director sitting in the board, the dummy variables 
equals 0 when the board does not have female director sitting in the board. FID_NUM is the number of  
independent female director on board. FID_PER is the percent of  female independence director on board. 
FID_DUM is a dummy variable, the dummy variables equals one when the board has independent female director 
sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals zero when the board does not have independent female director 
sitting in the board. FCEO_DUM is a dummy variable, the dummy variable equals one when the board have 
female CEO sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals zero when the board not have female CEO sitting 
in the board. 𝒁𝒊𝒕 include FS indicates firm size which is defined as total assets. LEV indicates leverage which is 
defined as the ratio of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. TANGI indicates tangibility which is defined as 
the ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. GROWTH indicates sales growth which is defined as the percentage 
change in sales year-on-year. CAPEX indicates capital expenditure defined as the total capital expenditure divided 
by total assets. BS indicates board size which is defined as the total number of  directors on the board. IN_DIR 
indicates the number of  independent directors on the board. Thus, our regression model (1) use system GMM. 
 
Table 4.6.2 (1) shows that there is no relationship between female directors and firm performance. Firstly, the 
coefficient on dummy variable FD_DUM is not significant at 10% significance level. Secondly, the coefficients on 
variable FD_NUM and FD_PER are not significant at 10% significance level. In addition, the coefficient on 
variable FCEO_DUM is significant at 10% significance level, but the sign is negative, which means that the 
presence of  female CEO is detrimental to firm performance. Table 4.6.2 (2) shows that the presence, the number, 
and the percentage of  female independent directors have no influence on firm performance as all coefficients on 
relevant variables are insignificant at 10% significant level.  
 
Regarding AR (1), AR (2), this is related to the test of  second-order serial correlation. For the valid of  system 
GMM estimates, the residual of  the first difference (i.e., AR (1)) should be correlated, but the residual of  the 
second difference (i.e., AR (2)) should be no correlated. My results are consistent with these expectations.  
 
Regarding Hansen test, it tests the over-identification. The system GMM estimator uses multiple lags as 
instruments, which means that the system is over-identified. The Hansen test yields a J-statistic which is distributed 
as χ2 under the null hypothesis of  the validity of  the instruments. This indicates that the Hansen test rest should 
not reject the null hypothesis, which is consistent with the results in the empirical study. 
Female independent directors can be just rubber stamps. That explains why people call these independent directors 
 188 
"rubber-stamps." Independent directors are supposed to play the role of  keeping large shareholders and top 
managers in check, as the owners of  the firm (e.g., controlling shareholders in China) tend to act in their own 
interest or make wrong managerial judgments. However, independent directors seem to raise few objections at 
board meetings, and they are often called as “rubber-stamps” or “vase independent directors” (flower vase are 
often used to describe ladies who are beautiful, but not intelligent or not experts in that area) in China. Thus, if  
female independent directors are vase independent directors, they cannot play monitoring role effectively and 
therefore have no effect on firm performance. 
The coefficients of  some control variables are consistent with the expectation. For example, small firms perform 
better because they have more investment opportunities. Firms with high leverage perform better because of  the 
tax shield benefits.  
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Table 4.6.2 (1) The Relationship Between Female Directors (FDs) and Firm Performance (system 
GMM) 
This table presents the results of  system GMM. The dependent variable is TQ_01. The sample period is from 
1999 to 2016 and the sample consists of  all listed firms listed on Main board in Chinese stock exchange excluding 
financial firms. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
L.TQ_01 0.468*** 0.384*** 0.386*** 0.396*** 
 (4.813) (4.911) (4.973) (4.608) 
L.TQ_02 0.393*** 0.375*** 0.372*** 0.389*** 
 (4.919) (4.876) (4.821) (4.851) 
FD_DUM -0.135**    
 (-2.032)    
FD_NUM  -0.043   
  (-1.452)   
FD_PER   -0.433  
   (-1.588)  
FCEO_DUM    0.000 
    (0.489) 
BS -0.006 -0.037* -0.043** -0.037* 
 (-0.219) (-1.849) (-2.110) (-1.700) 
IN_DIR 0.092 0.124** 0.120** 0.124** 
 (1.335) (2.265) (2.221) (2.140) 
FS -0.230** -0.375*** -0.366*** -0.342*** 
 (-2.054) (-4.788) (-4.631) (-3.941) 
LEV 0.628*** 0.429** 0.430** 0.449** 
 (2.620) (2.262) (2.284) (2.196) 
TANGI -0.389 -0.026 -0.050 -0.066 
 (-1.224) (-0.106) (-0.204) (-0.260) 
GROWTH -1.437*** -0.788*** -0.800*** -0.927*** 
 (-4.793) (-3.814) (-3.963) (-4.167) 
CAPEX 1.463 0.994 1.009 0.998 
 -0.006 -0.037* -0.043** -0.037* 
     
Constant 0.982*** 1.687*** 1.735*** 1.572*** 
 (3.003) (6.793) (6.852) (5.926) 
     
Observations 20,099 18,390 18,390 18,390 
Number of stkcd 1,516 1,454 1,454 1,454 
Ar1 -6.391 -6.859 -6.958 -6.693 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.136 
Ar2 -0.719 -1.303 -1.310 -1.492 
P-value 0.472 0.193 0.000 0.000 
Hansen 17.439 23.259 23.877 26.146 









Table 4.6.2 (2): The Relationship Between Female Independent Directors (FID) and Firm 
Performance (system GMM) 
This table presents the results of  system GMM. The dependent variable is TQ_01. The sample period is from 
1999 to 2016 and the sample consists of  all listed firms listed on Main board in Chinese stock exchange excluding 
financial firms. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
L.TQ_01 0.424*** 0.433*** 0.435*** 
 (4.587) (4.717) (4.749) 
L2.TQ_02 0.389*** 0.381*** 0.381*** 
 (4.922) (4.852) (4.845) 
FID_DUM -0.030   
 (-0.648)   
FID_NUM  0.004  
  (0.132)  
FID_PER   0.119 
   (0.319) 
BS 0.001 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.037) (0.060) (-0.035) 
IN_DIR -0.097 -0.100 -0.100 
 (-1.249) (-1.294) (-1.288) 
FS -0.434*** -0.413*** -0.403*** 
(-4.973) (-4.777) (-4.778) 
 
34 1 -0.403*** 
9 3 7 (-4.778) 
 
34 1 -0.403*** 
9 3 7 (-4.778) 
 
LEV 0.530*** 0.530*** 0.530*** 
 (3.077) (3.083) (3.074) 
TANGI -0.395 -0.408 -0.406 
 (-1.524) (-1.567) (-1.557) 
GROWTH -0.558** -0.558** -0.567** 
 (-2.032) (-2.030) (-2.034) 
CAPEX -0.585 -0.586 -0.557 
 (-0.631) (-0.631) (-0.594) 
    
Constant 1.610*** 1.623*** 1.617*** 
 (6.087) (6.270) (6.108) 
    
Observations 18,390 18,390 18,390 
Number of  stkcd 1,454 1,454 1,454 
Ar1 -6.394 -6.554 -6.572 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.134 
Ar2 -1.509 -1.498 -1.498 
P-value 0.131 0.208 0.000 
Hansen 17.486 17.972 18.099 






4.7 Further Check: Market Reaction to the Resignation of  Female 
Independent Directors (FIDs) 
I also investigate the market reaction to the resignation of  female IDs using the Regulation 18 and 
11 as an exogenous shock to board composition. If  gender matters, I expect that the market 
responds negatively to the announcement of  female IDs. 
Table 4.7.1(1) shows that there is no significant market reaction to the announcement of  
resignation of  FIDs as the abnormal return is not significant from zero on the announcement date. 
Table 4.7.1(2) also shows that there is no significant market reaction to the announcement of  
resignation of  FIDs as the cumulative abnormal return is not significant across various windows. 
Overall, the market reaction results indicate that investors do not view female independent 




4.7.1 Market Model 
 
Table 4.7.1 (1): FID (female independent director) AR results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 -0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 
_cons 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.033 0.032 0.033 0.034 0.032 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.032 0.028 
 (0.76) (0.52) (0.18) (0.19) (0.70) (1.22) (1.19) (1.25) (1.27) (1.20) (1.24) (1.20) (1.15) (1.20) (1.20) (1.22) (1.18) (1.00) 
N 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
 
 





Table 4.7.1 (2): FID (female independent director) CAR results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-4,4] [-5,5] [-10,10] [-15,15] [-20,20] 
_cons 0.031 0.032 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.034 0.038 0.033 
 (1.23) (1.24) (1.15) (1.09) (1.14) (1.29) (1.42) (1.22) 













4.8 Robustness Check 
4.8.1 Alternative Dependent Variable 
We use the ROA to replace Tobin’sQ as alternative dependent variable and re-run regression.  
The methods used is Fixed Effect analysis. The main results are shown in Table 4.8.1(1) and Table 
4.8.1(2).  
The Relationship Between Female Directors and Firm Performance (Fixed Effect) 
 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐷_𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐷_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑂_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐷𝑈𝑀_𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                   
                     
                 Model 10   
In this model, the dependent variable is FIRM_PERFORMANCE and is measured by ROA. 
The key independent variable is FD_NUM represents the number of  Female directors on board. 
FD_PER represents the percent of  woman directors on board. FD_DUM is a dummy variable 
and equals one when the board have female director sitting in the board, the dummy variables 
equals 0 when the board does not have female director sitting in the board. FCEO_DUM is a 
dummy variable, the dummy variable equals one when the board have female CEO sitting in the 
board, the dummy variables equals zero when the board not have female CEO sitting in the board. 
The control variables are same with before. Thus, our regression model uses Fixed effect 
regression. 
 
Effect of  Female Independent Directors (FID) on Firm Performance (Fixed Effect) 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝐼𝐷𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐼𝐷_𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐼𝐷_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11𝐷𝑈𝑀_𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                                                                                        
                                                                          
                 Model 11 
In this model, the dependent variable is FIRM_PERFORMANCE and is measured by ROA. 
The key independent variable is FID_NUM is the number of  independent female director on 
board. FID_PER is the percent of  female independence director on board. FID_DUM is a 
dummy variable, the dummy variables equals one when the board has independent female director 
sitting in the board, the dummy variables equals zero when the board does not have independent 
female director sitting in the board. The control variables are same with before. Thus, our 
regression model uses Fixed effect regression. 
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Table 4.8.1(1): The Relationship Between Female Directors (FD), Female CEO, and 
Firm Performance (Fixed Effect) 
This table presents the results of  FE regression. The dependent variable is ROA. The sample 
period is from 1999 to 2016 and the sample consists of  all listed firms listed on Main board in 
Chinese stock exchange excluding financial firms. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. 
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided 
in parentheses.   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model Model 
     
FD_DUM -0.000    
 (0.001)    
FD_NUM  -0.000   
  (0.000)   
FD_PER   0.005  
   (0.005)  
FCEO_DUM    0.005* 
    (0.003) 
BS -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IN_DIR 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FS 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.168*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
TANGI -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
GROWTH 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CAPEX 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.147*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
DUM_YEAR Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.117*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
     
Observations 21,921 21,921 21,921 17,768 
R-squared 0.265 0.265 0.266 0.258 
Number of stkcd 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,550 
Adj. R-squared 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.186 
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Table 4.8.1(2): The Relationship Between Female Independent Directors (FID) and Firm 
Performance (Fixed Effect) 
This table presents the results of  FE regression. The dependent variable is ROA. The sample 
period is from 1999 to 2016 and the sample consists of  all listed firms listed on Main board in 
Chinese stock exchange excluding financial firms. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix. 
All variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile values. Robust standard errors are provided 
in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Model Model Model 
    
FID_NUM 0.000   
 (0.001)   
FID_DUM  -0.001  
  (0.001)  
FID_PER   0.005 
   (0.008) 
BS -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IN_DIR 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FS 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LEV -0.169*** -0.169*** -0.169*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
TANGI -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.052*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
GROWTH 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CAPEX 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
DUM_YEAR Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Observations 21,921 21,921 21,921 
R-squared 0.265 0.266 0.265 
Number of stkcd 1,589 1,589 1,589 




4.8.2 Alternative Expected Return Model 
In this section, I use Fama-French three factor and Fama-French five factor model as alternative models to calculate the expected returns. And 
accordingly, I calculate the AR and CAR separately. The main results do not change.  
4.8.2.1 Fama-French Three Factor Model 
 
Table 4.8.2.1(1): FID (female independent director) AR results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 -0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 
_cons 0.004 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.024 0.019 
 (0.54) (0.16) (-0.14) (-0.13) (0.36) (1.08) (1.03) (1.05) (1.07) (0.99) (1.03) (0.98) (0.96) (0.99) (0.95) (0.97) (0.87) (0.68) 
N 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
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Table 4.8.2.1(2): FID (female independent director) CAR results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-4,4] [-5,5] [-10,10] [-15,15] [-20,20] 
_cons 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.025 0.027 0.031 0.035 0.029 
 (1.18) (1.18) (1.11) (1.00) (1.05) (1.19) (1.30) (1.08) 
N 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
r2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
r2_a 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 










4.8.2.2 Fama-French Five Factor Model 
 
Table 4.8.2.2(1): FID (female independent director) AR results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 -0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 20 
_cons -0.004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.004 0.021 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.020 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.010 
 (-0.42) (-0.74) (-0.95) (-0.90) (-0.43) (0.79) (0.73) (0.79) (0.79) (0.76) (0.79) (0.71) (0.69) (0.71) (0.67) (0.67) (0.50) (0.35) 
N 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
 
 






Table 4.8.2.2(2): FID (female independent director) CAR results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 [-1,1] [-2,2] [-3,3] [-4,4] [-5,5] [-10,10] [-15,15] [-20,20] 
_cons 0.029 0.030 0.028 0.025 0.027 0.030 0.030 0.021 
 (1.16) (1.17) (1.11) (0.99) (1.06) (1.15) (1.14) (0.79) 
N 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 316 
r2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
r2_a 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 





4.9 Conclusion  
This chapter investigates the impact of  female (independent) directors on firm performance. 
Different models lead to different results. OLS estimation results indicate that both female 
directors and female independent directors have impact on firm performance. Fixed effect 
estimation results indicate that female directors have no impact on firm performance, but female 
independent directors have impact on firm performance. However, system GMM results indicate 
both female directors and female independent directors have no impact on firm performance. 
Given that OLS estimation results did not consider endogeneity issue, fixed effect estimation 
results have strong assumption about the error term and independent variables. The system GMM 
results are more reliable, particularly considering the dynamic characteristics of  the model. Female 
independent directors can be just rubber stamps. That explains why people call these independent 
directors "rubber-stamps." Independent directors are supposed to play the role of  keeping large 
shareholders and top managers in check, as the owners of  the firm (e.g., controlling shareholders 
in China) tend to act in their own interest or make wrong managerial judgments. However, 
independent directors seem to raise few objections at board meetings, and they are often called as 
“rubber-stamps” or “vase independent directors” (flower vase are often used to describe ladies 
who are beautiful, but not intelligent or not experts in that area) in China. Thus, if  female 
independent directors are vase independent directors, they cannot play monitoring role effectively 
and therefore have no effect on firm performance. Overall, the main finding of  this chapter is that 




Table 4.10: Variables Explanation 
Dependent Variables   
TQ_01 Tobin’s Q is defined as market value of  total 
assets divided by book value of  total assets. 
TQ_01 using the 30% of  tradable shares as the 
proxy of  market price of  corresponding non-
tradable shares. 
TQ_02 using the 30% of  tradable shares as the proxy 
of  market price of  corresponding non-
tradable shares. 
TQ_03 using the net asset value per share as the proxy 
of  market value of  corresponding non-
tradable shares. 
TQ_04 using the market price of  tradable shares as the 
proxy of  market price of  corresponding non-
tradable shares. 
MTB represents market-to-book ratio and it is 
defined as the market value of  total equity 
divided by the book value of  total equity. 
ROA return on assets, which is defined as net 
income over total assets. 
Independent Variables  
FD_NUM represents the number of  female directors on 
board.  
FD_PER represents the percent of  woman directors on 
board. 
FD_DUM a dummy variable and equals one when the 
board have female director sitting in the board, 
the dummy variables equals 0 when the board 
does not have female director sitting in the 
board. 
FID_NUM the number of  independent female directors 
on board.  
FID_PER the percent of  female independence director 
on board. 
FID_DUM a dummy variable, the dummy variables equals 
one when the board has independent female 
director sitting in the board, the dummy 
variables equals zero when the board does not 
have independent female director sitting in the 
board. 
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FCEO_DUM a dummy variable, the dummy variable equals 
one when the board have female CEO sitting 
in the board, the dummy variables equals zero 
when the board not have female CEO sitting 
in the board. 
D1_ FD a dummy variable equals one when the board has one 
female director sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. 
D2_ FD a dummy variable, equals one when the board has two 
female directors sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. 
D3_ FD a dummy variable, equals one when the board has 
three female directors sitting in the board, and zero 
otherwise. 
D1_FID a dummy variable equals one when the board has one 
independent female director sitting in the board, and 
zero otherwise.  
D2_FID a dummy variable, equals one when the board has two 
independent female directors sitting in the board, and 
zero otherwise. 
D3_FID a dummy variable, equals one when the board has 
three independent female directors sitting in the 
board, and zero otherwise. 
Control Variables   
FS indicates firm size which is defined as total 
assets. 
LEV indicates leverage which is defined as the ratio 
of  total long-term liabilities to total assets. 
TANGI indicates tangibility which is defined as the 
ratio of  fixed assets to total assets. 
BS indicates board size which is defined as the 
total number of  directors on the board. 
IN_DIR indicates the number of  independent directors 








Chapter 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
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5.1 Introduction 
Board of directors have been studied extensively in corporate governance literature. Some 
literature discusses the role of board composition. For example, Guner, Malmendier, and Tate 
(2008) present a research on the financial outside directors. Baker and Gompers (2003) study the venture 
capital investors as directors. In addition, some other studies also discuss the CEOs as outside 
directors of other companies. Fich (2005) finds that the market response to the adding CEOs of 
well-performing firms to the board is positive. Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) show that the company's 
performance is down when the interlocking directorates joined the company. Seary, and Tuna (2005) 
present that interlock directors receive abnormally high pay. Several other papers investigate the lobar 
representation on the board, such as Faleye et al (2006). However, little literature discusses board 
composition from the perspective of academic professors sitting on the board as independent 
directors. This is one focus of this dissertation.  
In addition, the literature on the corporate governance role of female directors is still inconclusive. 
For example, Carter, Simkings, and Simpson (2003) and Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) find 
that the percentage of female directors has positive impact on firm performance. Levi, Li, Zhang 
(2014) find that female directors are beneficial in creating shareholder value through reducing bid 
premium. Liu, Wei, and Xie (2014) find a positive association between female directors and firm 
performance. On the contrary, Ahern and Dittmar (2012), Bohren and Staubo (2014) document 
that imposing the quota of 40% female directors sitting on the board is detrimental to the firm 
value. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find a positive association between female directors and 
corporate governance, such as attending board meeting and playing monitoring role. However, 
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they did not find evidence about the positive association between female directors and firm 
performance. Triana, Miller, and Trzebiatowski (2013) show that board gender diversity is a 
double-edged sword as it depends on the firm performance and the power of female directors. 
Thus, another focus of this dissertation is about corporate board composition from the perspective 
of the female (independent) directors. 
The first objective of this dissertation is to investigate the corporate governance role of academic 
independent directors (AIDs, hereafter). The second is to investigate the corporate governance 
role of female (independent) directors. 
To achieve these objectives, this dissertation focuses on the following research questions. Firstly, 
it investigates the corporate governance role of  AIDs, particularly focusing on the relationship 
between AIDs and firm performance. Secondly, it investigates the market reaction to the 
resignation of  independent directors (i.e., IDs) and academic independent directors (i.e., AIDs). 
Thirdly, it investigates the corporate governance role of  female (independent) directors, 
particularly focusing on the relationship between female (independent) directors and firm 
performance.  
In this chapter, I present a conclusion of  the main findings of  this thesis. Section 5.2 discusses 
and summarizes main research findings. 5.3 discusses the limitation of  this thesis. 5.4 explores the 
future research areas. 5.5 concludes.  
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5.2 Summary of  research findings 
Firstly, overall, this study finds no evidence about the influence of  AIDs on firm performance. 
AIDs have influence on firm performance only when AIDs hold senior academic position, such 
as PhD supervisor post. This study uses various methods to do data analysis and find the similar 
results. These results are not consistent with previous studies. The possible reasons might be: 
Firstly, academic directors might have no enough time on playing advising and monitoring role 
due to their busy work in research and teaching in universities their serve. Secondly, AIDs are 
nominated by members of  nomination committee and appointed by shareholders. The 
effectiveness of  monitoring of  AIDs is reduced and limited if  firms are controlled by controlling 
shareholders as essentially AIDs are appointed by controlling shareholders and represent the 
interest of  controlling shareholders rather than minority shareholders. This might be the case in 
this study as many Chinese listed companies are controlled by large controlling shareholders. 
Thirdly, AIDs cannot play an effective monitoring role as they receive their service fees from 
companies they serve. As the Bible says, “You shall not take gift, for gift blinds the wise, and 
perverts the words of  the righteous” (Exodus, 23:8). Overall, AIDs cannot play effective corporate 
governance role and have no impact on firm performance. 
Secondly, the market reaction to the resignation of  AIDs is positive. This result is opposite to the 
expectation if  AIDs are beneficial to the firm. This is because if  AIDs are beneficial to the firm, 
investors should view the departure of  the AIDs as bad news and the market should respond 
negatively to the resignation of  AIDs. However, this study finds the opposite results. This indicates 
that investors do not interpret this as an improvement in the corporate governance structure. The 
 209 
reason behind this could be the fact that this “resignation wave” was not driven by the spontaneous 
need of  listed companies for improving their internal governance structure. What’s more, this 
“resignation wave” was not targeted at or carried out to improve the internal governance of  listed 
companies. Rather, it is just a part of  the “prescribed actions” under the requirement of  party 
discipline. Therefore, investors expect it to do little in changing the current governance structure 
of  Chinese listed companies fundamentally. That being said, by introducing the independent 
director system into China’s corporate governance structure in 2001, China Securities Regulatory 
Commission was intended to lower the agency cost between the management personnel and small-
and-medium shareholders of  listed companies, whiling putting restrictions on the tunneling acts 
of  large shareholders with the professional third-party identity brought by independent directors, 
thereby mitigating the agency conflict in corporate governance to protect the interests of  investors, 
especially small and medium investors. Therefore, government regulatory authorities must probe 
deeper into further improving the independent director system, such as promoting the 
professionalization of  independent directors, including setting position-related thresholds, 
building an education system, establishing assessment mechanism, and building industry 
associations for independent directors. 
 
Thirdly, this study finds no evidence about the corporate governance role of  female (independent) 
directors. Female independent directors can be just rubber stamps. That explains why people call 
these independent directors "rubber-stamps." Independent directors are supposed to play the role 
of  keeping large shareholders and top managers in check, as the owners of  the firm (e.g., 
controlling shareholders in China) tend to act in their own interest or make wrong managerial 
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judgments. However, independent directors seem to raise few objections at board meetings, and 
they are often called as “rubber-stamps” or “vase independent directors” (flower vase are often 
used to describe ladies who are beautiful, but not intelligent or not experts in that area) in China. 
Thus, if  female independent directors are vase independent directors, they cannot play monitoring 
role effectively and therefore have no effect on firm performance. 
5.3 Limitations 
The first limitation (possibly the most important limitation) of  this dissertation is to how draw 
causal inference. Even though I have already tried various methods to address endogeneity issue, 
this is not perfect. I know that the best strategy to draw causal inference is to use natural 
experiment. However, given that this is social science research, it is very difficult to do natural 
experiment, if  it is not impossible. The second limitation is that some new methods were not 
attempted to use in this dissertation such as regression discontinuity design (RDD) used to address 
endogeneity issue, propensity score matching (PSM) used to find the matching group.    
5.4 Future Research Areas 
Some research topics can be used as future research areas. For example, the impact of  AIDs on 
various corporate decisions including financing decision, investment decision, payout decision, 
M&A decision etc. In addition, it is very interesting to investigate corporate governance role of  
AIDs focusing on the influence of  AIDs on earnings management, tax avoidance, CEO 
compensation etc. Similarly, it is also interesting to investigate the influence of  female (independent) 
directors on various corporate decisions and the corporate governance role of  female 
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(independent) directors.     
 
5.5 Summary   
 
The research conclusions of  this paper have important policy implications. Under the special 
condition of  highly centralized shareholding structure of  Chinese listed companies characterized 
by the dominance of  single shareholder, how to design a competent governance mechanism to 
curb the infringement of  large shareholders on small-and-medium shareholders and protect their 
interests is an important policy target for the regulating authorities of  the capital market. This 
paper examined the effectiveness of  the independent director governance mechanism of  listed 
companies in China from a brand new perspective of  the firm value, The research in this paper 
also provides new perspectives and evidences for understanding and evaluating the policy effect 
of  independent director system reform of  listed companies in China.
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